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ABSTRACT  
   
Extant evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 have focused 
primarily on its effects on the pace of innovation and on the norms and practices of 
academic research but neglected other public values. Seeking to redress this 
shortcoming, I begin by examining Bayh-Dole with respect to other relevant public 
values following the Public Value Failure approach. From that analysis, equity emerges 
as a pressing issue. I define equity issues, in a loosely Rawlsian sense, as situations of 
unfair distribution of political power and economic resources. 
My analysis identifies a business model of offices of technology transfer—
that I call “nurturing start-ups”—that is likely to become a standard of practice. This 
model can foster either firm competition or concentration in emerging industries and 
will therefore have an impact on the distribution of economic benefits from 
innovation. In addition, political influence to reform Bayh-Dole is allocated 
disproportionately in favor of those who stand to gain from this policy. For instance, 
elite universities hold a larger share of the resources and voice of the university 
system. Consequently, adjusting the nurturing start-ups model to foster competition 
and increasing cooperation among universities should lead to a more equitable 
distribution of economic benefits and political voice in technology transfer. 
Conventional policy evaluation is also responsible for the neglect of equity 
considerations in Bayh-Dole studies. Currently, "what is the policy impact?" can be 
answered far more systematically than "why the impact matters?" or "is this policy 
designed and implemented legitimately?" The problem lies with the consequentialist 
theory of value that undergirds evaluation. Hence, I propose a deontological theory 
of evaluation to reaffirm the discipline’s commitment to democratic policy making.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Research Problem. 
Before the end of his single term, President Carter signed into law the Bayh-
Dole Act (henceforth the Act) granting universities, not-for-profit organizations, and 
small businesses the right to retain title to inventions that emerged from federally 
funded research. This policy is central to the U.S. innovation system and particularly 
critical to the subsystem comprised by universities. A glimpse into the resources 
involved in this subsystem may give a sense of the importance of this policy. In 
2008, $31.2 billion or 21.6% of the total federal R&D budget was allocated to 
universities (NSF, 2010a; 2010b). This $31.2 billion represents 60% of the total R&D 
funds in the university system and is allocated primarily among 297 research 
universities (Carnegie Classification, 2010). Furthermore, the 213 universities that 
responded to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) 2009 
survey reported filing 12,981 new patent applications and being issued 3,537 new 
patents that year, and deriving a total licensing revenue of $2.4 billion or 4.7% of the 
systems’ R&D budget (AUTM, 2010).1 
Further testimony of the importance of Bayh-Dole is the volume of 
evaluation studies of this legislation. The Web of Science citation index has 161 articles 
with the phrase “Bayh-Dole” in their topic, Science Direct has 400 articles with the 
                                                 
1 Consider this the minimum of patents issued and licensing revenues collected, because not all 
universities participate in the ATUM survey. 
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phrase anywhere in the manuscript, and Google Scholar has 221 with the phrase in the 
title of the article and 5900 with the phrase anywhere co-occurring with words that 
mean “evaluation” (searched on March 22, 2010). Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
this evaluation literature, however detailed and rigorous, has neglected a very 
important set of public values and policy outcomes. Specifically, most evaluation 
studies of Bayh-Dole address its effects on either the pace of innovation 
(Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 1998; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Jaffe and 
Lerner, 2004; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Mowery et al., 2004; Rafferty, 2008; Sampat, 
Mowery and Ziedonis, 2003; Shapiro, 2000; Thursby and Thursby, 2006; Walsh, 
Arora, and Cohen, 2003) or the culture and organization of academic research 
(Greenberg, 2007; Judson, 2004; Slaughter, 1990; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; 
Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005), but they generally neglect equity 
concerns. 
I use equity to characterize a situation in which inequality in the distribution 
of resources or privilege is problematic from a normative point of view. As Sen 
(1992) points out, when discussing inequality normatively, the first question to ask is 
“inequality of what?” My answer to Sen’s question is Rawlsian: “primary goods”—
resources and capacities that individuals require to lead their own conception of the 
good life (Rawls, 1971). However, my position is only loosely Rawlsian, because I am 
concerned also with inequalities at the level of groups and organizations—although 
these institutions are arguably the conduit of primary goods for individuals. At the 
level of groups and organizations, equity concerns are better mapped onto economic 
resources and relative political power. 
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The three evaluative criteria—the pace of innovation, the independence of 
research, and the equitable distribution of the privileges and resources from 
university patenting—are interdependent. But for this very reason, the lack of 
explicit attention to the distributional outcomes requires greater attention. In the 
following chapters I seek to address this lacuna by taking a different approach to 
assess Bayh-Dole and view the problem from a different perspective. Before I 
explicate this approach and perspective, I would like to address two pressing 
questions: Why has the evaluation community shown so little interest in examining 
the distributive character of the Act, and why should we care about equity issues in 
this policy domain? 
It is unexceptional for evaluators to focus on the hot issues of a policy debate 
and neglect other considerations that receive less public attention. In the Bayh-Dole 
debate, the impacts on the pace of innovation and on the non-commercial activities 
of universities have been brought into the limelight while equity problems have been 
relegated to backstage (NRC, 2010). This has happened largely because equity has no 
strong political advocate. The Congress that enacted Bayh-Dole had representatives 
and senators who had fought in the 1960s and 1970s to pass welfare, healthcare, and 
civil rights legislation. Subsequent generations of lawmakers have shown much less 
zeal for the cause of equity and have even rolled back welfare legislation (Bartels, 
2008, Murray, 1994|1984). In addition, Bayh-Dole affects the distribution of 
resources via consumption of new products in the same way that patents do, with 
the difference that technology developers of academic research have the research 
part of R&D paid by the government. The problem resides in that consumers in 
general, and specifically the demand for new medical treatments and other 
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applications of public patents, are not politically organized and cannot 
counterbalance monopolies in the market or exert pressure on policymakers to 
redress abuses of excessive pricing or inventory-managed shortage. Moreover, equity 
issues are also related to allocation of licensing revenues across the implementers of 
Bayh-Dole—the universities—and they exhibit very little interest in adjusting the 
manner in which licensing revenue is divided. Still, lack of public attention to equity 
issues in Bayh-Dole does not mean these issues are not important. 
The first and most obvious manner in which distribution of resources is 
important to Bayh-Dole is because it fashions itself as a mechanism to fulfill the 
promise of another distributive policy: the public funding of research. I use 
“distributive policy” (Lowi, 1972) because using general taxation to support the 
research enterprise is justified because the benefits of research are widespread. 
However, by transferring intellectual property rights (IPRs) from the public to the 
private domain, Bayh-Dole seems to be a rather counterintuitive mechanism to attain 
that goal, and it was counterintuitive to many policymakers before it was enacted. 
Since then, it has become an article of faith to believe that private enterprise requires 
IPRs to develop any technology, but this view was far from unanimous when Bayh-
Dole was being debated and equity concerns were behind opposition to the Act. For 
this reason it is worthwhile to highlight some key events leading to Bayh-Dole. 
 
1.2 The road to enact the Bayh-Dole Act. 
In addition to evaluations of Bayh-Dole, scholars have given serious 
attention to its history. The leading accounts of how Bayh-Dole came to be law are 
told by Eisenberg (1996), Guston (2000, Chapter 5), Mowery et al. (2004, Chapter 5), 
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respectively from the legal, political, and economic perspectives. To these I may add 
Bermans’ (2008) history of the institutionalization of the Act from the sociological 
perspective. Neither of these authors addresses equity issues explicitly, although 
Eisenberg and Guston recount in detail the objections in Congress which were 
motivated by equity concerns and Berman reminds us of the formation of the 
universities political support of the Act, which hints at the current distribution of 
political power in the university system; from the beginning, it was elite-universities 
that controlled the voice of the university system. The journalistic chronicles by 
Greenberg (2007), Washburn (2006) and Stevens (2004) highlight the work of a 
handful of individuals whose offices permitted the passing of Bayh-Dole, and 
whereas Mowery and colleagues (2004) emphasize the effects on innovation, 
Greenberg and Washburn focus on the effects of Bayh-Dole on academic science. 
The debate about ownership of “public patents” —that is, patents originated 
from publicly funded research—dates back to the postwar debate on the institutional 
structure of U.S. research policy. Two prominent figures in that debate, Vannevar 
Bush, former director of the wartime Office of Scientific R&D, and Senator Harley 
Kilgore, are representative of the opposing views on the issue of patents. Bush 
recognized the inventors’ rights to their inventions; Kilgore in turn contended that 
the public interest was best served when the government retained ownership 
(Guston, 2000; Hart, 1998; c.f. Smith, 1990). The debate for the postwar 
configuration of science policy started during World War II and extended beyond 
the war, and the institutionalization of public funding of research—through agencies 
such as the National Science Foundation—was not settled until the early 1950s. The 
standstill took longer to settle regarding intellectual property and only twice in the 
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next thirty years was government patent policy revisited. First, President Kennedy’s 
memorandum of 1963 (36 F.R. 16889) explicitly asserted the government’s rights to 
public-funded inventions but granted some latitude to federal agencies to transfer 
title to contractors or license government patents on an exclusive basis under special 
circumstances and on reasonable terms. Then, President Nixon’s memorandum and 
policy statement of 1971 (28 F.R. 90343) reaffirmed the administrative discretion 
granted by his predecessor but denied that a “single presumption of ownership of 
patent rights to Government-sponsored inventions” was a “satisfactory basis” for 
government-wide patent policy. The conventional moral wisdom that public research 
should lead to patents held in the public domain prevailed, albeit reasonable 
exceptions were allowed, and federal agencies had as many as twenty-six different 
patent policies in force by the end of the 1970s (Eisenberg, 1996). 
The then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)—renamed 
in May 1980 as Department of Health and Human Services—was at the center of the 
Bayh-Dole story. After World War II, universities had been allowed to license to 
pharmaceutical firms chemical compounds developed in research programs funded 
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and occasionally the licenses were given 
on an exclusive basis. When the practice was denounced, HEW required in 1962 that 
firms screening such compounds commit to not pursue exclusive rights on them. 
HEW was later criticized in the Harbridge House report (1968) on patents’ use and 
another report on patents for medicinal chemistry (General Accounting Office, 
1968) for introducing such restrictions. In consideration to the parallel 
recommendations contained in both reports, HEW instituted in 1968 the 
Institutional Patent Agreements (IPAs) to grant ownership of discoveries emerging 
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from agency’s research grants to universities that demonstrated technology transfer 
capabilities. The Department of Defense had a similar policy in place already and the 
National Science Foundation implemented IPAs in 1973. In 1977, HEW’s own 
General Council Office observed that liberal policy on NIH patents could lead to 
excessive pricing of new treatments. In response, HEW secretary Joseph Califano 
moved to delay (withhold) 30 patent applications and three IPAs applications. The 
universities and the NIH then mobilized to reverse this move and found an ally in 
Senator Robert Dole who, in a press conference, criticized HEW for “stonewalling” 
university patenting. Senator Birch Bayh, already an advocate of university patenting, 
was then able to partner with Senator Dole to introduce to the Senate in September 
13, 1978 a bill modeled after the IPAs. 
It should be recalled that Representative Ray Thornton had introduced the 
previous year a bill to the House Subcommittee on Science, Research and 
Technology proposing to transfer rights to all research contractors. The bill died in 
committee but the proposal attracted the attention of opponents to the idea. Senator 
Gaylord Nelson held hearings and invited vocal detractors of transferring public 
patents to the private sector, notably Admiral Hyman Rickover who directed the 
development of the nuclear submarine, and Senator Russell Long—son of Senator 
Huey Long and a strong advocate of social policy—who saw in this bill yet another 
industry subsidy (U.S. Senate, 1980a). 
The bill introduced in the 95th Congress had to be re-introduced in the 
following Congress after the midterm elections as S. 414 on February 9, 1979. The 
Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on May 16 and June 6, and 
reported favorably to the Senate on December 12, 1979. The bill was then debated in 
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the floor of the Senate on February 5 and 6 and passed on April 23, 1980. This was 
nevertheless not the bill eventually enacted because the House Committee on the 
Judiciary required the recoupment provision to be dropped—this provision would 
have had the government share in a portion of the incomes arising from licensing 
patents. Finally, the mirror bill introduced (with modifications) passed the House on 
November 17. At this point the sponsors of the bill numbered 54 and counted with 
ample support in Congress; and won the Senate vote 91 to 4 on November 20 
(Berman, 2008). Being late in the year, there was a risk of a pocket veto. In a hurry, 
congressional advocates reached out for representatives of small businesses and 
universities to pressure the White House for a last minute signature (Stevens, 2004). 
In the end, President Carter signed Bayh-Dole into law on December 12.  
This sweeping reversal of the long-standing government patent policy—
allowing agency discretion—begs the question, what upset the political balance? One 
reason is the economic environment. The U.S. economy was shaken during the 
seventies as the effects of a cyclical recession (1973-1975) were compounded by the 
oil embargoes of 1973 and 1979.  The economic and social turmoil of that period put 
in question the presumed robustness of the economy. General apprehension verged 
into histrionics when the surplus of the trade balance went into decline (albeit the 
first trade deficit did not occur until 1982). Particularly, visible sectors —such as 
automobiles, electronics, and textiles—started to lose their competitive edge in 
international markets and higher import penetration was suggestive of lassitude in 
the domestic market as well. The recessive economy and the symbolic loss of 
strength in the manufacturing sector were perceived as a widespread 
“competitiveness crisis”, even though it was confined to a few economic sectors 
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(Papadakis, 1994). As I show later in Chapter 3, the competitiveness crisis became 
the main characterization of national economic problems and policy makers who 
capitalized on this rhetoric were in better position to advance their policies and 
programs casting them as responses to the crisis (see also Slaughter and Rhoades 
1996). This strategy required the appeal to fresh ideas that buttressed the prescribed 
reforms, and by the end of the Carter Administration, many new ideas focused on 
small business and entrepreneurship; one of these was Bayh-Dole. 
The political balance was also tilted in favor of reform because a central 
argument motivating Bayh-Dole had gained great currency in Congress. As I explain 
in Chapter 4, the argument is that government funded research was underutilized 
because, unable to gain title or exclusive license to an invention, firms were 
discouraged from taking the inherent risks of large developmental investments. The 
support of this argument relied primarily on one piece of evidence: only 5% of the 
28,000 government-owned patents were under a licensing contract (Federal Council 
for Science and Technology, 1978). However, Eisenberg (1996) found that the 
majority of those patents, about two-thirds, belonged to the Department of Defense 
whose patent policy allowed contractors to take title; what is more, she found that 
325 of the 28,000 belonged to HEW and 75 of them were licensed at the time the 
report was made. The fact that DoD contractors had not taken title suggests that 
those patents had little commercial value. Still, in 1980 the FCST data stood 
unchallenged and the belief that exclusive licenses were condition sine qua non for 
product development was cemented in policymakers’ minds. 
Creating a sense of political urgency and a convincing economic logic were 
not the only reasons for the legislative agreement achieved by Bayh-Dole. Enacting 
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the Act required the offices of skillful policy actors—including bureaucrats and 
congressional staffers (Washburn, 2005; Stevens, 2004)—capable of bringing 
universities into a coalition (Berman, 2008) and to push the bill through Congress by 
anticipating all opposing arguments. These arguments had been voiced when, a year 
earlier, Senator Nelson held the aforementioned hearings to counter the Thornton 
bill. The objections were mainly three: (i) that transferring rights to public patents 
was tantamount to a giveaway to corporations, (ii) that it would condone 
monopolistic practices, particularly in sectors such as healthcare, and (iii) that 
taxpayers were denied legitimate returns from research investments. In turn, the bill 
addressed each of these objections with specific provisions. Bayh-Dole, as originally 
enacted, is for the explicit benefit of small businesses and not-for-profit 
organizations, and exclusive licenses for large businesses are limited to five years. As 
mentioned above, the original bill included a recoupment provision. It also 
established two mechanisms for government intervention: the first allows federal 
agencies to limit or cancel rights to a patent but only under “exceptional 
circumstances” and the second mandates the agency to take up a paid-up non-
exclusive license to use and practice a patent that is not being developed. 
This brief history of the road to Bayh-Dole reveals that equity considerations 
were once important. The fact that the original bill sought to regulate the market 
incentives with safeguards of the public interest is an implicit recognition of the 
imperative of seeking the widest possible distribution of the fruits of research. 
However, as I show in the next following chapters, the normative counterweights to 
market values are faint at best. Still, for this very reason equity must be brought back 
into the debate again. 
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The historic context in which Bayh-Dole emerges is indeed useful to 
understand equity concerns in Bayh-Dole. Likewise, it should serve us well to locate 
it within the wider context of research and innovation policy in the U.S. 
Not long ago, legal scholars Stuart M. Benjamin and Arti K. Rai (2009) called 
for the creation of a White House office of innovation policy. Their argument 
summarizes the received wisdom on innovation policy: that growth in productivity is 
key for long-term economic growth, that technological change fosters productivity 
gains, and that research is key in the new technologies. Bayh-Dole was conceived 
precisely as regulatory policy to strengthen the weakest link in that chain, that is, the 
transfer of knowledge from laboratory research to new technologies used in the 
factory floor. In that context Bayh-Dole bridges the domains of research policy or 
the public funding of scientific research, and innovation policy or the public 
incentives given to firms to produce gains in productivity.  
Speaking of innovation, in the National Academics symposium on Innovation 
Policies for the 21st Century, economist Carl Dahlam (2006) stressed that variety of 
ingredients that support a thriving economy in the very long run. He suggested that 
the U.S. economy had benefited from: 
• Very large, integrated domestic markets; 
• An economic institutional framework facilititatind rapid 
deployment and restructuring to take advantage of new 
opportunities; 
• Strong competition; 
• A deep and flexible capital market (including risk capital); 
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• A deep and flexible labor market; 
• Good rule of law; 
• Very strong science and technology institutions; and 
• Very flexible managerial organizational structures. (Dahlam, 
2006, p. 48) 
Consequently, it is important to remember that innovation policy is best seen 
in the context of the variety of institutional capacities that an economy must develop 
to foster growth in the long-run, and it is hardly the most important institution. 
What has fueled the rhetoric that innovation policy as the most important ingredient 
of economic wellbeing is perhaps the fact that policy on those other institutions is 
much more politically contested. Consider the contestation the laws on the flexibility 
of the labor market, or reform of the financial industry, or anti-trust law. Innovation 
makes for palatable political speech and thus it is often depicted in disproportion of 
its power for economic change. I do not argue here against the importance of 
innovation in economic prosperity, or the advancement of science and technology, 
or the creation of an adequate environment for entrepreneurship, but I want to stress 
that the received wisdom of innovation and growth, and the extolled role of Bayh-
Dole in linking research and innovation has been overemphasized. The obverse side 
of this coin is that the distribution of income—that occurs simultaneously with 
growth—is deemphasized, and as I will show in the following chapters, in the Bayh-
Dole debate, it is all but absent. 
Sizing properly innovation policy, what type of policy is then Bayh-Dole? 
First of all, Bayh-Dole is a regulatory policy because it regulates IP rights and it does 
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not involve additional spending on the part of government or on the part of 
taxpayers. However, as I suggest in the first part of Chapter 4, it could be considered 
also industrial policy insofar insofar as it helps to increase the market power of 
established firms, it increases industry concentration in dynamic sectors (as opposed 
to competition), and by these means, it reduces the rotation of productive assets 
between new and old firm-cohorts in the transition to a new technological platform. 
Is is industrial policy also in the sense that Bayh-Dole is a “tax on technology 
development,” when compared to a policy that gives patent rights free of charge; a 
tax that firms pay and universities collect (Eisenberg, 1996). Bayh-Dole could also be 
seen as a “tax on consumption” in the case of exclusive licenses that could be 
developed under competition; a tax that consumers pay as a portion of consumer 
surplus and the monopolist collects in profits. In addition, Bayh-Dole can also be 
understood as a distributive policy as I suggest in the second part of Chapter 4. It 
operates like a subsidy, because it reallocates the potential stream of incomes from 
the licensing of public patents: from government to the university. A bit more subtly, 
the Act could be seen as a subsidy for elite universities, because it increases the 
probability of producing a blockbuster patent for higher levels of financial resources 
while keeping it the same for lower levels of resources. 
Equipped with this notes on the history and policy context of Bayh-Dole, I 
now turn to the approach and perspective that I will take in bringing equity back into 
the discussion of Bayh-Dole. 
 
1.3 Approach, perspective, method and data. 
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The conventional approach to policy evaluation (Heckman, 2007; 2001; 
Weiss, 1998) is condensed in the idea of “comparative statics.” This approach 
compares the effect of the policy in question as though nothing else but the policy 
changed. Bayh-Dole is a challenge for comparative statics because the outcomes are 
not well determined and because the policy has gradually changed by effect of 
amendments and models of implementation. Making the challenges worse, the 
effects of Bayh-Dole cannot be easily separated from those of patent policy as a 
whole and patent policy has undergone significant changes in two decades starting in 
1979. 
For those reasons, my approach examines instead the “policy drift,” that is, 
the gradual shift in the way a policy is interpreted and implemented. This concept is 
derivative of the concepts of bureaucratic drift (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 
1987), legislative drift (Horn and Shepsle, 1989) and epistemic drift in policy (Shapiro 
and Guston, 2007) that refer, respectively, to tensions between administrative 
procedures and bureaucratic discretion, between political changes and 
institutionalization in the legislature, and between new knowledge and technical 
standards, and how these tensions shape policy. First, I trace the changes in the letter 
and implementation of Bayh-Dole to reforms in the patent system and even shifts in 
the macro political and economic environment. I do this to reveal external forces 
(discourse and institutions) to the Bayh-Dole debate that, to a significant extent, set 
the internal terms of that debate and the design of the policy itself. I use “policy 
design” to emphasize the fact that public policy is susceptible to amendments and 
  15 
change and the fact that it is construed differently at multiple points in time 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1997). 
While the comparative statics approach often treats policy in the same way as 
a treatment in a clinical trial—i.e., as a stable change in a regime—my approach 
instead takes it as an organic evolving institution. I show that Bayh-Dole’s design has 
been heavily influenced by a doctrinal shift in U.S. policy-making driven by 
neoliberal conceptions of the proper management of the economy and government 
(Harvy, 2007, Turner, 2008, Mirowski, 2009). One tenet of this new doctrine is that 
unfettered markets are a necessary condition for economic prosperity; yet, unlike 
classical liberalism, not only competitive markets but also monopolistic structures are 
to be freed from regulation. Therefore, a strong patent system is a policy imperative, 
and so it is private ownership of all patent rights, including those patents that result 
from public R&D investments (Mirowski and Sent, 2007; Nedeva and Boden, 2010; 
Pestre, 2005; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). 
Furthermore, for this new doctrine to hold sway in all domains of policy-
making it needed to enlist a rationale that is perceived as neutral and objective and 
that is, at the same time, compatible with its normative commitment to free markets. 
It so happens that the standard of policy analysis, the market failure rationale, is 
predicated on the premise that public action is justified only when markets fail or do 
not exist (Bator, 1958; Samuelson, 1954). From this perspective, it can be fully 
expected that market failure assessments of Bayh-Dole further justify its basic logic 
of creating a market for public patents. For this reason, I introduce an alternative 
analysis to market failure to study Bayh-Dole, an analysis based on Public Value 
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Failure rationale (Bozeman, 2002). This emerging analytical rationale rejects the 
notion that only a market failure justifies public action; rather, it seeks to identify 
situations when public values of consensus are not served, even when markets work 
well. Considering public value failures reveals important dimensions to Bayh-Dole 
that most evaluations neglect. In particular, the tone of the debate has shifted from 
caution to eagerness in transferring public patent rights to private parties. 
Consequently, subsequent amendments to Bayh-Dole gradually removed all 
constraints on the profit motive, particularly constraints introduced for the sake of 
equity. 
The study of the distributive character of Bayh-Dole creates the space for 
adding a new perspective to policy analysis. Schneider and Ingram (1997) show that 
policy stakeholders “construct” target populations across two dimensions: power and 
just deserts. When populations are deemed powerless, the methodology of evaluation 
can simply assume that effects flow from policy to populations, without feedback, or 
actualization. In the case of Bayh-Dole’s distribution of resources, this perspective 
would consider the allocation of resources from consumption of new products 
developed from university patents, or would consider the asymmetry of rents 
perceived by universities. However, allocation matters and consumers and 
universities may organize politically to re-design Bayh-Dole if they perceived unfair 
distribution. While consumers of innovation are too dispersed to coalesce politically, 
universities have in fact professional organizations and even a technology managers’ 
association (AUTM) that muster a degree of political clout. Hence, the perspective 
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that I add to evaluation examines the policy effects flowing also in the opposite 
direction, from target populations to policy design. 
My analysis shows the mutual influence between policy and target 
populations by combining both perspectives. Bayh-Dole allowed a few universities 
to accrue significant revenues from licensing. Other universities sought to raise 
incomes in the same way and developed technology transfer capabilities, modifying 
in this way the organizational structure for the implementation of the Act (Mowery 
et al., 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). As I show in Chapter 4, this increase of 
organizational capacity not only exacerbated the asymmetry of resources of the 
university system because many universities run technology transfer offices at an 
operative loss but also placed incentives for creative licensing practices that worsen 
the allocative effects of patents. Universities were publicly criticized for these 
creative practices (e.g., reach through clauses) when it became apparent that they 
maximized financial gain for the university at the expense of the public interest 
(Wadman, 2005; Eisenberg, 2003; Eisenberg and Rai, 2004). The organized response 
of universities was to commit publicly and voluntarily to a set of best practices that 
ostensibly protect the public interest, affecting de facto the implementation of Bayh-
Dole. The declaration is entitled In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing 
University Technology (Bienenstock, 2007) and has been endorsed by AUTM. Future de 
jure reforms to the Act are expected and it can be anticipated that these reforms will 
respond to the mutuality of policy and target populations made explicit by the 
double-perspective analysis offered here. 
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The research conducted here uses a multi-method approach involving 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The inquiry is primarily reliant on archival 
research and refers to primary sources from Congressional hearings, statutes, public 
speeches and declarations. Secondary sources are used extensively too since this 
work is concerned with evaluation studies. Statistical analysis used survey data on 
university patenting from the AUTM patenting survey (2010), R&D data of the 
federal government and the university system from the National Science Foundation 
(2010a; 2010b), and data on universities from the Carnegie Classification of Higher 
Education (2010) and on patents from the U.S. Trademark and Patent Office (2009). 
The details on the use of these data are clarified over the presentation of arguments, 
generally in footnotes. 
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation. 
The following chapters elaborate four themes in the re-assessment of Bayh-
Dole in relation to its distributive effects. Chapter 2 is a critical review of the 
evaluation literature of Bayh-Dole. This chapter surveys studies of the intended and 
unintended consequences of Bayh-Dole. The common approach of these studies is 
comparative statics; however, I also survey studies in the National Systems of 
Innovation tradition that examine the policy within its economic and institutional 
context. The multiple concerns attended to in this literature can be synthesized in 
two groups, one motivated by the effects of Bayh-Dole on the pace of innovation, 
and the second guided by the changes to the organization of science and particularly 
of university research. 
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It is worth noting here the parallels between my review and the recent report 
from the National Research Council, entitled Managing University Intellectual Property in 
the Public Interest (NRC, 2010). The NRC report organized its review along two 
themes, the influence of technology transfer on the university culture (p. 33) and the 
effectiveness and accountability of university technology transfer (p 49). The former 
overlaps perfectly with the theme I identified as threats to academic research and 
culture. The latter point in the NRC report has two parts. The first deals with 
effectiveness, and as Bozeman (2002) suggested in his review of technology transfer: 
effectiveness is a contingent concept. The various ways in which the NRC refers to 
effectiveness— level of disclosure, patenting, licensing, and fostering 
entrepreneurship—could be collapsed onto the pace of innovation. The explicit 
treatment of accountability is admittedly a difference with my own synthesis. 
However, the NRC treats it as derivative of effectiveness because it seeks to 
emphasize management practices and self-regulation of university patenting and 
licensing as well as shortcomings of government oversight (53-60). Chapter 3 and 4 
delve into these accountability concerns in relation to the university’s stewardship of 
the public interest and the university new business models of patent 
commercialization. 
The two main concerns identified above are important but narrow. 
Consequently, in Chapter 3 I seek to expand the set of concerns by examining the 
policy drift in Bayh-Dole and probing this drift with the Public Value Failures 
rationale (Bozeman, 2002, 2007). There are two dimensions of this drift, the changes 
in the debate and in the design of the Act. It would seem an odd coincidence that 
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separate political bodies as the Executive, Congress, and the courts would become 
aligned in the direction given to patent policy reform since 1980. In fact, regulations 
and dispositions, new law, and court rulings have all strengthened patent protection, 
expanded the scope of patentable subject matter, made it easier to acquire patents 
and costlier to infringe them. Likewise, it appears coincidental that these bodies 
issued and enacted an array of policies to enhance incentives and protections for 
businesses without regard to their size or the market structure in which they 
operate—that is, monopolies are no longer treated with suspicion as it was the norm 
from the Progressive Era and up to the early 1970s. However, placing the Bayh-Dole 
debate in the larger discourse on policy in relation to the economic debacle of the 
1970s and the political rhetoric that emerged, the seeming coincidences are rendered 
instead purposeful and systematic. I argue that the ascendancy of neoliberalism in 
policy making is implicated in shaping patent policy in the manner I just described. 
What is more, Bayh-Dole itself was not immune to these changes in the 
policy environment. As I show in Chapter 3, it was successively amended to include 
large business (it originally limited the benefits for these) and regulated by the 
Department of Commerce such that the provisions that would allow agencies to 
intervene in the public interest were rendered impractical. To the light of the policy 
drift, I introduce an analysis of public values relevant to the Act within the 
framework of Public Values Failure as explained above and identify tensions 
inherent to values such as political equality and transparency in the implementation 
of the Act. The relevance of this analysis is highlighted by the threat of reforms that 
would remove altogether the built-in safeguards to the public interest. 
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Probing Bayh-Dole through the lenses of those values reveals an interesting 
aspect. As I discuss in Chapter 3, the degree in which opposing views were giving 
equal consideration at the time Bayh-Dole was passed, suggests that political equality 
is now in decline. Likewise, the analysis of other values reveals increasing inequality 
in the distribution of benefits from Bayh-Dole. For instance, the inability of the NIH 
to intervene and use the provisions of the Act that could control pricing excesses by 
companies that licenses their patents from universities; or the increasing secrecy 
necessary for offices of technology transfer to compete in an environment similar to 
that of a capital investment firm. From this analysis emerged a patterned array of 
considerations missed by other studies: lack of use of the mechanisms and authority 
in the Act to promote an equitable distribution of its benefits. 
Chapter 4 probes more deeply the distributional effects of Bayh-Dole. 
Taking first the perspective of the university system, I discuss specific institutional 
arrangements that reinforce a very asymmetric distribution of political and economic 
resources among universities. It is well known that economic resources (research 
funds, endowments) are disproportionately allocated to elite universities, but it is 
sometimes overlooked the fact that elite universities also command the political 
voice of the system. As a result, smaller universities do not yield enough influence to 
promote federal policy that would curb resource allocation to their favor. In the 
specific case of technology transfer, most of these universities generate very little 
returns (generally operating tech-transfer offices at a loss); yet, spokespersons of the 
university system have given unqualified support to Bayh-Dole on behalf of all 
universities. 
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In this environment, and partly due to it, universities have sought new 
business models to increase the financial returns from technology transfer, and at the 
same time they have sought to hedge the reputational risks of engaging too 
aggressively in licensing activities. Among other alternatives such as patent pools 
(Winickoff, 2006) and socially responsible licensing (Mimura, 2007; 2010) a business 
model has emerged that seems to balance the financial needs and public mission of 
the university. This model, called here “nurturing start-ups,” consists on providing 
business services, such as legal counsel and administrative asistance, to new 
companies established with intellectual property from the university’s own faculty-
inventors. The university will thus promote entrepreneurship while taking a stock 
interest in the firm that can be recouped if the firm is later acquired or offered in 
open financial markets (Feldman et al., 2002). I use this emerging business model as 
an example of an institutional arrangement with significant consequence on the 
distribution of benefits from innovation. When established firms can easily acquire 
new high-tech start-ups, new economic sectors are unlikely to emerge in a 
competitive environment. In that scenario, productive assets are not reshuffled 
across technological platforms and market concentration reallocates the benefits 
from consumers to monopolists. 
A case in point is the emergence of the biotechnology industry. Early in the 
history of this industry, well-established pharmaceutical companies came to 
constitute its “core”; the rest either constituted the “supporting nexus” or failed in 
their attempt to join the core firms (Chandler, 2005). Of about one hundred 
promising start-ups in the early 1990s, all but two succumbed to the liquidity 
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pressures of establishing themselves independently; the rest either closed operations, 
merged, or were acquired by the big pharmaceutical companies in the industry’s core. 
The prospects of success for the business model of nurturing start-ups, and the 
significant share of university patenting that goes into biotechnology, suggest that 
distributive benefits from public research and innovation risk being a significant and 
pervasive problem. 
In discussing distribution of resources in relation to Bayh-Dole, I addressed 
too the set of standard assumptions as to how innovation comes to be widely 
distributed. For instance, research has been conceptualized as a public good or that 
innovation-driven economic growth creates new wealth atop of the economic ladder 
that eventually trickles down to all economic strata. I show that these assumptions 
are suspect at best, and inadequate in a wide variety of circumstances. 
Is the neglect of equity issues specific to Bayh-Dole? It may seem that the 
problem is not endemic to this policy alone; rather, it is the entire domain of 
innovation policy that has neglected the problem of inequality—notable exceptions 
are Healey, Hagendijk, and Pereira (2009), and symposia discussed in Senker (2003) 
and Wetmore (2007). Still, if we suspend judgment about any systematic bias on the 
part of students and policy-makers of innovation, a usual suspect for the neglect of 
equity could be the methodology of evaluation itself. 
In Chapter 5, I take issue with what seems to be a systematic neglect of 
important public values in conventional public evaluation. I examine the 
philosophical underpinnings of policy evaluation to see if there lies a source of the 
chronic neglect of values in evaluation. I argue that “instrumental reason” is the 
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primary if not the only logic guiding the practice of evaluation and that 
“consequentialism” has hegemonic control of the moral thinking in this discipline. 
This orientation precludes evaluators from asking deeper questions, as to “why do 
we care for such and such outcome?” or “why do we accept such and such law as 
legitimate?” While methodologically robust in measuring impacts—given that data 
are available and “well-behaved”—evaluation is too thin in valuing outcomes and the 
policy process itself, it relies too heavily on intuitive judgments. But then, when the 
normative questions are more complex and there are trade-offs between values that 
cannot be reduced to the same measure, intuitive judgments become inadequate. 
Policy evaluation thus needs to be complemented by a deontological perspective that 
formalizes the valuation of outcomes and the valuation of the policy process. 
The task of formulating a theory that guides the formation of judgment in 
policy evaluation is a question that makes explicit the commitments of the discipline 
with democratic policy making. In Chapter 5 I critique not only the conventional 
conception of policy, at least from a methodological perspective, but also the related 
conventional notions of political representation. From that critique, I seek to 
formulate the basic conditions to be required from deontological evaluation. To this 
end, I draw from recent work in science and democracy (Brown, 2009) and the 
bureaucracy and democracy (Catlaw, 2007) to introduce a different conception of 
representation to policy evaluation. This conception relies on a different ontology of 
the sovereign (the people) that is distributed across an ecology of institutions of 
representation. Thus, the traditional epistemic and ontological unity in the 
representations of “popular will” breaks apart and is replaced by a descentralized 
system of representation that is at the same time more socially robust (in the sense of 
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enhancing of social cohesion and resilience) and fairer in terms of political power 
(because power is a function of the ability to claim one’s representation is truthful). 
The challenge is surely to adapt this conception of representation to policy 
evaluation. 
This is not a complicated way to say that politics is local and that a normative 
theory of policy evaluation should observe local sensibilities. Descentralization does 
not imply necessarily geography or other physical criteria of dispersion. Rather, it 
does imply a distribution along the spectrum of political power, along degrees of 
participation and marginalization. In fact, it seeks to elevate the voice of traditionally 
marginalized technical and political representations. It also implies that evaluation 
must not settle for single representations (such as that from polling) but rather cross-
reference the various institutions of representation. It also implies that a 
deontological perspective in evaluation does not suppress value trade-offs or resolve 
them by projecting competing values onto a single unit of measurement; it implies 
instead the necessity to match values to institutions of representation. 
Chapter 6 offers a summary of the main conclusions of the preceding 
chapters. I emphasize here what could be called and “epistemic conflict of interest” 
in policy evaluation. That is when the method of evaluation and the object of 
evaluation are normatively informed by the same theory, as it would be the case of 
making a market failure analysis to Bayh-Dole. In addition, I stress the relation of 
political resources and economic resources as they are distributed similarly among 
groups, as it was shown for the university system. When the problem cannot be cast 
as a zero-sum game, the economic disadvantaged cannot wield the political power 
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necessary to change external factors of their disadvantage.2 Finally, in the very last 
section, I suggest an implication of this study to the theory of governance. By 
interpreting the evolution of Bayh-Dole to the light of the mutual influence between 
emerging technologies and the institutions that facilitate and regulate their 
emergence. Specifically, the emergence of biotechnology has been shaped by patent 
policy, and this in turn has been influenced by the advances and new entities brought 
about by this technology. I ask “how can this mutuality be managed?” and I draw 
from “anticipatory governance” (Barben et al., 2008) to conceive of Bayh-Dole as an 
“integrative” institution in the sense that it integrates tasks of innovation (research, 
commercialization) that are traditionally conceive as separate, and doing this it opens 
the possibility to shape the entire innovation process. 
 
 
                                                 
2 University patenting is not a zero-sum game because the licensing of an elite university does not 
impede the licensing of a non-elite university, if the latter were to produce a blockbuster patent. 
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Chapter 2 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BAYH-DOLE EVALUATION 
LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
The body of work that evaluates the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act is a 
veritable library. In this essay, I synthesize that literature and offer a critical review. 
From the outset, the university must be located within the system of 
innovation. For this reason I begin my survey taking the perspective of the National 
Systems of Innovation (NSI), offering a brief exposition of the origins and tenets of the 
NSI approach in innovation studies and then examining studies in this genre that 
addressed the history of the university. The historic and systemic character of NSI 
analysis illuminates some important aspects that are only hinted in evaluation studies 
based on partial approaches; specifically, it refutes the traditional view of an insular 
U.S. university as the record shows a rather different picture. From inception, most 
universities were sensitive to the industrial needs of their geographic constituencies 
and had close links to industry, a relation that was only temporarily weakened in the 
postwar period. 
Against this backdrop of the innovation system, I then discuss more 
specifically the Bayh-Dole Act. The economic logic that came to dominate the 
debate was codified in the text of the Act, namely, that the goal of Bayh-Dole was to 
accelerate the commercialization of federally funded research. This is my starting 
point and I discuss the studies that assessed the realization of that objective. Because 
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commercialization escapes easy measurement, proxy variables such as patent counts 
are used for inference. Looking at these data it becomes apparent that the growth of 
university patenting precedes Bayh-Dole. However, it also becomes clear that a 
number of reforms to the patent system introduced in the 1980s—taken together 
and not solely the Act—provided the institutional support for the sustained growth 
of patenting observed for more than two decades. The Act was neither the cause of 
the surge in university patent nor the only reform that supported it for more than 
two decades, but it was undoubtedly an important part of the institutional 
rearrangement of the patent system. 
Having discussed the intended effect of the Act, I will turn my attention to 
its unanticipated consequences. I organize the literature here under three groups. The 
first is concerned with the effects of Bayh-Dole on the efficiency of the innovation 
system. The problems identified there include the following: the possible crowding-
out of basic research by applied research, the emergence of “patent thickets” that 
might slow down innovations that draw from several previously patented inventions, 
the restricted licensing of research tools and limitations to the sharing of databases 
and materials, and other perverse incentives that create situations in which 
universities are caught in patenting and bargaining contests that restrict their own 
ability to do research. The second group deals with unintended organizational 
changes within the university that are traced back to Bayh-Dole. Studies of this 
group are concerned mainly with a rupture in academic tradition in terms of public 
dissemination of research results, faculty discretion in setting the curriculum and 
research agenda, and impartiality in the conduct and peer-review of research. 
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2.2 The University in the Innovation System. 
2.2.1 Brief Introduction to National Systems of Innovation. 
National Systems of Innovation (NSI) is a conceptual framework that arose 
from two main preoccupations. The first was a concern about the economy. The co-
occurrence of an economic downturn during the 1970s, the emergence of Japan as a 
technological power, and a deteriorating trade balance in the U.S. (and many 
European countries), were both factors that fueled the idea of a competitiveness 
crisis. 
The second concern was theoretical. The economics of innovation had 
grown as a sub-discipline enough to put neoclassical economic theory to the test, and 
several scholars of innovation found this theory wanting as a framework to explain 
innovation (see, prominently, Freeman, Lundvall, Nelson and Rosenberg; whose 
work is cited further below). The feeling among these scholars is that 
microeconomics oversimplified economic behavior by imposing the constricting 
assumption that economic agents have a well-determined objective function, and 
from there proceeding to aggregate individual behavior to deduct conditions of 
equilibria under various markets structures. This critique took issue with the 
modeling of innovation simply as a particular form of the production function or 
alternatively as a factor of production like labor or capital. It also took issue with the 
neglect of important aspects of innovation such as the role of “networks” and “tacit 
knowledge.” Moreover, these scholars felt that the stylization of firm behavior and 
innovation made difficult the consideration of organizations whose behavior does 
not fit the inflexible assumption of profit-maximization; take, for instance, the 
university. The stylized market relations also ignored significant institutions whose 
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dynamics affect all aspects of innovation; institutions such as law and legal precedent, 
traditions of research and academic life, regimes of the governance of science and 
technology, and due process in the allocation of political authority. There was also a 
palpable sense that these institutions were configured differently in different 
countries, yet neoclassical analysis does not have any historic awareness because it 
tends to reduce the state of affairs to atemporal regularities of firm and consumer 
behavior (see a complete exposition of this critique in Nelson, 2005). 
Christopher Freeman introduced the concept of national systems of innovation to 
the literature (Freeman, 1982; 19873); he recalls to first have heard the phrase from 
Bengt-Åge Lundvall. Further work of Freeman (1994a), and team projects directed 
by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) gave body to the NSI framework and 
provided the basis for what came to be called “reasoned history” (Freeman and 
Louçã, 2001)—that is, a historical analysis of innovation that looks into five 
interdependent domains: 
1. the generation of scientific knowledge; 
2. the development, improvement, adoption of new artefacts and new 
techniques of productions (that is, the domain of technology); 
3. the ‘economic machine’ which organizes the production and distribution 
of goods, services and incomes; 
4. the political and legal structure; and finally, 
5. the cultural domain-shaping values, norms and customs (Dosi, 2008, p. ix). 
                                                 
3 Note that the subtitle of the 1987 NSI book, “Lessons from Japan” is testimony to Freeman’s 
concern and curiosity for Japan’s innovation feat. 
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NSI privileges the national level because, Freeman (1994) argues, only at this 
level is it possible to encounter sufficient independence of these domains to permit 
an analysis of their trajectory and interconnectedness, such that the effects of 
“techno-economic paradigms” on society are rendered discernable (Perez, 2002). I 
submit that this choice of level of analysis is somewhat a choice of convenience. For 
one, it is consistent with the received wisdom of state sovereignty; I may suggest as a 
possible explanation that the post-World War II stabilization of national borders 
created the illusion that nation-states are neatly demarcated across homogenous 
histories and cultures, and the electoral rhetoric of democratic states only reinforces 
this belief. Another convenient aspect is that data, when available, are generally 
collected at the national level, making nations the de-facto ideal unit of empirical 
analysis. Nevertheless, it should be noted that within the systems of innovation 
literature there have been attempts to define other levels of analysis: the regional 
system of innovation (Storper, 1995) and the sectoral technological system (Breschi 
and Malerb, 1997). 
The NSI approach benefited from the parallel emergence of an evolutionary 
theory of innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Directly confronting the 
assumptions of neoclassical economics, evolutionary economists do not see the firm 
as a maximizing agent but as an organism that seeks survival and adaptation. The 
market acts as the selective mechanism that rewards fitness with profit and 
bankrupts those unable to adapt. The elementary unit of firm behavior, the 
“routine,” is both path-dependent and to some degree sensitive to changes in the 
external environment of the firm’s own structure. The capability of adaptation of a 
firm resides in acquiring the set of routines that will allow it to innovate the 
  32 
technologies used in production, the processes of supply, production and 
distribution, and the organization of the firm itself. Considering that this theory 
holds innovation as the critical function of firm evolution, and the routine as the 
empirical unit of analysis that links the productive system, it is not surprising that the 
systems of innovation approach rapidly incorporated evolutionary economics as its 
explanatory kernel (Dosi, 1988; and McKelvey, 1997). 
This brief exposition of the basic concepts in the NSI will let me now turn to 
the literature, within this framework, that considers the effects of Bayh-Dole. As 
suggested above, these studies seek to understand the process of innovation from a 
historical perspective. 
2.2.2 The role of the university in the innovation system. 
Because Bayh-Dole is particularly relevant to universities, it is the historic 
role of the U.S. university in the innovation system that guides this review. Earlier, 
section 4.2 considered evaluations centered in the university that sacrificed a systemic 
perspective for the sake of a thick explanation. In contrast, the histories of the role 
of the university reviewed here emphasize the relationship of these organizations to 
the other actors of the innovation system. 
The first significant aspect to be observed is that U.S. universities functioned, 
from inception, in a decentralized system—in contrast to other high-income 
countries.  For instance, since the Napoleonic reform, France has a centralized 
administration of higher education. Universities in the U.S. were at the same time 
accountable to the geographical constituencies they served, tailoring their educational 
programs and research to the needs of these constituencies, but also were recipients 
of the beneficence of these constituencies (Mowery and Sampat, 2005a). 
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Sensitivity to industrial needs is evidenced by the rapid incorporation of 
educational programs in engineering, introduced as early as 1802 in West Point 
(when it was founded), and followed by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (1824), MIT 
(1865), and the School of Mines of Columbia (1864). The importance of state level 
support to state universities further deepens the incentives for universities to be 
attuned to local needs. This is epitomized by the emphasis on agricultural research at 
the land-grant colleges that were created by the endowments of the Morrill Act of 
1862. Further support was provided by the Hatch Act of 1887, and the Adams Act 
of 1906 that complemented existing education and research in agriculture by 
establishing experimental stations (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). University support 
of local industry continued in the twentieth century, as Rosenberg (1998) pointed 
out, through the significant emergence of chemical engineering. Places like the 
University of Akron that became a critical supplier of skilled labor and research to 
the rubber industry exemplify this period. Furthermore, great research attention and 
resources were placed on the improvement of the yield of arable land. The 
investments took decades to pay off because output per acre remained flat in the first 
part of the twentieth century and the growth in the agriculture sector was merely 
“extensive;” but by 1940 university research in biology and chemistry applied to 
agriculture (e.g. hybrid seed corn) made a breakthrough and started to increase that 
output per acre several fold—primarily in cotton, wheat, oats, and corn (Parker, 
1972). 
The post-war period saw major shifts in the federal organization and funding 
of science in general and of the university in particular (Guston, 2000; Smith, 1990). 
In fact, the increase of federal funding of university research multiplied by a factor of 
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5 from mid 1935 to 1960, and again by a factor of 4 from 1960 to 1985 (going in 50 
years from $0.4 bn to $8.5 bn in 1982 dollars). This increase led economic historians 
Mowery and Rosenberg to conclude that federal support “transformed major U.S 
universities into centers for the performance of scientific research”, adding that this 
was “an unprecedented role” (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993, p. 47). Far from 
allocating this increase solely to fundamental research, monies were allocated 
through federal agencies, each with its own goals and missions, and generally 
requiring an application in sight (Stokes, 1997). 
The increasing willingness of the federal government to fund universities 
displaced, to some extent, industry funding of university research. That this retreat 
was justified because universities continued research with a practical orientation is 
not a completely invalid conjecture (Swann, 1988). In effect, the university research 
portfolio in the postwar period was rebalanced to accommodate ever larger shares of 
research relevant to the manufacturing sectors. At the same time, the stable 
corporate profits in the 1950s and 1960s permitted industry to fund sizeable 
operations in their own laboratories, both for fundamental research and product 
development (Mirowski and Sent, 2008). It should be stressed that prior to the war 
university-industry ties were close, with industrial barons chartering private 
universities and endowing schools at public universities.   
The second significant aspect that emerges throughout the history of U.S. 
innovation is the cycles of industry-university partnership: a wax and wane that 
responds to institutional changes at the industrial and governmental levels. In fact, 
the significant changes triggered by World War II altered the relationship between 
government and science and, as noted earlier, increased the federal commitment to 
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research at universities and national laboratories. Also, the economic boom of the 
postwar period strengthened the position of corporations that expanded their in-
house R&D operations; both events reinforced the industry withdrawal from 
funding university research. However, economic conditions shifted again in the 
1970s. Increasing international commerce and capital flight made economies more 
interdependent, and this in itself led to a second wave of reforms in the governance 
of science around 1980. Notice that Bayh-Dole and the other patent reforms are 
really not seen here as the source of reform, contrasting with most studies discussed 
earlier (section 4.2). Rather, it is seen as part of systemic phenomena including (i) low 
productivity gains of the economy as a whole combined with a negative trade 
balance (Papadakis, 1994), (ii) increasing international trade and the emergence of 
strong exporting economies that took world leadership in some high-technology 
sectors (Freeman, 1994b), and (iii) easier technology transfer across international 
borders combined with deregulation of several sectors that led corporations to re-
concentrate on their core products and refocus their R&D operations by gradually 
farming it out of the firm, through research consortia or closer ties to universities 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993; Mirowski and Sent, 2008). 
The increased breadth and depth of university-industry relations that is 
observed since the 1980s is not a new phenomenon; rather, it has a precedent in the 
organizational arrangements that dominated the interwar period. This relationship 
was perhaps weakened in the 1950s and 1960s, but after the macro-events of the 
1970s and 1980s unfolded the relationship evolved with a wider array of channels 
specific to each industry. In this context, Bayh-Dole and the other patent reforms of 
the 1980s can be seen, now from a wider perspective, more as a catalyst than as 
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cause of the reconfiguration of university-industry relations. It is worth noting here 
that, compared to other high-income countries, the proportion of non-academic 
basic research performed in the U.S. by the government is relatively low, while that 
of industry remains relatively high (Mowery and Sampat, 2005a). It is possible that 
the proportion of university basic research that is of interest to industry increased 
since Bayh-Dole by effect of licensing contracts allowed in this regime (Mowery, et. 
al, 2004). It should be recalled nonetheless that industry does not see intellectual 
property to be a main mechanism to appropriate returns to R&D investments (with 
few exceptions, e.g. pharmaceuticals) and that informal channels of knowledge 
diffusion rank higher than licensing agreements (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson, 
and Walsh, 2000; 2002). 
Undoubtedly, the NIS approach expands the understanding of the effects of 
Bayh-Dole. Recapitulating, the two aspects that emerged from this historic and 
systemic view of the U.S. university are that from inception the university was 
sensitive to local industry needs and that this relationship has been punctuated by 
economic trends and the regimes of science governance. Both aspects relocate the 
debate on Bayh-Dole into a discussion of economic and trade policy; patent policy is 
still important but only in concert with other policy domains. 
This vantage point allows us to identify drivers of policy reform that are not 
otherwise readily apparent. For instance, political pressure to increase patent 
protection may increase in recessive periods of the economic cycle or when facing 
emerging competition from a foreign exporting industry. Another example is the 
effect of international commerce agreements on national patent policy, and, in 
particular, the deleterious effect of the implementation of the Special 301 Report 
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(Haskins, 1998),4 which includes incentives for other OECD countries to implement 
policies inspired by Bayh-Dole (Mowery and Sampat, 2005). 
2.2.3 Limitation of the NSI framework. 
For all its strengths, NSI analysis suffers from two types of limitations that 
become apparent when considering the role of the university in the innovation 
system. The first is the pervasive problem of determining the scope of the system. 
For instance, while studies thus far have adequately given innovation a historic 
perspective with respect to economic conditions and industrial organization, other 
domains, such as financial markets, remain confined to footnotes. In light of the 
events that unfolded since September 2008 (Greenspan, 2010), NSI studies will have 
to incorporate financial markets within the analysis or suffer the same under-
determination and policy ambiguity as the economic analysis it aimed to replace 
(notable exceptions are Perez, 2002; and Coriat and Orsi, 2002). 
The second limitation of NSI studies is perhaps deeper and more difficult to 
redress. The motivation of these studies seems too tightly aligned with the narrow 
concerns articulated in elite discourse. As such, innovation appears worth studying 
chiefly because of its effects on national “competitiveness” for high-income 
countries (see Cantwell, 2005), “catching-up” for middle and low-income countries 
(Kim, 1993; Alcorta and Peres, 1998), and a general concern for the “returns of 
R&D investments” for which measurements are developed (e.g. the Innovation 
“Oslo Manual,” first produced in 1992; OECD, 2005). These are surely important 
issues as they relate to overall employment and economic growth. However, the 
                                                 
4 Whereby the Trade Representative may suggest sanctions to U.S. trade partners who do not enforce 
IPRs under the World Trade Organization terms of the Uruguay Round (Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPS). 
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alignment with the worries expressed by the press and policymakers has kept NSI 
scholarship from tackling other critical problems. In economic matters, for instance, 
very little has been said on the relation of income inequality with innovation, and, 
more specifically, with the role of the university and the intellectual property regime. 
The obsession with the pace of innovation seems to neglect the risks to the 
democratic order that come from the uncritical adoption of new technologies—an 
alarm raised from several angles of science and technology studies (see Jasanoff et al., 
1995; Hackett et al., 2008). At the organizational level, the NSI approach has 
carefully codified the heterogeneity of industrial sectors but it has not carried over 
this nuanced analysis to the other actors of innovation. Universities are in fact a very 
uneven group and some policies may be to the advantage of only a few of them, 
which is precisely the case of Bayh-Dole. Likewise, governments rarely function 
consistently.  Instead, Congress, the Executive branch, and the courts often transmit 
contradicting signals to the actors of the innovation system; bureaucracies implement 
policy sometimes with exclusive discretion; and state and national legislatures hardly 
operate with a single voice. Insofar as the NSI approach rejects over-stylizing 
institutions and rejects the heuristics of the linear model of innovation, it provides a 
useful conceptual framework for the analysis of innovation. But this is not always the 
case in NSI studies, particularly when universities or government are depicted as 
monolithic agents following consciously a logic or plan, or when the analytical value 
of easy dichotomies (basic-applied, research-development) goes unquestioned. 
In the specific case of Bayh-Dole, NSI analysis has given new light to the role of 
university and intellectual property in the innovation system, but it has also 
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reaffirmed the widely held belief that the Act should be assessed ultimately by its 
impact on competitiveness. 
 
2.3 Assessing the Intended Consequences of Bayh-Dole. 
The Bayh-Dole Act was proposed justified by two premises, the first being 
that the U.S. economy confronted a competitiveness crisis and the second that 
fostering innovation was the long-term solution to that crisis (I discuss in more detail 
these premises in Chapter 3). The problem, thought the framers of Bayh-Dole, was 
that ambiguity of patent rights was a bottleneck in the innovation process—a 
bottleneck that impeded public R&D investments (turned into inventions) to flow 
swiftly from the laboratory to the market place. Accordingly, the proposed solution 
was simply assigning patent rights to the organizations performing the research to 
resolve the problematic ambiguity and to accelerate commercialization of public 
R&D. 
Such a goal poses a problem for evaluators who want to quantify 
“commercialization” because such a concept eludes easy measurement. The usual 
method for hard-to-measure concepts is to find proxy-measures that are 
conceptually related to the phenomena of interest. Provided that the Act was 
proposed on the presumption that patenting is a precondition for commercialization, 
university patenting has been the focal variable of evaluation studies of the Bayh-
Dole. 
Unsurprisingly, advocates of the Act are quick to point out to the rapid 
increase of university patenting following 1980 (CRS reports in Schatch, 2005; U.S. 
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GAO, 1987, 1991, 1998; AUTM, 1996, 1998). By implication, they attribute the 
growth in patenting to Bayh-Dole. 
At least two reasons cast doubt on the adequacy of such an attribution. First, 
by the time the Act was enacted, universities were already patenting at increasing 
rates year after year. For instance, universities were granted 188 patent titles in 1969 
and 264 in 1979. In fact, university patenting grew at an exponential rate for at least 
seventeen years before 1980 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Patenting Activity, Universities and US System. 
 
Data Source: USTPO (2009). Note: Scale in thousands of patents granted. 
 
 
Second, before Bayh-Dole many research universities had already developed 
the administrative capacity for patenting and licensing. By 1980 nearly 76% of the 
“largest research universities” had signed an invention administration agreement with 
the Research Corporation, a non-profit organization founded in 1912 to be a third-
party administrator of university patents (Mowery and Sampat, 2001a and 2001b). In 
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addition, a few state universities not contracting with the Research Corporation had 
set up their own offices of technology transfer following the steps of the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) of the University of Wisconsin, founded in 
1924. It should be recalled as well that universities that participated in the HEW’s 
IPA program (and similar programs in other federal agencies) were required to 
demonstrate technology transfer capabilities. 
Figure 2. Forecast 1980-2005 of Patenting Activity using 1963-1979 data. 
Data Source: USTPO (2009). 
OLS regression in Figure 2 is over time (no lags), and estimated slope statistically significant at 
p =.01. 
 
Considering the rapid growth of university patenting observed from 1963 
through 1979, as well as the organizational capacity for patenting prior to 1980, I 
have projected, using time series analysis, the growth of patenting based on those 17 
years of data. The best fit is an exponential curve and it happens to be, with 
hindsight, surprisingly accurate 20 years forward (see Figure 2). Even before Bayh-
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Dole, it would not have been unreasonable to expect a long period of exponential 
growth of university patenting. It should not be assumed, however, that fast growth 
was sustainable, at least not for two decades, without significant reforms to the 
patent system. Such reforms did take place through the 1980s, changing the use and 
scope of patents in the U.S. Starting with the Stevenson-Wydler Act (PL 96-480), 
enacted two months before Bayh-Dole, that created offices of research and 
technology application (ORTAs) inside federal laboratories. This act was later 
amended and expanded by the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (PL 99-
502) that introduced economic incentives for federal researchers to seek technology 
transfer and for federal laboratories to enter into Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreements (CRADAs) with private parties (Guston, 2000; see 
Chapter 5). The incentives for universities (Bayh-Dole), federal laboratories 
(Stevenson-Wydler), and CRADAs (FTTA) mutually reinforced each other, and 
created a favorable environment for patenting and licensing to industry. The 
increasing patenting observed through the 1970s (Figure 1) stressed and strained the 
appellate courts that at the time were responsible for hearing appeals in patent 
infringement cases. To address this problem, Congress created in 1982 the CAFC or 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (PL 98-462) that centralized patent appeal 
decisions under a specialized court. The creation of CAFC intended to relieve the 
regional appellate courts from the flood of patent cases and to provide greater 
consistency across decisions. Greater consistency was in fact achieved; nevertheless, 
taken together and in comparison with the previous decentralized system, the 
decisions of the new court are skewed towards leniency in judging the validity of 
patents and towards severity in sanctioning patent infringement (Henry and Turner, 
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2006; Lunney, 2003). Further restrictions related to anti-trust legislation were relaxed 
under the National Co-operative Research Act of 1984 (PL 98-462) for patents 
under public-private research joint ventures (see Scott, 2008). Another protection, 
more specific to the pharmaceutical industry, was packaged in the Hatch-Waxman 
Act of 1984 (PL 98-417) that extended patent rights up to five years to compensate 
pharmaceutical companies for the lengthy approval process of a new drug (on 
average 7.5 years). Further protection to patenting in the biotechnology and software 
industries was given by two Supreme Court decisions, respectively: Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty (447 U.S. 303/1980) initiated the patenting of genetically engineered life 
forms and Diamond v. Diehr (450 U.S. 175/1981) paved the way for the patenting of 
software.5 This overhaul of patent policy created a favorable environment for 
patenting, yet it is evident that this environment—of which Bayh-Dole is part—is 
not responsible for the growth in patenting activity anymore than a cold winter is the 
cause of a flu pandemic.6 
What then was the cause of the growth of university patenting? Three 
possible explanations have been put forward. First, starting in the late 1960s, the U.S. 
government sought greater control of the research agenda and research output of 
universities (see Guston, 2000, pp. 77-85); while the total federal research budget did 
                                                 
5 Following the precedent of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the U.S. Trademark and Patent Office modified 
its guidelines declaring “non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including 
animals, to be patentable subject matter” (USTPO, 1987). Diamond v. Diehr allowed the patenting of a 
machine controlled by a computer creating an exception to the theretofore exclusion of mathematical 
algorithms as patentable subject matter, the scope of which was later expanded by various rulings of 
the CAFC and ultimately codified in the USTPO 1996 guidelines for computer-related claims 
(USTPO, 1996). 
6 Other relevant legislation includes the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (PL 97-414) granting a seven year 
exclusive license of government patents related to drugs that target rare diseases (less than 200,000 
patients diagnosed) and the U.S. Trade Representative’s mandate known as “Special 301” used to 
monitor and sanction U.S. trade partners that fail to provide adequate IPR protection. For further 
reference see Coriat and Orsi (2002; Table 1, p. 1494). 
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not fall, the focus on some research programs (e.g. Research Applied to National 
Needs7 and Nixon’s War on Cancer) benefited some universities more than others, 
increasing pressure for those in the funding periphery to seek sources of income 
other than federal grants. The economic crisis on the 1970s may have accentuated 
this problem as state budgets for education shrank and university endowments 
contracted. Second, new technologies produced entire families of new patentable 
inventions. One such family of novelties is in the field of biotechnology that through 
the 1970s flourished into a well established discipline and industry (see the history of 
molecular biology in Judson, 1996|1979; and of bioengineering in Citron and 
Nerem, 2004). Another sector that expanded quickly in the 1980s is computer 
software, both personal computers and network servers. Looking at patent data, 
Kortum and Lerner (1998) show that from 1969 and 1991 biotechnology and 
software patents nearly doubled their weight in the total of patents (from 3% to 6% 
for biotechnology and from 4% to 7% in software). The third explanation for the 
increase in university patenting is a cultural change in the academic and business 
worlds about the role of patents. The attitudes of university administrators and even 
the disposition of some scientists towards patenting has turned from reluctance to 
euphoria in three decades, from setting their scruples aside and timidly patenting 
university inventions to actively seeking and promoting patenting (Greenberg, 
2007—see specially Chapter 4; also Bok, 2003). Today, most research universities 
encourage (if not require) their faculty and staff to provide invention disclosures 
when appropriate, have all personnel sign patent release contracts, and they give 
                                                 
7 The NSF started in 1971 the Research Applied to National Needs (RANN) program; expanding the 
previous short-lived Interdisciplinary Research on Problems Relevant to Our Society (IRPOS) 
program. 
  45 
great latitude to their offices of technology transfer to maximize licensing profit, 
including sometimes undertaking aggressive litigation (Greenberg, 2007). 
In summary, the ostensible goal of Bayh-Dole was to accelerate 
commercialization of public R&D. Consequently, evaluation studies seek to assess 
whether this goal was accomplished. Because commercialization itself is difficult to 
measure directly, evaluators focus on university patenting—deemed strongly related 
to commercialization. University patenting has grown significantly, yet this growth 
started before Bayh-Dole was enacted. In fact, the drivers of the explosion of 
university patenting—the coming to maturity of emerging fields of research, and 
institutional changes in university funding—are unrelated to the Act. Still, important 
reforms to the patent system that started in 1980 did create a favorable environment 
for patenting, and Bayh-Dole is undoubtedly an important part of these reforms. For 
this very reason, the Act should be seen more as a catalyst than as a driver of the 
growth in university patenting. What is more, due to the interconnectedness of these 
reforms, it is difficult and perhaps futile to try to separate the individual effect of the 
Act (Mowery et al., 2001; Mowery et al., 2004; and Mowery and Ziedonis, 2000; 
2002). 
It should be added that the effects of the Act have not been assessed only in 
reference to its goal of accelerating commercialization of university inventions. Other 
important effects have been discussed, mainly in relation to the quality of university 
patenting and the organization of university research. These are discussed next. 
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2.4 Assessing the Unanticipated Consequences of Bayh-Dole. 
The unintended effects of Bayh-dole can be arranged in three groups: effects 
on the efficiency of the innovation system, effects on the internal organization and 
culture of science broadly and the university particularly, and effects on the 
distribution of costs and benefits of innovation. What follows in this chapter engages 
the former two groups because they have received serious attention in the literature. 
Because the latter has been generally neglected, Chapter 3 introduces my own 
analysis of distributional outcomes. 
  
2.4.1 Effects on the efficiency of the innovation system. 
The most common heuristic representation of innovation is referred to as 
the “linear model of innovation,” as it evokes the image of an assembly line where 
the conveyor belt transports raw materials through different processes to convert 
them into a final product. This process originates in basic research, the findings of 
which are later used to solve specific problems through applied research, that feeds the 
stage of development for the mass production of final products (a canonical 
representation in Ziman, 1987). Although this representation has been charged with 
obscuring rather than illuminating how innovation takes place, it remains widely used 
in public discourse and to some extent in empirical evaluations of science policy, 
including evaluations of Bayh-Dole (for a history of the linear model as a discourse, 
see Godin, 2006). 
National accounting of innovation is partly responsible for the pervasiveness 
of the linear model. For instance, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget under 
Circular A-11 (2009) requires federal agencies to account for R&D expenses under 
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the basic-applied-development template; what is more, agencies that account 
expenses in greater detail must fit their typology within the same template (see 
Fossum et al., 2000 for a comparison with the U.S. Department of Defense).8 The 
result is that the main sources of data, such as the annual NSF report on national 
patterns of R&D (NSF, 2007), shape hypothesis formation in the cast of the linear 
model. 
As a heuristic description, the linear model implies a parsimonious division 
of labor. In the case at hand, the division of labor among the organizations 
participating in innovation accords to the government the funding of research, to 
universities and national laboratories the performing of research, and to industry the 
development of research findings into products and their commercializing. It also 
implies a boundary between the public and private spheres of innovation, placing 
universities on the boundary of these two spheres. From this perspective, the 
problem, as Bayh-Dole conceived it, was very clear: resources flowed from 
government to universities and laboratories but the resulting inventions barely 
trickled to industry because of the ambiguity of patent rights. As said earlier, the Act 
sought to widen this bottleneck and various evaluations of Bayh-Dole are couched in 
this logic. In what follows, I will engage these studies in their own terms. Later, in 
Section 2.4, I will show the inadequacy of some of these studies from a different 
perspective. 
Political discourse linked innovation to the public interest through economic 
growth and competitiveness (see Chapter 4). The currency of this normative link has 
                                                 
8 The status of the “linear model of innovation” in innovation studies is comparable to that of the 
“linear policy process” in public policy studies. 
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nursed a consensus in innovation policy about targeting the pace of innovation.9 It is 
plain that this was the ostensible goal of Bayh-Dole: to accelerate innovation by 
fostering commercialization of inventions. Consequently, evaluators have identified 
problematic effects where Bayh-Dole (and the other patent reforms) may be slowing 
down innovation, to wit: the crowding-out of basic research, inefficiencies in the 
Republic of Science,10 and perverse incentives. 
Crowding-out basic research. 
The sequential logic of the linear model implies that undermining basic 
research is equivalent to thinning the stream of innovation at the headspring. Hence 
the concern for the absolute and relative size of basic research in the university 
research portfolio. 
Measuring basic research is not straightforward, but empirical studies have 
suggested that some useful inferences are possible by examining patent data. There is 
in fact a long tradition of research that uses patent data to measure various aspects of 
innovation (for a review see Griliches, 1990). Two of these measures are patent 
importance and patent generality. In order to prove “novelty,” a patent application must 
account for prior art including all existing patents relevant to the invention at hand. 
Between two patents, the one more often cited should be deemed relatively more 
important, because it leads to more novel inventions, all else being equal—i.e. given 
                                                 
9 Generally, innovation policy seeks to affect the pace but also the direction of innovation. While 
there is broad consensus in policy aimed at accelerating innovation, some controversy exists for policy 
that seeks to direct innovation towards certain economic sectors. Bayh-Dole is considered a “neutral 
instrument” because, a priori, it does not benefit any specific sector at the expense of another. 
10 The phrase “Republic of Science” was introduced by Michael Polayni (1962) who argued that 
science is a social institution with such a political and economic structure that resemble that of a 
republic of its own. 
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that both patents were granted at the same time and in the same economic sector.11 
Moreover, between two patents of equal importance, the one less concentrated in a 
single sector is relatively more general, since its impact extends across more 
economic sectors. 
Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1998) compared university patents 
against non-university patents (a 1% random sample) looking at patents issued from 
1970 through 1988 and patent citations up to 1992. They observed that university 
patents were more important (between 1970 and 1983) and more general (between 
1975 and 1983) than the comparison group. However, by the mid 1980s (between 
1984 and 1988) no difference is discernible suggesting a drop in the quality of 
university patents. 
Sampat, Mowery, and Ziedonis (2003), replicated the analysis of Henderson 
and colleagues adding seven more years of forward citations including data until 
1999. Henderson et al. (1998) had anticipated a truncation bias, and indeed this was 
apparent when more years were considered. As it turns out, post Bayh-Dole 
university patents are as important as pre 1980 patents but the bulk of citations 
arrives at a later time, and that explains why Henderson and colleague observed a 
drop in quality. These “changes in the intertemporal distribution of citations”, 
Sampat et al. (2003, p. 1373) found, are partly explained by a systematic increase in 
lag between application and granting of patents, but the question of the 
intertemporal effect remains open.  
                                                 
11 Forward citations are admittedly an imperfect measure of patent use in productive activities, the 
latter being closer to the notion of patent importance. 
  50 
The patent reforms of the 1980s led to a concern for technology transfer 
activities to displace basic research at university and government R&D laboratories 
(Rahm, Bozeman, and Crow, 1988).  Along the same line, evaluators of Bayh-Dole 
(e.g. Foray and Kazancigil, 1999) worried that the Henderson et al. (1998) study 
suggested that applied research was crowding-out basic research. Such a conjecture 
depends on the assumption that basic research patents are more important than 
applied research patents and these last are not more important than non-university 
patents. However, when the Sampat et al. (2003) study refuted the lower quality 
thesis and suggested instead an intertemporal effect, the question was somewhat 
reversed. Under the assumption that basic research produces patents that take longer 
to be widely cited, Bayh-Dole could have either increased the relative production of 
new basic research patents or it could have opened up a stock of patentable 
inventions that was composed mostly of basic research findings. What is clear in this 
interpretation is that Bayh-Dole seems to have stimulated the patenting of inventions 
further upstream in the innovation process. Using survey data, Jensen and Thursby 
(2001) corroborate this impression showing that universities are licensing mostly 
patents for embryonic inventions: 77% of university patents are either proof of 
concept (48%) or prototypes available only at a laboratory scale (29%).12 
If the hypothesis that Bayh-Dole led to a crowding-out of basic research is 
correct, then the effect should be observed in the historic composition of the 
portfolio. However, looking at the time series of university R&D expenditures, 
                                                 
12 Survey data from 62 U.S. research universities reporting technology transfer operation from 1991 
through 1995 (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). 
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Rafferty (2008) finds no “structural break” around 1980;13 all trends—basic, applied, 
and development—remain unchanged. If instead the hypothesis that Bayh-Dole 
encouraged the patenting of existing inventions (the low-hanging fruit) and these 
were mostly basic research findings, the resulting wave of patenting should be 
observable in the graphed series (Figure 1) and detected in Rafferty’s (2008) tests of 
structural changes. But no such wave is observed. The intertemporal effect of Bayh-
Dole in the distribution of patents is perhaps not well explained by a model of 
innovation that explains the additional lag on university patents on a basic and 
applied dichotomy. A deeper insight into the nature of inventions that universities 
are patenting motivated case study research. 
Responding to the Henderson et al. (1998) study, Mowery and Ziedonis 
(2000, 2002) examined the patenting of three major research universities, University 
of California (UC), Stanford University, and Columbia University; the former two 
had experience patenting before Bayh-Dole and the latter started only afterwards. 
They observed two important phenomena: First, biotechnology—dominated by 
applications in biomedicine—had increased its importance in the portfolio of 
disclosures, patents, licensed patents and income-yielding licenses of UC and 
Stanford, but this change had started about a decade before Bayh-Dole was enacted. 
Second, they observed no drop in importance and generality in the UC and Stanford 
patents, they observed too that these patents were of higher quality than the patents 
of the less experienced Columbia—experienced in patenting, that is—although 
Columbia’s patents remain more important and general than non-academic patents. 
                                                 
13 It should be added that Rafferty’s (2008) analysis does find structural changes that occurred before 
Bayh-Dole, likely connected with the coming to maturity of the biotechnology and software industries 
that I described in the previous section. 
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The authors concluded that there is a learning curve in the business of university 
patenting; universities that had started to patent and license before Bayh-Dole were 
ahead of a learning curve while the others, like Columbia, trying to catch up had 
been a little less selective of the inventions they were patenting. Under this light, the 
change in the intertemporal distribution of citations of university patents discussed 
earlier could be attributed, as suspected by Henderson et al. (1998), to lower quality 
patents; albeit not necessarily to lower quality research. It was the inexperience of 
“entrepreneurial university administrators” (Thursby and Thursby, 2002) who, once 
Bayh-Dole passed, rushed to take title on batches of low quality patents. This 
accounts for the “transitory element” of the intertemporal effect, transitory because, 
at some point, universities become more selective of what they patent and learn the 
business of licensing (Mowery, Sampat, and Ziedonis, 2002). Moreover, to the extent 
that the intertemporal effect of Bayh-Dole has a “permanent element”, this is 
attributable to the increasing number of biotechnology patents. Forward citations for 
patents in this field are likely to peak later than other patents because their prior art is 
more densely patented and they are more highly contested (see below “patent 
thickets”). 
An underlying concern of the crowding-out of basic research was that 
researchers themselves, by effect of the Act, had shifted their attention away from 
fundamental questions in pursuit of applications that led to royalty income. This 
culture change hypothesis is, as seen above, not supported by evidence, at least not 
strictly in terms of basic versus applied research (Mowery et al. 2001; Mowery et al. 
2004; and Thursby and Thursby, 2002). It would seem more plausible to talk of a 
crowding-into of biotechnology, which has characteristics of both basic and applied 
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research; more specifically, in biotechnology the search for fundamental knowledge 
is not considered exclusive of the pursuit of practical applications which bear the 
prospect of royalty income. The greater currency of biotechnology and this field’s 
own dynamics promoted greater tolerance and even at times eagerness among faculty 
to patent their research findings. More than a cultural change then, what took place 
was a change in attitudes towards patenting. Still, this change is not causally 
attributable to Bayh-Dole but it was certainly facilitated its endorsement of university 
patenting. What this change permitted, however, was the patenting and licensing of 
research findings (stocked and new) that previously had been placed in the public 
domain, and in many cases patent rights were asserted on inputs for further research 
as if they were no different from inputs for final products. Many evaluators of Bayh-
Dole (see below) worry that this lack of discrimination in what is being patented 
should have an effect, too, in the organization of science. 
Inefficiencies in the Republic of Science. 
The linear model of innovation stresses the importance of science as the 
foundation of innovation. In this perspective, a division of labor is implied between 
laboratories (of universities and government) and firms, each performing a 
characteristic task (research and development) and a specific output (science and 
technology). Other models (e.g. the evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter, 
1982) do not readily accept that innovation follows a sequential process or that labor 
is divided so neatly, but they too stress the importance of science in innovation. 
Hence the widespread concern that Bayh-Dole disrupted the organization of science, 
and that a weakened science risks constricting and slowing down innovation (Merges 
and Nelson, 1990; and Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). 
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This concern presumes a demarcation of science and while the demarcation 
debate is inconclusive, it can be shown that most evaluators of Bayh-Dole seem to 
subscribe to (or their arguments are subsumed by) the characterization of the “new 
economics of science” (Dasgupta and David, 1994).14 In contrast to the old 
economics of science (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962), Dasgupta and David adopt a 
sociological perspective and discern between science and technology by looking at 
the different socio-political arrangements of the communities that produce science 
and technology. Previous theorized distinctions—ontological, epistemological, 
methodological, and financial15—are rendered in this view epiphenomenal to these 
socio-political arrangements and their respective incentive mechanisms. In the 
domain of science, the rewards (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) are allocated 
according to the “rule of priority” of discovery, and given that discovery must be 
demonstrable, this incentive encourages disclosure of findings, methods, and data 
into the public domain. Conversely, in the domain of technology the goal is to gain 
commercial advantage and the incentive encourages either secrecy or, when patent 
protection is reliable, patenting. A central point of this characterization is that 
disclosure of scientific findings into the public domain is not only a consequence of 
                                                 
14 The new economics has been greatly influential because it synthesizes much of the economics and 
sociology of science of the post-war period with important exceptions being the French “Action 
Network Theory” and the Scottish sociology of the “Strong Program.” It should be added that 
Dasgupta and David (1994) do not subscribe to the linear model of innovation although it could be 
considered a particular case of their framework. 
15 Ontological because as objects they were differentiated by their inherent attributes, such as 
appropriability or uncertainty—for instance, a central concept in the old economics was to construe 
science as a public good. Epistemological, in the philosophical quest for the demarcation of science 
from other forms of knowledge and thus rendering technology outside the province of science, albeit 
as a derivative of it. Methodological to the extent that scientists and engineers are presumed to follow 
different research strategy to acquire their knowledge.  Financial, the source of funding for science 
(generally public) is often presumed distinct from that for technology (a mix of public and private). 
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the organization of science but also guarantees its rapid and robust advancement 
(Dasgupta and David, 1994; Nelson, 2002; Rai and Eisenberg, 2003). 
The problem “arises when the domain of public science becomes entangled 
with the domain of proprietary product development.” (Eisenberg and Nelson, 2002, 
p. 93) or put another way, the “narrowing of the conceptual gap between 
fundamental research and commercial application” (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003, p. 289). 
With the Supreme Court decisions that expanded the definition of patentable subject 
matter (referred to in Section 2.3) and the U.S. Patents and Trademark Office 
following suit, the entanglement has been inevitable and the profit motive has 
quickly advanced over what was traditionally governed by the rule of priority of 
discovery and public disclosure. Patented databases and materials force researches to 
take license before undertaking research paths that make use of these tools. In fact, 
in the field of biomedical research it has become a matter of regular business to sign 
and pay for patent licenses, material transfer agreements, and database access 
agreements. For instance, in the sequencing of the human genome, the publicly 
sponsored Human Genome Project (HGP) created the Genbank database in the 
public domain, but this has not prevented private firm Celera from establishing 
proprietary databases and selling access to research universities, hospitals and even 
the National Cancer Institute. Evidently, Celera’s gene sequencing data and other 
capabilities in bioinformatics provide a service to research organizations beyond 
what they can freely acquire from Genbank, but this only highlights the fact that 
these universities now consider payment for research tools a normal course of 
business, even in genetics where a significant public investment regimented open 
disclosure of sequences. 
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Nelson and Eisenberg (2002) observe that the parallel development of public 
and private data may have actually complemented each other in a race to map the 
human genome thus making genetic biology more robust. Their concern is not this 
public-private complementarity, but that patenting research tools and licensing them 
on an exclusive basis is becoming “normal practice.” A dramatic example in which 
this practice restricted further research and market competition is the case of 
research on the breast cancer genes called BRCA1 and BRCA 2. Parthasarathy (2007) 
has documented how the patenting of the BRCA genes weakened both the research 
program and the healthcare provided with these genes. The sequencing of BRCA1 
involved significant public funding and was the joint effort of five organizations—
University of Utah, McGill University and National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences (of the NIH), and firms Eli Lilly and Myriad Genetics—that 
involved 45 researchers in total. This was only one of several research programs that 
had zeroed in the BRCA genes and much of the knowledge and methods were 
common knowledge in the scientific community. In fact, Mike Stratton’s team (not 
Myriad) is generally credited with uncovering BRCA2 and his priority was recognized 
with a patent in the UK. Nevertheless, Myriad was granted patents for BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 in the U.S. and this firm used them to set up a profitable testing service. 
What is more, at the time Myriad was awarded the testing for BRCA, genes were 
already being provided—specifically, University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic 
Diagnostic Laboratory (GDL) and firm OncoMed (using the Stratton patent). 
Parthasarathy (2007) shows that these laboratories were not only more cost-effective 
for patients but provided higher standards of care than Myriad; particularly, GDL 
and OncoMed used to provide counseling of patients by genetic specialists following 
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the recommendation of several professional associations in light of the complexity 
underlying the interpretation of BRCA tests. Yet, Myriad bought the OncoMed 
patents for an undisclosed amount and then forced GDL to discontinue their testing 
services with the consequent constraint on their research program because GDL 
could no longer access new patients’ genetic data.16 
Another prominent example is that of the OncoMouse, a mouse 
bioengineered to carry an activated oncogene and thus a predisposition to cancer; it 
is therefore clear that the sole purpose of creating this mouse was to further 
research. Harvard University was granted a patent for the OncoMouse in 1988 that 
was subsequently licensed on exclusive basis to DuPont who, not without 
controversy, charged hefty fees and imposed a number of restrictions to sublicensing 
(Marshall, 2002; Hanahan, Wagner, and Palmiter, 2007). DuPont is also infamous for 
licensing with “reach through” provisions by means of which it retains a claim to 
royalties from products developed from research with the OncoMouse. This practice 
has extended to university licenses too. WARF, the patenting office of University of 
Wisconsin, has also included a reach through clause in licenses of its human embryos 
stem-cell (HES) patents derived from research funded partly by NIH. This decision 
triggered litigation and controversy that mounted pressure on WARF for 
renegotiating the licensing terms to research organizations. Because the research that 
led to the patents was partly funded by NIH, the agency could execute its rights 
under Bayh-Dole if it was able to demonstrate a failure on the part of WARF to 
practice the patent widely. This implicit threat enabled Public Health Services to 
                                                 
16 On March 30, 2010, a Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff (and against Myriad) invalidating the 
patent on the basis that naturally occurring substances should not be patented. The case will be 
appealed in the Federal Circuit (Schwartz J., and Pollack A., 2010). 
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negotiate low licensing fees and a waiver to reach through licensing for research uses 
of the HES patents, albeit inter-laboratory sharing of materials was kept restricted. 
High fees and the reach through provision remained in effect for other licensees 
(Wadman, 2005; Eisenberg and Rai, 2004). Patenting of research tools has, in those 
instances, disrupted the organization of science and its incentives for public 
disclosure of findings.  
These examples are just anecdotes. However, a more systematic threat to 
science is in the impetus for establishing those special tactics, including exclusive 
licensing, patent hoarding, and reach through provisions as “normal practices.” If 
those practices are effectively normalized, the patent system risks inducing the 
formation of an “anticommons”, that is, “a property regime in which multiple 
owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource” (Heller, 1998, p. 668). 
To understand this problem, recall the “tragedy of the commons” that occurs when 
lack of property rights leads to overuse of a scarce resource (Hardin, 1968). 
Biotechnology, argue Heller and Eisenberg (1998), is a clear example of the “tragedy 
of the anticommons” because the building blocks of certain scientific puzzles are 
patented to different parties, and each party excludes others from using its own 
piece. The solution to the puzzle becomes eventually “common” knowledge in the 
scientific community and yet it cannot be used to advance the science of that puzzle. 
Heller and Henderson (1998) illustrate this point with the patenting of receptors 
(cells that react to stimuli). New drug development involves testing it against all 
known receptors in the relevant families of receptors, but if these are patented to 
multiple companies every new drug would required the impossible task of collecting 
all relevant patents; developers are slowed down by a “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 
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2000). Specifically, when Heller and Eisenberg (1998, p. 699) searched the term 
“adrenergic receptor” in an index of patents, they found it in more than 100 patents. 
Seide and MacLeod (1998) claim that only a small portion of these patents would be 
required for any given application, but the point remains that research in said 
receptor, if not already an anticommons problem, it is at serious risk of becoming 
one. 
In a study commissioned by the National Research Council, Walsh, Arora, 
and Cohen (2006) concede that much, but stress that the emergence of anticommons 
should not be exaggerated. They argue that the preconditions for anticommons are 
latent; yet, patents on research tools “do not yet pose the threat to research projects” 
(p. 322). This, suggest Walsh and colleagues, is in part due to countervailing actions 
taken by federal agencies—as in the case of the Public Health Service that negotiated 
differentiated treatment for research with HES patents—and some isolated efforts 
from the biomedical industry. In some niches of drug development the risk of 
anticommons has given way to the promotion of public disclosure of findings or 
alternatively the use of patent pools. Examples are, respectively, the Wellcome Trust 
(associated with the HGP) that set up a public database of single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNP, base-points of individual variation in the DNA) and the 
Public Intellectual Property Resources for Agriculture (PRIPRA) that organizes 
bundling and pooling of patents in agribusiness (see Winickoff, Saha, and Graff, 
2009). 
It is not clear yet the extent to which this countercurrent can reinforce itself 
and eventually provide sufficient resistance to the increasing use of research-tool 
patents. What is clear is that it will depend on future patent policy, judicial precedent, 
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and particularly the organizational capabilities that universities develop to manage the 
tensions between public and private domains of intellectual property. 
Perverse incentives. 
When a university engages in patenting and licensing, two of its critical 
functions, securing self-sustenance and fulfilling its service mission, are set in 
conflict. However, the office that manages the university’s intellectual property, the 
office of technology transfer (OTT), is not commonly structured to balance this 
tension. Jensen and Thursby (2001) surveyed 62 OTTs and asked them the following 
question: What are the most important outcomes of their operations? Respondents 
were given a three-item scale of importance (extreme, moderate, not very, plus the 
fourth item not applicable) to apply over five broad categories: revenue generation, 
invention commercialized, licenses executed, attracting sponsored research, and 
patents generation. Revenue generation ranked above all other categories with 71% 
of respondents thinking it was extremely important. The other four categories were 
also extremely important by decreasing proportions of respondents (61%, 49%, 35%, 
and 17% respectively). It is reasonable to expect that responses of OTT officials 
might have deflated the revenue motive and inflated the other categories to project 
an image of themselves as entrepreneurs motivated by a balanced mix of goals rather 
than the unidimensional bottom line. Under this light, the candor of OTT officers is 
surprising; they could not conceal that revenue generation commanded their 
professional efforts much more than commercialization itself. Moreover, Jensen and 
Thursby (2001) asked the same question to university administrators about the 
outcomes of their OTTs. In this case, the administrators were speaking of a third 
party, the OTT, and thus felt perhaps less pressure for offering an answer 
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conforming to social expectations. Among administrators, about the same 
proportion (70%) thought that revenue generation was extremely important, but far 
less thought the other four categories were also extremely important. 
In a similar study, Rahm and Hansen (2002) surveyed 121 OTT managers 
about their understanding of the costs and benefits of technology transfer and found 
great consensus in their definitions, with “money for research” the dominant 
definition of benefit. This is surprising given that few universities do actually profit 
from technology transfer. The answer suggests an organizational culture within 
OTTs that values revenue generation above all else. Consider now, from the same 
study, the responses of 759 industry-linked academic researchers, i.e. “PhD-level 
researchers who have interacted with businesses in an effort to transfer knowledge, 
know-how, or a technology” (Rahm and Hansen, 2002, p. 60). Rahm and Hansen 
(2002) inquired about the researchers’ definition of success in university-industry 
technology transfer. When they analyzed the answers to their open-ended questions 
they found that 85% of respondents understood success of technology transfer 
operations as benefit for the firm, the researcher, or both and only 2% thought 
success was characterized by benefit for society. 
It is clear that OTTs aim to maximize revenues. Their operation may be 
compared to venture capitalists, because OTTs often keep oversight on legal aspects 
and the business strategy of the firms to which they license, taking even, in some 
cases, a stakeholder interest in those firms (about 10.3% of the time based on my 
tabulation with data from AUTM, 2008). 
Furthermore, OTTs are insulated as much as possible from the university 
structure and in some cases they are even chartered as independent legal vehicles. 
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This insulation allows the OTT a degree of independence to manage its operations 
and thus to be assessed simply on revenue generation. At the same time it allows 
university administrators to distance themselves from practices that, however normal 
in the venture capital business, might be considered unbecoming of a not-for-profit 
organization. 
Among these questioned practices, the most prevalent is unnecessary 
exclusive licensing. Exclusive licenses are justified in several circumstances, especially 
when only one start-up firm has the capacity for developing a patent or when 
significant costs, such as those of new drug development, would prevent 
development under a competitive market structure (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). 
Other times, however, non-exclusive licenses suffice for widespread use and 
development of a patent, the Cohen-Boyer patents being a good example. Yet, even 
in cases where non-exclusive terms are good enough, the pressure for revenue 
generation will lead OTTs to seek high-yielding exclusive contracts, as in the case of 
the OncoMouse. 
It seems that not all patents under Bayh-Dole are licensed on exclusive basis. 
This begs the question: are exclusive licenses pervasive? 
AUTM reports that U.S. universities and hospitals in 2007 licensed 36% of 
all executed licenses on exclusive terms. Furthermore, of all active licenses that year, 
48% yielded some income (Figure 3). The AUTM survey does not offer a breakdown 
of income data by exclusive and non-exclusive licenses; nevertheless, a rough 
approximation can be made because, between 1996 and 2007, on average, 
universities executed 45% of their licenses on a exclusive basis, and of all their active 
licenses only 43% yielded income. Add to this the fact that exclusive licenses 
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generally yield higher income than non-exclusive ones and it can be safely 
conjectured that the bulk of licensing income has historically come from exclusive 
licenses.  
Moreover, the observed declining trend in the proportion of exclusive to 
total licenses (Figure 4) need not imply a decline in the proportion of revenue that 
exclusive licenses yield; exclusive licenses will not fall into disuse nor will they cease 
driving licensing revenues in so far as they remain unregulated. On the obverse side 
of the coin, 64% of all licenses in 2007 were non-exclusive contracts. Considering 
that exclusive rights pay higher royalties, the large proportion of patent licenses 
without exclusivity may be in part due to a low demand for those patents and in part 
due to the universities making a conscious effort to balance their own financial 
interest with the needs of various users of those patents, as it was the case with the 
aforementioned Cohen-Boyer and Axel patents. 
Furthermore, the profit motive led legal teams at OTTs to come up with 
creative provisions, such as reach-through royalties, and some universities have 
permitted their OTTs to pursue even more aggressive tactics. The most visible 
example of this has been the case of the Axel co-transformation patents, a significant 
discovery in biomedicine that enables researchers to induce production of specific 
proteins in mammalian cells by inserting genes. Colaianni and Cook-Deegan (2009) 
described how Columbia University not only aggressively litigated the infringement 
of the Axel patents—and won in the case against Roche Diagnostics—but also 
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sought to extend the expiration of these patents by filing successive divisional and 
continuation applications until 1995.17  
Figure 3. Cumulative Total of Active Licenses. 
 
 
Source: My own tabulation with data from AUTM (2008). 
                                                 
17 It used to be that patents in the U.S. protected rights of use for 17 years from the “date of issue”. 
Since June 8, 1995, rights are extended for 20 years counting from “date of application”, not date of 
issue anymore. Divisional applications are filed in response to the patent office objection that the 
application encompassed more than one invention. Continuation applications are filed to revise a 
claim. These applications retained the original priority date and until the aforementioned reform, 
effectively extended the issue date as the patent office had to review the applications anew. 
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Figure 4. Licenses Executed (per year). 
 
 
Source: My own tabulation with data from AUTM (2008). 
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(Colaianni and Cook Degan, 2009)—the costs for these firms dropped by the 
amount of the license fees and royalties, yet their prices on co-transformation related 
products did not fall proportionally. 
In addition to a preference for exclusive licenses and the other licensing 
practices, universities have, in fact, become more aggressive asserting their patent 
rights in the courts (Moore, 2001; Bessen and Meurer, 2008, c.f. Leaf, 2005). The 
normalization of these practices sends a clear signal that the universities have a clear 
economic interest in patent protection. This was the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
of the Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke (307 F.3d 1351/Fed. Cir. 2002). Physicist 
John Madey had sued his former employer, Duke University, for infringement of his 
patent, and while a trial court granted summary judgment for Duke based on the 
“experimental use doctrine,”18 the Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Madey, noting 
that “Duke… like other major research institutions of higher learning, is not shy in 
pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program from which it derives a not 
insubstantial revenue stream” (307 F.3d 1351). Eisenberg (2003) observes that this 
decision did “not extinguish the experiment use defense entirely, [but] it eviscerated 
it to the point that it is essentially useless to research universities” (p. 1019). 
Undoubtedly, universities are now forced to spend money and time negotiating 
licenses that before the Madey ruling did not seem necessary, and both firms and 
universities are growing more suspicious of each other and entering into lengthier 
negotiations to cover all possible liabilities of licensing contracts (Thursby and 
Thursby, 2006). Whereas Bayh-Dole sought to “lubricate” the transactions between 
                                                 
18 The doctrine dates back to 1813 when the Supreme Court ruled on the Whittemore v. Cutter case. 
Justice Story added to the court’s opinion a dicta legalese (a statement without binding authority) to the 
effect that the legislature could not have intended to prohibit mere experimental use of inventions. 
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university and industry, the profit incentive seem to have had the perverse effect of 
increasing “friction” in that relationship. 
But the problem is larger than that of the OTTs, for, however insulated, 
universities cannot fully disown these units and their practices. What is more, the 
profit incentive introduced by Bayh-Dole and the other reforms possibly exerted 
influence also in other units and domains of university activity. 
 
2.4.2 Effects on the internal organization of the university. 
In the previous section I showed that a dominant normative concern in 
evaluations of Bayh-Dole is the efficiency of the innovation system. Efficiency is, 
however, not the only measuring rod; neither science nor the university are 
important to society just because they contribute to innovation and economic 
growth. For this reason, many evaluators of patent policy have displaced efficiency 
from the normative center of attention (although rarely excluded it completely) and 
assessed instead Bayh-Dole’s effect on other values that they ascribe to science and 
universities. These evaluation studies follow the Weberian strategy of crafting an 
“ideal type” for both institutions (on this strategy see Palumbo and Nachmias, 1983) 
and comparing what is observed against that image. 
Robert Merton’s characterization of the “ethos of science” (1973; originally 
published in 1942) is the most influential ideal type science. The scientist, proposed 
Merton, is guided by four norms in performing science, to wit: communism, 
universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. The scientist feels part of a 
communitarian enterprise that seeks universal understanding of nature, i.e. 
knowledge should transcend social and cultural contexts. A conventional reading of 
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Merton takes his famous article to be a descriptive sketch of the organization of 
scientific activity; I would instead submit that he describes the common aspirations 
and beliefs shared by scientists about how science “should” be organized; this 
reading can be supported if we accept that the famous sociologist knew full well that 
these norms are not uniformly observed. 
In contrast, the ideal type university has not been codified to a set of norms the 
way Merton did for science; however, “academic freedom” is widely endorsed as a 
key normative principle in the organization of the university. The defense of 
academic freedom is part and parcel of two doctrines. The first is the autonomy of 
science; a characteristically modern view, popularized by Michael Polanyi as the 
Republic of Science (1962), asserts that the efficient operation of science is only 
possible if no external institution, such as government or the market, attempts to 
guide or steer it.19 The second doctrine, in a pre-modern fashion, argues that a liberal 
education is intrinsically valuable because it is constitutive of the “good life” 
(Nussbaum, 1997), and in its modern version reasserts critical thinking as 
indispensable to democratic order (Menand, 2010). By implication, academic 
freedom becomes a precondition for both: the autonomy of science in academia, and 
the preservation of a liberal arts curriculum. 
Each discourse, the ethos of science and academic freedom, accrued gravitas 
in their respective spheres of influence since the beginning of the twentieth century 
and especially the interwar period, but their organizational aspirations only came to 
fruition in the aftermath of the war. The autonomy of science came to be received by 
                                                 
19 It should be noted that the defense of the autonomy of science is never a case for the autarchy of 
science; quite the contrary, it is an argument to shield public spending for science from political cycles. 
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the political establishment as an article of faith, ironically, when the perils of the Cold 
War elevated scientific research to an imperative for the preservation of democracy 
(Smith, 1990; Hart, 1998). At the same time, U.S. universities were finally able to 
legitimize their dual claim to self-government and government financial support, in 
no small measure, due to their visible contributions to the war campaign (Jencks and 
Reisman, 1969). This claim encompassed the consolidation of the tenure system 
(hitherto unevenly applied for five decades) and faculty discretion over curricula and 
the research agenda (Fuchs, 1963; Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955).20 
It was the accident of war that synchronized these organizational changes in 
science and the university, but their co-occurrence has too often been taken to be a 
single phenomenon. Historiographies that blend the two into one usually attach this 
particular normative conception of science, i.e. Merton’s norms, to university 
practices and behaviors adopted in the name of academic freedom. In other words, 
the normative ideal type of science is conflated with a set of specific university 
practices. 
This “traditional type” university is thus vested with all the virtues of 
Mertonian science and becomes the point of reference evaluating any putative 
departure from the virtuous traditional type. The Weberian evaluations to which I 
have been referring are fashioned accordingly as they all point to a discontinuity or 
inflection point in the trajectory of the university, locating it generally in between the 
mid 1970s and 1980s. Authors in this canon include Slaughter and Leslie (1997) who 
denounce the onset of “academic capitalism” as a process of transformation of the 
                                                 
20 For further reference see van den Haag (1963) and the special issue on academic freedom in Law 
and Contemporary Problems in which it appears. 
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university into a for-profit organization; a process epitomized by the commercial 
success of University of Phoenix. Likewise, Etzkowitz and Webster (1998) suggest 
that the university underwent a second revolution in the 1980s by extending the 
range and depth of its transactions with industry—the first revolution, noted Jencks 
and Reiman (1969), took place in the aftermath of World War II. Calhoun (2006) 
locates the rupture more squarely on Bayh-Dole and the patent reforms of the 1980s, 
buttressing his argument with the collection of incidents reported in Washburn 
(2005). This book shows case after case where commercial interests compromised 
the integrity of university researchers (also on this, see Judson, 2004), where the 
protected domains of the ivory tower—course curriculum, faculty promotions, and 
mentoring of graduate students—were seriously constrained by university-industry 
agreements, and even cases where entrepreneurial administrators committed future 
research of entire departments to industrial sponsors (in the same vein, see 
Greenberg, 2007). Further discontinuities in the trajectory of the traditional 
university are observed not only in research commercialization but also in its 
educational mission, from the provision of undergraduate degrees (Slaughter and 
Rhoades, 2004) to medical schools (Angell, 2004). 
These studies differ in their identification of the inflection and its causes, but 
for all their differences, a remarkable agreement surfaces in their characterization of 
the traditional type university along three organizational attitudes: (A1) public 
disclosure of research findings, (A2) faculty discretion in setting the research agenda 
and teaching curricula, and (A3) impartiality in the conduct and peer-review of 
research. 
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It should be plain that the history of transgressions to these attitudes is as 
long as the history of the attitudes themselves, albeit the literature cited above seems 
to suggest that transgressions are on the rise. This is precisely the significance of the 
evaluation studies mentioned above, which collectively justify a point of inflection, 
generally around Bayh-Dole, and with respect to it demonstrate that the 
transgressions in the succeeding period greatly surpass those in the preceding one. 
Great is the temptation to accept the premises and diagnostics of these studies, 
particularly when one is ready to accept the traditional ideal type as characterized by 
A1, A2, and A3. However, to the extent to which their vantage point is located 
within the university, the analysis is endogenous to a university system in equilibrium, 
and Bayh-Dole (and the other reforms) appears either as an exogenous disruptive 
force, or, when it is linked to the university lobby, all explanatory dynamics remain 
corralled inside the university campus. This endogenous perspective lends at times 
narrative depth to these studies. However, it does so often at the expense of 
analytical breadth, for it neglects important factors outside the universities that drove 
organizational change in the university as well as Bayh-Dole and the other reforms. 
Two other shortcomings in these studies are important to note as well. The 
first is the presumed stability of the traditional type. However conservative is the 
university as an organization, its culture, practices and attitudes are in constant flux; 
taking a representation of university attitudes as frozen in time to produce 
convenient evaluative standards, presumes a stability that those attitudes never really 
exhibited. It becomes apparent in Hofstadter’s (1952) history of higher education in 
the U.S. that colleges and universities have been sensitive to the national political and 
economic circumstances since inception. Likewise, economic histories such as 
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Rosenberg and Nelson (1994), Mowery and Rosenberg (1993), and Mowery et al. 
(2004) recount the significant influence that industry and government exerted over 
research universities throughout their entire history. Consequently, the purity of 
university autonomy and the absence of secrecy and patenting as depicted in the 
traditional type simply cannot be reconciled with the history of the U.S. university. 
The second shortcoming of these evaluation studies is their docile subordination to 
the specific normative theory contained in the ethos of science—the conflation of 
ideal and traditional types that I pointed out earlier. Admittedly, such a normative 
perspective is still the most influential compass for the organization of science in the 
political establishment—recall for instance, the inaugural address of President 
Obama (2009) exhorting to “restore science to its rightful place”. For this very 
reason, these critical studies, at least in a normative sense, amount to little more than 
specious apologies for the establishment. A establishment, should be added, whose 
inadequacies have become increasingly apparent by the very success it has had 
promoting unbridled technological development (Hilgartner, 2010). 
Earlier (Sections 2.4 and 2.4.1) I made the case that Bayh-Dole alone could 
not be considered the cause for the increase in patenting and commercialization, and 
this casts doubt on the claims that the Act caused the institutional discontinuity in 
the recent history of the university. Perhaps not even the set of reforms to the patent 
system taken together marks the inflection because rushing into such a conclusion 
may neglect other important forces, external to the university but exerting important 
influence on it, ranging from increasing international trade, transformation of 
industrial organization and research, and new political priorities arising from the end 
of the Cold War. 
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It would be incorrect to suggest that the studies mentioned above dismiss 
those forces; quite the contrary, they often provide an insight into the operation of 
such forces. Where these evaluations come short, however, is in assembling all the 
explanatory threads into a coherent structure and integrating them with the history 
of the university. Considering the trajectory of the university, and any discontinuity 
in this trajectory, from a higher vantage point than the simple story of a single 
explanatory thread, and rather integrating the several explanations inevitably expands 
the character of policy evaluation into the realms of historic and political analysis as 
well as political economy. More robust studies of the university and the 
commercialization of its functions could be found, for instance, in the analyses of 
former Harvard University president Derek Bok (2003), political scientist David 
Guston (2000), and economic historians Philip Mirowski and Miriam Sent (2008). 
Bok (2003) is worth noting for its historic perspective on university politics and the 
tensions between certain traditional institutions and reforms of commercial bent. 
This study shows that, rather than any major inflection point, it is the gradual 
concession to commercial interests, sometimes born of necessity, that determines the 
trajectory of the university. Bok offers the example of the commercialization of 
varsity sports where every concession given to their establishment in campus 
becomes an irrevocable right of constituencies (popularity hungry administrators, 
alumni association, student bodies) and irreparable damage to others (student 
athletes). In turn, Guston (2000) takes a historic perspective of the entire governing 
system of science policy in the postwar period and integrates the explanatory threads 
with the theories of principal-agent relations and boundary organizations; in this 
account Bayh-Dole is recognized as an important policy reform but within the larger 
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transformation of the U.S. science policy system. Likewise, Mirowski and Sent (2008) 
acknowledge the science policy regime change, but integrate this to the historical 
transformation of large corporations, and particularly the corporate laboratory, to 
explain the changes in the university—drawing from the Chandlerian perspective on 
the rise of the U.S. corporation, its growth and diversification and later restructuring 
and concentration (Chandler, 1977). 
These studies dissect the problem from different angles but they all keep a 
systemic perspective of the whole and seek to integrate extant explanatory threads. 
The aspiration of this more robust type of analysis led a group of innovation scholars 
to propose a systems approach to study innovation. 
 
2.5 Conclusion. 
This survey offers important insights into the significance of Bayh-Dole in 
the U.S. innovation system. First, the oft-repeated claim that the Act initiated an era 
of research commercialization misrepresents the role of this policy. University 
patenting and licensing has a long history and it started to expand more than a 
decade before the Act. Second, Bayh-Dole is best understood as part of an orchestra 
of policy reforms that together in concert lent institutional support to the rapid 
expansion of university patenting and the establishment of offices of technology 
transfer. Third, the greater the distance between these offices and the university, the 
more these offices become unencumbered by the public mission of the university, 
sometimes engaging in practices that to some extent threaten the research 
performance of the universities themselves. Fourth, the organizational changes of 
the university and its relationship with industry respond to larger transformations of 
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the economy and corporate governance and this linkage must be kept in mind when 
considering the institutional design of technology transfer. 
The glaring absence of studies examining the distributional consequences of 
Bayh-Dole as well as other public values immanent to the Act motivate the 
subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
PUBLIC VALUE FAILURE IN THE BAYH-DOLE REGIME 
 
3.1 Introduction. 
The foregoing survey of evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act showed 
that they are generally concerned with the pace of innovation or the transgressions to 
the independence of research. While these concerns are important, I propose here to 
expand the range of public values considered in assessing Bayh-Dole and 
formulating future reforms. To this end, I first examine the changes in the terms of 
the Bayh-Dole debate and the drift in its design. I find that the neoliberal ideas have 
had a definitive influence on U.S. innovation policy for the last thirty years, including 
legislation to strengthen patent protection. I also find that the neoliberal policy 
agenda is articulated and justified in the interest of “competitiveness.” The inherent 
vagueness of the term helps actors to conflate the public interest with economic 
growth. Against that backdrop, I use Public Value Failure criteria to show that values 
such as political equality, transparency, and fairness in the distribution of the benefits 
of innovation, are worth considering to counter the “policy drift” of Bayh-Dole. 
In the last three years, Congress has intensified scrutiny of the Bayh-Dole 
Act (P.L. 96-517) holding hearings to assess the first 25 years of this policy (U.S. 
House of Rep., July 17, 2007), to revise a rarely used provision21 (U.S. Senate, 
October 24, 2007), and more recently, to consider the possibilities for improving the 
technology transfer regime (U.S. House of Rep., June 10, 2010). In the most recent 
                                                 
21 This provision requires government-owned-contractor-operated facilities to pay the government a 
75% of any portion of net operating licensing income (i.e. net of related expenses) that exceeds 5% of 
the facility’s operating budget (35 U.S.C. §202-C-7-E-i). 
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hearing, Rep. Daniel Lipinski (Dem.-IL), chair of the Technology and Innovation 
Subcommittee, announced that the intention of the subcommittee is “to carry out a 
comprehensive review of the Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Acts later this year.” Anticipating that Congress may eventually muster 
the political will to amend Bayh-Dole, the National Research Council (NRC) 
commissioned a consensus report on university management of intellectual property 
that was recently published (NRC, 2010). Because that report synthesizes the 
voluminous literature that assesses Bayh-Dole, this chapter could be read as a 
companion study that points out lacunae in the literature. 
The vast majority of evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act (the “Act”) are 
either concerned with its effects on the pace of innovation or concerned with the 
culture and organization of academic research. Studies of the first type examine, for 
example, the possible loss of quality in university research (e.g. Henderson, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 1998; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Mowery et al., 2004; Mowery and 
Ziedonis, 2002; Rafferty, 2008; Sampat, Mowery and Ziedonis, 2003), the threats to 
basic research from the “enclosure” of the scientific commons (Heller, 1998; Heller 
and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2000; cf. Walsh, Arora, and Cohen, 2003), and the 
friction brought about by aggressive bargainers of intellectual property (Jaffe and 
Lerner, 2004; Thursby and Thursby, 2006). These are presented as problems because 
they risk slowing down innovation. Studies of the second type believe in an ideal set 
of norms for academic research, an “academic ethos” that encompasses norms such 
as the public dissemination of research, impartiality in peer-review, and faculty 
discretion over the curricula and the research agenda.  These authors argue that since 
Bayh-Dole was enacted, the transgressions to these norms have become more 
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frequent and pervasive (Greenberg, 2007; Judson, 2004; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; 
Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005). While both concerns must to be 
taken in consideration to understand the Bayh-Dole regime, I argue in this chapter 
that limiting our attention to them narrows the scope of analysis and misses other 
important values. For instance, “distributive equity” or “political equality” are much 
more adequate values for evaluating outcomes such as affordability of new medical 
treatments or processes such as bureaucratic regulation of patent-based monopolistic 
practices. 
To redress this narrowness in conventional evaluations of Bayh-Dole, I take 
a different approach to evaluation. This approach, called Public Value Mapping 
(Bozeman, 2002; 2007), allows me to explicitly consider public values other than the 
pace of innovation or transgressions to the academic ethos. In order to expand the 
scope of values considered it is necessary to understand the public values that 
currently dominate the institutions and discourses of the Bayh-Dole regime. It is 
necessary as well to examine how the balance between those dominant values shifted 
in time, transforming in turn the terms in which Bayh-Dole was debated and 
implemented. The examination of this dual drift problem—the simultaneous “drift” 
in the policy design and the policy debate—is integral to my analysis. 
Before discussing the dual drift problem, I want to briefly describe what is 
the Public Value Mapping (PVM) approach and why it is suitable for the evaluation 
of Bayh-Dole. Considering that public values are latent in all facets of policy, from 
the formation of expectations to the evaluation of outcomes, PVM is an approach to 
examine policy through the lenses of the intervening public values. PVM redirects 
attention in policy analysis from cause-and-effect relations to the articulation-and-
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realization of public values in the making of policy. Why is PVM useful to examine 
Bayh-Dole? The answer follows from two premises. First, the predominant criteria 
of policy evaluation, the Market Failure Criteria (MFC), are also common rationales 
for policy: government is justified to intervene in the economy only to correct noise 
in the price mechanism. Second, Bayh-Dole is a canonical policy solution to a market 
failure problem. The alleged problem is that firms are reluctant to invest in product-
development if they cannot appropriate the potential returns of their investment, in 
this case, by keeping exclusive rights to the patents of those products. The Bayh-
Dole solution consists in creating a market for those patents: government transfers 
its patent rights to universities, and universities can lease those patents to firms. It 
follows from these premises that, evaluation studies that use the Market Failure 
Criteria will conclude that the Act has been an unqualified success because it did in 
fact create a market for public patents. If evaluators disagree, it will be only about the 
degree of success—as measured by the effectiveness of the appropriation 
mechanism, or how much development and commercialization were really 
streamlined, or whether the incentives introduced have perverse effects. However, 
market failure studies cannot assess the other half of Bayh-Dole on its own merits 
because they must apply the same evaluation standard to all provisions; under that 
light, the provisions to keep a check on the profit motive are bound to be considered 
unnecessary. PVM in turn is normatively more flexible than market failure. It starts 
by identifying the public values that motivated those provisions and then examines 
whether those values were realized in the evolution and implementation of Bayh-
Dole. The normative criteria of PVM are concerned with the realization of core 
public values in the policy making process without necessarily privileging the 
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operation of the markets. In Section 4, I probe Bayh-Dole with the Public Value 
Failure Criteria. 
I should make at this point a conceptual digression to explain my use of 
“policy design.” I use this term in the sense of Schneider and Ingram (1997) to refer 
to the “substance of public policy;” that is, the “blueprints, architecture, discourses, 
and aesthetics of policy.” (p.2). The use of policy design underlines my stance in 
policy analysis that conceives of policy as a fluid institution rather than a crystallized 
rule, and deals with policy making as an ongoing political negotiation rather than a 
multi-stage linear process that commences in formulation and ends in 
implementation. As Schneider and Ingram (1997) point out, the letter of the law is 
fixed but only until the law is amended or modified by other statutes, and more 
pervasively, the letter of the law it always subject to different interpretations and 
those interpretations are subject to contestation. 
Returning to the dual drift problem, I argue that the systematic changes in 
both the Bayh-Dole debate and the policy design can be traced to the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism over U.S. policymaking and to the reforms to the patent system 
(including the amendments to the Bayh-Dole statute). I treat these factors as two 
analytical threads recognizing that they are entwined and interdependent. 
The influence of neoliberal ideas over social and economic policy, over the 
last three decades and on both sides of the Atlantic, cannot be underestimated. 
Neoliberalism is hard to catalogue; it has been variously defined as a doctrine of 
political economy (Harvy, 2007), an ideology (Turner, 2008), and a “thought 
collective” (Mirowski, 2009). For all its internal plurality, its adherents share a 
fundamental commitment to private property, free markets, and a strong state to 
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enforce the law. The neoliberal defense of free markets acquires a political dimension 
when it equates freedom with free markets, adding a moral imperative to the classical 
justification of markets as the most efficient mechanism for the allocation of 
resources. Furthermore, the neoliberal state ought to be small but strong enough to 
effectively enforce the law, property rights, and secure the untroubled operation of 
markets. The dual prescription of unfettered markets and an assertive state have 
pervaded all policy domains, and in the case at hand, their decisive influence on the 
Bayh-Dole regime has been amply noted (Mirowski and Sent, 2007; Nedeva and 
Boden, 2006; Pestre, 2005; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). In Section 2, I bring these 
arguments to bear and discuss the centrality of “competitiveness,” as a key public 
value and a rhetoric trope, to the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate. 
The second factor driving the policy drift in Bayh-Dole can be decomposed 
into two components, “bureaucratic drift” (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987) 
and “legislative drift” (Horn and Shepsle, 1989). Bureaucratic drift—that is, changes 
to the policy by administrative discretion—resulted from the failure of the enacting 
coalition to establish administrative procedures that would effectively constrain the 
profit motive, particularly with respect to exclusive licenses and the emergence of 
“creative” licensing practices (e.g. reach-through clauses). Legislative drift—that is, 
subsequent statutory amendments to the law that alter its mechanisms and aims—
was the consequence of not providing for institutional mechanisms to replicate the 
political pressures of the enacting coalition, particularly with respect to limited 
benefits for large firms and sufficient authority for federal agencies to safeguard the 
public interest. To understand why the enacting coalition arrived at a compromise 
with respect to checks on the profit motive, limitations on large firms, and 
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administrative regulatory discretion, I review in Section 3 the terms of the 
compromise achieved by the enacting coalition and account for the drift in terms of 
amendments to Bayh-Dole, and other changes in the patent law and the patent 
system, including the creation of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit and key 
Supreme Court rulings on patentable subject matter. 
The next two sections will engage respectively with the drift in the debate 
and the drift in the design setting the stage for the analysis of public value failure in 
the subsequent section. The last section draws some conclusions from this analysis. 
 
3.2 The changing terms of the Bayh-Dole debate. 
The impetus for legislative reform does not come as a surprise when one 
considers that the Bayh-Dole debate has carried on for three decades and that critics 
of the Act have redoubled efforts to reform it, lately, opening a new front of attack. 
Whereas past critics of the Act worried that the incentives to accelerate the 
commercialization of public research had a perverse effects on the performance of 
research itself (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Heller, 1998; Henderson, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 1998; Merges and Nelson, 1990; Mowery et al., 2004; Shapiro, 2000), a 
new generation of critics now worries that Bayh-Dole does not facilitate research 
commercialization sufficiently well (Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy, 2007; Kenney and 
Patton, 2009). This latter group, led by researchers of the Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation—a steward of entrepreneurship—proposed to amend Bayh-Dole so that 
inventors retain title to their inventions and be given full discretion over those titles, 
instead of assigning those rights to their employers, the universities. They claim that 
the university is a bottleneck in the commercialization of research and that in order 
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to avert a slowing down of innovation, scientists should be free to choose a partner 
to negotiate the development of their research (Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy, 2007). In 
response, former senator Birch Bayh—one of the Act’s sponsors and its staunchest 
defender—rebuked the Kauffman Foundation proposal, arguing that the university 
was an essential partner in the commercialization of public-funded research, and 
stressed that it was widely believed that Bayh-Dole promoted research 
commercialization and injected dynamism in the U.S. innovation system (Bayh, 
Allen, and Bremer 2009). Still, the Kauffman Foundation proposal was welcomed in 
the business community and endorsed by the influential Harvard Business Review 
(2010), and what is more, Lesa Mitchell, one of its authors and a vice-president at 
that foundation, was invited as a witness to the most recent congressional hearing on 
Bayh-Dole. 
If we remember that the 96th Congress would not have even considered 
Bayh-Dole in 1980 had the proposed bill not included the university in the equation 
(see Stevens, 2004; Washburn, 2005, pp. 63-69), we cannot help to wonder: How did 
we get here? How can a proposal to exclude the university from technology transfer 
be given serious consideration? The answer lies in the changing terms of the Bayh-
Dole debate, particularly the importance that government officials ascribe to patent 
protection and an increasingly liberal attitude of universities administrators towards 
patenting and licensing. Regarding patent protection, with few exceptions 
(particularly chemical and pharmaceutical industries) firms have not used patents as 
the primary strategy to secure the returns of their R&D investments (Levin et al., 
1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; 2002). Still, during the last thirty years, all 
three powers of the U.S. government have strengthened patent protection (Scherer, 
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2009) and even coerced U.S. trade partners to enforce IP law (Haskins, 1998). It may 
seem that these changes to patent policy were driven more by a doctrinaire view of 
patents than the actual needs of industry. 
Regarding the university in the Bayh-Dole regime, the change is visible in the 
attitudes of university administrators towards generating revenue from licensing 
intellectual property. While university patenting was increasing before 1980, the 
prevailing attitude at that time was that patenting was justified only in the public 
interest, and the public interest was thought best served by promoting wide diffusion 
of inventions through affordable non-exclusive licenses—this was precisely the case 
of the famous Cohen-Boyer patents. Today, university administrators are much more 
interested in supporting regional (or national) economic growth than in promoting 
the diffusion of inventions. Because they understand that growth is driven by 
industrial innovation and entrepreneurship, they feel the public interest is best served 
when universities contribute to the creation of new companies. They also know that 
the ultimate measure of entrepreneurial success is the firm’s market capitalization (its 
market value in financial markets). In the case of high-tech start-ups, market 
capitalization depends on intangible assets, and more specifically, on whether the 
firm has exclusive rights to key patents. For this reason, university offices of 
technology transfer have fewer qualms about licensing on exclusive basis than they 
did thirty years ago; the public interest is still guides their actions, only now the 
public interest is conflated with the university financial need and the financial value 
of the firms taking licenses. Again, this change in the way university administrators 
construe the public interest seems guided by a doctrinaire view that privileges 
economic growth over diffusion of innovation—which is a form of economic 
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distribution. Let me stress that these attitudinal changes are not arbitrary; rather, they 
seem to systematically favor property rights and profit maximizing behavior. This 
doctrinaire character of the changes is part and parcel of a larger political project of 
neoliberalism. To understand the drift in the Bayh-Dole debate it is thus necessary to 
account for the influence of neoliberal ideas on innovation and the patent system. 
Let me start by giving some context to the emergence of neoliberal ideas in 
the U.S. By the time Bayh-Dole was enacted, in 1980, the thin political consensus in 
the U.S. on the welfare state was wearing thinner. The electoral contest of that year 
brought a direct attack on big government and the institutions that represented, 
particularly in economic and social policy, the growth of governmental power. The 
economic debacle of the 1970s was the perfect excuse to declare the failure of any 
and all government intervention in the economy, including regulatory and 
redistributive policies. The discourse went beyond simply an electoral platform for it 
drew from the neoliberal project, a philosophical and political project that by that 
time had been in the making for nearly four decades. Neoliberalism has been given 
content by various schools on both sides of the Atlantic and across various 
disciplines—notably in economics, political philosophy, and law—as it is perhaps 
best understood as a thought collective rather than single coherent ideology 
(Mirowski, 2009; cf. Harvey, 2007; Turner, 2008). The greatest affinity among its 
adherents is their shared desire to propose a practical alternative the dominant 
Western traditions of social order: “laissez-faire classical liberalism, social welfare 
liberalism, and socialism” (Mirowski, 2009, p. 431). The variety of intellectual 
programs and significant personalities (and egos) that conformed the neoliberal 
thought collective never allowed to enunciate a manifesto or even a statement of 
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founding principles; however, most members share a fundamental belief in 
unfettered markets, private property, and a minimal but strong state; strong because 
it must be able to adjudicate property disputes between powerful interests (Plehwe 
and Walber, 2006; Turner, 2008). What is more, neoliberals dispute the notion that 
monopolies are antithetical to free markets on the grounds that the prospect of 
monopolistic profits creates the incentive for firms to invest in R&D; monopolies 
are thus necessary for innovation. 
Although the word neoliberalism is not of common use in the U.S.,22 the 
most important economic, trade, and regulatory policies introduced by every 
Administration since Reagan are canonical examples of neoliberal policymaking 
(Meeropol, 1998; Pollin, 2003; Van Horn and Mirowski, 2009), for instance, 
deregulation (and later re-regulation), devolution, the 1995 welfare reform, and 
NAFTA. In the specific case of innovation policy, Slaughter and Rhoades (1996) 
observed the formation of a political coalition that successfully advanced a neoliberal 
agenda under the banner of promoting “competitiveness.” The previous political 
force of innovation policy, the Cold War coalition, underlined the transformative 
character of basic research as the source of U.S. leadership over the Soviet Union. 
They believed that the autonomy of science was a necessary condition to unleash the 
creative forces of basic research and gradually expanded funding for the scientific 
establishment. The new coalition was formed in response to the emergence of Japan 
as an economic power and the seeming loss of competitiveness of the U.S. economy. 
                                                 
22 Neoliberalism, in U.S. political parlance, is more closely aligned with conservatism than it is to 
liberalism. This is due to the curious reversal of meanings that dates back to President Roosevelt 
campaigning for the New Deal reforms and describing them as truly liberal reforms. He did this with 
such success that his political opponents eventually surrendered the word and adopted the label 
conservative for themselves (see Lowi, 1995, p. 87). 
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They attributed the economic success of Japan to strong research in engineering and 
applied programs as well as the adoption of more efficient models of production and 
commercialization. Consequently, they sought to redirect government resources to 
support industrial R&D and business interests. Slaughter and Rhoades (1996) are 
careful not to draw easy distinctions between these coalitions as they recognize that 
the emergence of the competitiveness coalition did not fully displace the Cold War 
coalition. However, these authors stress the increasing power of the new coalition in 
enacting key legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act itself and its later amendments 
(see Section 3), the creation of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit (P.L. 98-
462), the subsidies to private sector R&D through the Small Business Innovation 
Development Act (P.L. 97-219), the tax-credits for clinical trials of the Orphan Drug 
Act (P.L. 97-414), and dispensations on anti-trust law including a seven year market 
exclusivity for developers of “orphan drugs” and a exempt status for R&D joint 
ventures under the National Cooperative Research Act (P.L. 98-462). Admittedly, a 
policy agenda for stronger patent protection, subsidies and tax-credits for industrial 
R&D, and softer anti-trust legislation, looks distinctly neoliberal.23 
The encroachment of neoliberal values in the organization of innovation 
extended beyond the competitiveness coalition; in fact, it reached the very regime of 
knowledge production including researchers themselves (Nedeva and Bolden, 2006; 
Pestre, 2003; 2005). The transition to the new mode of knowledge production, or 
“Mode 2,” is characterized by greater attention to the context of application 
(Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons, 2001). This is not the 
                                                 
23 Compare with Bruno (2009) who discusses “competitiveness” in the context of the European 
governance of innovation. 
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application of theoretical or experimental knowledge typical of Mode 1, but the 
context of application “describes the total environment in which scientific problems 
arise, methodologies are developed, outcomes are disseminated, and uses are 
defined.” (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons, 2003, p. 186). In a Mode 2 research 
environment the researcher has professional incentives to produce use-inspired 
research, and these will be reinforced by the financial incentives attached to those 
“useful” research findings; to the extend that Mode 2 has not replaced Mode 1, the 
Bayh-Dole regime is a catalyst of the transition to Mode 2. Consequently, it could be 
expected a “normalization” of the research culture stylized by the Mode 2 
description including a legitimation of profit-seeking behavior in university patenting. 
The drift in the Bayh-Dole debate is thus only a reflection of neoliberal ideas 
taking hold of policymaking in the U.S. At the legislative level, the competitiveness 
coalition reformed R&D and patent law. At the university administration level, it 
became more acceptable to engage in patenting and maximizing licensing income. 
Even at the level of academic research, the uptake of the market values of the Bayh-
Dole regime was reinforced by the emergence of fields like information technologies 
and molecular biology. The changing values at all these levels required a new lexicon 
to be communicated, and as Slaughter Rhoades (1996) suggest, the primary rhetorical 
trope has been “competitiveness.” For this reason, I now turn my attention to this 
term. 
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Competitiveness entered elite discourse with force about the same time 
Bayh-Dole was passed.24 The three foremost voices of elite discourse—political 
leaders, journalists, and scholars—quickly took up the term. Politicians adopted 
competitiveness because it transcends party-ideology given that the term fits well 
with what McCloskey and Zaller (1984) call “the American ethos”: the bipartisan 
agreement on public values such as personal freedom, self-help, and merit-based 
organization. In turn, mass communication media is in constant search for words 
that convey meaning, at once, intuitively and forcefully. Using LexisNexis Academic 
to track wires of the Associate Press and the print edition of the New York Times, I 
found that the term was used in the postwar period until 1980 a total of 117 and 201 
times respectively; the use exploded in the 1980s to 3442 and 2373, stabilized in the 
1990s with 3432 and 2817, and is like to remain at that level during this last decade, 
with the count at 3401 and 1448 on July 2009. No less important for the 
pervasiveness of competitiveness was the host of academic new ideas—in economic 
theory, public management, corporate culture, and industrial policy—where the term 
came to symbolize new paradigms. For instance, the efforts to conceptualize 
competitiveness in economics led to revisions in the theory of “comparative 
advantage” (for instance, Fagerberg, 1988) “conditional convergence” (for a 
theoretical and empirical synthesis see Baumol, Nelson, and Wolff, 1994). In public 
administration competitiveness was central to the emergence of the “new public 
management” school (Hood, 1991, surveys in Pollit and Bouckaert, 2000, and Hood 
                                                 
24 I use elite discourse in its standard definition in political science. That is “stereotypes, frames of 
reference, and elite leadership cues that enable citizens to form conceptions of and, more importantly, 
opinions about events that are beyond their full personal understanding.” (Zaller, 1992, p. 14) 
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and Peters, 2004). Corporate culture and industrial policy were influenced by the 
notion of “competitive advantage” pioneered by Porter (1980, 1990). 
More than any specific meaning or definition, the pervasiveness of the term 
in elite discourse impressed on the public imagination the notion that 
competitiveness is a public value of consensus, similar in its unqualified virtue to 
justice or freedom. At that point, a whole array of social problems could begin to be 
articulated in terms of their deleterious effects on competitiveness: A deficient 
educational system creates less competitive workers; poor public health reduces the 
productivity of the labor force; higher taxes and welfare benefits undermine the 
incentives for getting ahead in life; government intervention creates frictions in 
otherwise competitive markets. Competitiveness became, in the words of Paul 
Krugman (1994), an obsession that bore the serious risk of lowering the quality of 
policy discussion: “If top government officials are committed to a particular 
economic doctrine, inevitably that sets the tone for policy-making on all issues, even 
those which may seem to have nothing to do with that doctrine” (p. 42). 
Competitiveness became an all-purpose goal (if not an obsession) in policy 
discussions and it was elevated to be a public value of consensus in the public 
imagination. Unsurprisingly, Bayh-Dole and its subsequent amendments have been 
justified in terms of promoting competitiveness; Senator Bayh himself offered this 
reasoning during the hearings in 1980: 
One of the greatest threats to our economic (and ultimately political) 
well-being is the recent slump in American innovation and productivity… 
American industry is simply not keeping up with its international competition 
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in too many fields. While Government patent policy is by no means the only 
cause of this problem, it is certainly a contributing factor. (U.S. Senate, 1980). 
The popularity of competitiveness however does not logically link patent 
policy and this value. There was indeed a more formal explanation that linked patent 
rights to competitiveness. First, economists usually define competitiveness in terms 
of national productivity—measured usually as national product per hour of labor. 
More precisely, competitiveness is the relative position of an economy in terms of 
productivity (Hatsoupolus, Krugman, and Summers, 1988; see also Klein, 1988). 
Second, economic theory since the 1960s has re-invigorated the old notion that 
innovation is the driver of long-term productivity gains, and consequently, of 
sustained economic growth. While the fluctuations of the business cycle are 
explained by the fluctuations in employment of the factors of production, in the long 
run, the size of the economy is capped by its productive capacity at full employment. 
Hence, only technological innovation can expand the frontier of production 
possibilities by making labor, capital, and land increasingly more productive. Third, 
that other old notion that patents introduce an incentive for innovation is also alive 
and well— although it had suffered some setbacks from the Progressive Era through 
the 1960s as policy makers and the courts had favored, in some instances, anti-trust 
arguments over industrial patent rights. Fourth, and in relation to the previous point, 
it was believed that patent rights to public research (i.e. federally-funded research) 
were not clearly assigned because, unless prior agreement existed between research 
contractor and federal agencies, the government retained rights to those patents. I 
will elaborate on the latter point further in the next section, but here it is sufficient to 
stress that it was thought necessary to clearly assign patent rights to public research 
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for the private sector to invest in the development and commercialization of that 
research. This linear causal relation—from public support of research, to assignation 
of patents for private exploitation, to innovation, to productivity gains, to national 
competitiveness—linked Bayh-Dole to competitiveness and made of it a national 
cause. 
I have argued thus far that the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas over 
policymaking and particularly over the innovation system were the primary source of 
drift in the Bayh-Dole debate, and that competitiveness is a good point of reference 
to identify neoliberal justifications of the Act and posterior reforms to its design. It is 
to that aspect that I now turn my attention, the drift in the design of Bayh-Dole. 
 
3.3 Changes in the design of Bayh-Dole. 
Bayh-Dole is today a very different policy than it was when enacted. The Act 
ended the policy ambivalence and achieved uniformity in patent policy across most 
federal agencies25 but it did not close the Bush-Kilgore discord. By the late 1970s, 
many lawmakers—particularly those who fought the legislative battles for expanding 
the welfare state in the 1960s—would have scoffed at the idea of transferring 
government patent rights directly to industrial interests. The enacting coalition of 
Bayh-Dole had to overcome serious objections and in doing so it equipped it with 
provisions to balance the various intervening interests.26 
                                                 
25 Bayh-Dole exempts research programs directly tied to national security, especially at the 
Department of Defense. 
26 In addition to the Congressional wrangling, see Stevens (2004) and Washburn (2005, Ch. 5) for 
accounts of the closed-door negotiations leading to the legislative agreement on Bayh-Dole. 
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The objections were mainly three. If the Act was enacted, it was feared that 
granting rights on profitable patents would be seen as a government giveaway to 
large industrial interests, that unrestricted exclusive licenses would promote non-
competitive practices such as excessive pricing and the stifling of potential 
competitors, and that taxpayers would be denied their fair share of returns on 
research investments that yielded profitable patents. 
The balancing mechanisms were inscribed in the proposed bill (S. 414, 
introduced on February 9, 1979) and they were successful in preempting the 
aforementioned objections. To neutralize accusations that this policy was a giveaway 
to corporations, the Act explicitly states its aim “to encourage maximum 
participation of small business firms in federally supported research” (35 U.S.C. 
§200), requires that small businesses be given preference when granting a license (35 
U.S.C. §202-c-7-D) and, when enacted in 1980, it limited the time length of exclusive 
licenses for large businesses to five years. To forestall allegations that the taxpayer’s 
investments in research would never yield monetary return, the text of the Act—as 
originally introduced to the Senate—included a provision for the government to 
recoup a portion of the licensing income. Finally, and as the cornerstone of all 
safeguards against the lack-of-use, misuse, or abuse of titles or licenses, the Act 
established two mechanisms for government intervention before and after rights to 
title are granted. The first of these mechanisms allows funding agencies to limit or 
cancel the rights to an invention “in exceptional circumstances when it is determined 
by the agency that restriction or elimination of the right to retain title to any subject 
invention will better promote the policy and objectives of the Act” (35 U.S.C. §202-
a-ii), namely, that inventions “are used in a manner to promote free competition and 
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enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery” (35 U.S.C. 
§200). The second provision has two elements. First, it requires contractors that take 
title to inventions to grant, in favor of the funding agency, a “nonexclusive, 
nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license” (35 U.S.C. §202-c-4). Second, it 
confers the respective federal agency “march-in rights.” These rights are legal 
authority for the agency to practice such a royalty-free license under certain 
circumstances, primarily when “the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not 
expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical 
application” and when “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which 
are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees” (35 U.S.C. 
§203). 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that, in 1980, not even the few 
skeptics of Bayh-Dole could imagine how weak and impractical were those safeguard 
provisions. The first blow to the safeguards was inflicted even before the bill was 
passed: the final text of the Act did not include the recoupment provision. The 
second strike to the safeguards came with President Reagan’s memorandum of 1983 
that eased the restrictions for large companies to benefit from Bayh-Dole.27 Congress 
later amended the Act according to this memorandum, further striking down the 
five-year limitation on exclusive licensing for large companies in the Trademark 
Clarification Act of 1984 (PL 98-620). Furthermore, the provision for agency 
intervention was by design impractical given that its application requires meeting the 
high threshold of “exceptional circumstances.”  In fact, the sole place where this 
                                                 
27 See Woolley and Peters, 2009a, for Memorandum on Government Patent Policy of February 18, 
1983. 
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provision has been used is a solicitation for molecular target laboratories by the 
National Cancer Institute (2000). 
Likewise, regarding the march-in rights provision, Admiral Hyman Rickover, 
famous for directing the development of the nuclear submarine, warned during the 
hearings that it was impractical for the government to supervise the development of 
technology sufficiently to justify the use of march-in rights. The admiral thought of it 
as simply a cosmetic provision crafted to placate objectors to the Act. In time, his 
fears proved warranted. As this provision was regulated (37 CFR 401.6), agencies 
considered exercising the rights only upon petition of a disaffected third party, and 
under the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, any march-in determination is held 
in abeyance until the appeals process is exhausted (P.L. 98-620; §V-9). It is thus not 
surprising that only three petitions have been presented, and all were found 
unjustified by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (see details in the next 
section). 
Asserting that the changes to the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate and the 
changes to its design reflect the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas in US policy making, 
is not sufficient to evaluate these changes. If we think that the value of the 
technology transfer regime resides in its ability to streamline commercialization of 
pubic research, the current terms of the debate would not be a concern at all. If 
instead we see technology transfer policy as serving various public values other than 
those related to commercialization, we should assess how well the Act is performing 
with respect to those values. To this end, the next section will introduce the 
evaluation approach called “public value failure” and deploy it on Bayh-Dole. 
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3.4 Public Value Failure in the Bayh-Dole regime. 
The most influential rationale for policy evaluation is known as Market 
Failure Criteria. This is a normative theory for public action that justifies government 
intervention in the economy when markets fail to behave as perfectly competitive 
markets (Bator, 1958; Samuelson, 1954). The notion of perfect competition is an 
ideal state of frictionless markets where consumers and producers transact with 
complete and perfect information such that prices convey all the relevant 
information about the goods transacted. The fundamental assumption of market 
failure is that perfectly competitive markets allocate resources efficiently in a Pareto 
optimal sense, that is, no person can be made better off without making another 
worse off. 
This specific definition of efficiency, that means all markets clear at current 
prices, is silent about the pattern of distribution of resources. This point can be 
sufficiently illustrated by a stylized economy of two individuals who must divide a 
loaf of bread. An efficient allocation, in the Pareto optimal sense, is any allocation 
that exhausts the loaf; for instance, each person gets half, or one person gets the 
entire loaf while the other nothing. Perfect competition guarantees an efficient 
allocation in this specific sense (no bread is wasted), but it should be noted too that 
perfect competition supports any allocation of resources, however intolerable or 
unjust is such an allocation. 
Notwithstanding this inadequacy dealing with issues of distribution, market 
failure became enormously influential in policy analysis and policy making circles in 
the U.S. partly because it was vested with all the scientific authority that economic 
theory could muster—general equilibrium theory—and partly because it provided 
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the Cold War generation with a rationale for government intervention that did not 
betray their commitment to the market system, quite the contrary: it celebrated 
markets. Such is the sway of market failure, that its method par excellence, cost-
benefit analysis, was instituted as the norm when assessing prospectively federal 
regulatory initiatives—following President Reagan’s E.O. 12291 of 1981 and 
President Clinton’s E.O. 12866 of 1994.28 
In spite of its popularity, market failure has a fundamental problem because 
social groups do not always value efficiency or the freedom of markets as a 
superordinate goal. Rather, societies often balance the free markets against other 
values like security or justice, and as a consequence, governments may be fully 
justified to take action even when markets do not fail. Consider the case of basic 
necessities such as housing, food, or medicine. At any price level—even at the 
marginal cost of production, that is, the price of perfect competition—there will be a 
segment of the population unable to afford those prices. If social values were such 
that the provision of basic necessities to all citizens overrides the value of free 
markets; then, the government would have reasons to secure the provision of those 
goods for the entire population. 
To escape this fundamental narrowness of market failure, Bozeman (2002) 
proposed an alternative rationale, called Public Value Failure Criteria, that expands 
the analysis to non-market values. Whereas market failure prescribes public action 
only to restore perfect competition, public value failure prescribes action when any 
of several discrete “core public values” go underserved or neglected. This begs the 
                                                 
28 It should be noted that President Reagan executive order introduced cost-benefit analysis as part of 
the Regulatory Impact Analysis. The RIA also mandates the assessment of distributive and fairness 
impacts, although these are not formalized in a method in the same way as cost-benefit analysis. 
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question of which public values exactly? In answering this question Bozeman 
produced a canonical set of public values that reflects well-established convictions 
about the rule of law and democratic policy making (e.g. transparency, inclusiveness) 
but that are also distilled from a pragmatic theory of the public interest in democracy 
in the tradition of Dewey’s The Public and It’s Problems (Dewey 1927; the theory in 
Bozeman, 2007: Ch. 5). This canonical set of public values is referred to as “public 
value failure criteria” (Bozeman, 2002) or as “public value mapping criteria” (PVM-
C) when embedded in the public value mapping method (see Bozeman and Sarewitz 
in this issue). 
Note that assessing policy with the pubic failure criteria is a “negative test,” 
in the sense that it helps to identify failures to serve the public interest rather than to 
positively affirm whether a given policy is in fact furthering the common good. 
Bozeman formulated his criteria—the core set of public values—in such a way that it 
symmetrically counterposes the market failure criteria. Taking this symmetry in 
consideration, I have adapted Bozeman's criteria to the particular purpose of 
evaluating Bayh-Dole. 
Table 1 below summarizes Bozeman’s public value failure criteria (first 
column), transposes it to the Bayh-Dole problem (second column), and summarizes 
the main public value failures (third column) that are described in detail next. 
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Table 1. Summary assessment of Bayh-Dole with PVM criteria. 
Public failure criteria. In 
parenthesis, the market 
failure analog. 
Equivalent criteria for 
evaluation of Bayh-Dole. 
Brief description of the 
failure. 
Interest aggregation and 
articulation (general failures of 
the price system) 
Equal voice and equal 
consideration. 
Opposition to Bayh-Dole was 
neutralized by ill-designed 
safeguards that were easily 
defused and struck down. 
Legitimate monopolies 
(monopolies and non-
competitive market structures) 
 
Legal attributions of 
government. 
Failure to enforce march-in 
rights for controlling excesses 
of monopolistic pricing. 
Failure to support universities 
balancing organizational needs 
and the public interest. 
Imperfect public information 
(asymmetric information). 
Transparency. No formal channels for 
holding implementation agents 
(OTTs) accountable. 
Distribution of Benefits 
(benefit hoarding and rent-
seeking). 
Preclusion of benefit hoarding Lack of institutional 
mechanisms to determine 
“imperatives” for exclusive 
licensing. 
Provider availability 
(monopsonies and non-
competitive chains of supply). 
Provision of public goods and 
services. 
Exclusion of firms willing to 
develop applications in a 
competitive environment. 
 
Equal voice and equal consideration. 
A failure of aggregation of interests, occurs, explains Bozeman (2002), when 
“core public values are skirted because of flaws in the policy-making processes” (p. 
151). These failures could be attributed to ill-designed institutions governing the 
policy process, or the failures could be procedural when they are due to a willful or 
heedless deviation from due process. Procedural flaws could be uncovered by 
process audits and are commonly attributed to negligence or corruption. Failures of 
design are harder to detect because the system may work by-the-book. Bozeman 
(2002, 2007) offers an example of structural problems facilitated by the seemingly 
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reasonable rule of seniority for the chairmanship of Congressional committees; the 
problem was that this rule enabled tenured Southern congressmen to impede civil 
rights reforms for decades until the mid 1960s. Likewise, analyzing US science policy, 
Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005) characterize another structural flaw arguing that the 
science policy system of the US does not have a mechanism to involve lay citizens in 
crucial policy decisions such as the portfolio allocation of federal research funds. In 
both cases, policy-making institutions work according to design and still, widely held 
public values (such as equal rights or social returns on public investments) fail to be 
articulated and the resulting policy aggregates the competing values unduly 
privileging some stakeholders over others. 
The swift passage of Bayh-Dole suggests bipartisan cooperation, a success of 
aggregation of interests. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the sponsors of 
the Act had anticipated opposition and crafted provisions to address each major 
objection. This tactic effectively neutralized opposition. 
The degree to which the policy drifted from the seeming compromise of its 
first statutory version may not have been suspected by the sponsors of the bill, and 
surely, it was not forsawn by the opposition that was placated with the safeguard 
provisions. In retrospect, one is left wondering if the safeguards were mainly 
introduced to deflect objections rather than give objections due consideration. Were 
the voices of dissent given due consideration or were they simply assuaged under the 
pretense of safeguard provisions and the urgency of implementing solutions to the 
competitiveness crisis? The hearings of Bayh-Dole cannot be charged for failing to 
give equal voice to proponents and objectors; it is doubtful however that all voices 
have been given equal consideration. 
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Legal attributions of government. 
A public value failure occurs when private individuals or institutions exercise 
rights that are the exclusive privilege of government, such as speaking on behalf of 
the whole of society or making law and regulations to protect the public interest. For 
instance, foreign policy and the prevention of a flu pandemic, argue Bozeman (2002) 
and Feeney and Bozeman (2007) respectively, are both responsibilities and 
attributions of the government that no individual or organization can take upon itself 
to provide. Likewise, Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005) warn of public value failure 
when little or no governmental authority is executed to protect the physical and 
mental integrity of human subjects participating in clinical trials. When researchers 
conducting those studies have an economic interest in the companies producing the 
drugs, a public value failure ensues if the researcher’s conflict of interest is not fully 
disclosed to participants because it cannot be assumed that subjects who consented 
to participate were fully informed of the benefits and risks of their participation. 
Likewise, the enforcement of march-in rights in the face of excessive pricing 
and other monopolistic practices is a statutory attribution of government, and the 
failure to enforce has been indeed a public value failure. Three cases were brought to 
a federal agency petitioning the use of march-in rights, and all three were dismissed. 
In the first case, CellPro, Inc. had intended to license patents granted to competitor 
Baxter by John Hopkins University (developed with NIH grants). NIH found that 
Baxter was actively practicing the patent seeking FDA approval on a device with 
those patents; provided that Bayh-Dole requires only reasonable effort to practice 
the patent, the NIH rejected the petition (NIH, 1997). The other two cases regarding 
drugs Norvir, an HIV/AIDS treatment, and Xalatan, a treatment for glaucoma, 
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merited a similar conclusion from the NIH (see resolutions in NIH, 2004a; 2004b). 
In both cases the petitioners had complained of excessive pricing and requested the 
government to exercise its royalty-free license with respect to titles held by Abbott 
Laboratories and Pfizer respectively. However, NIH stressed that, under Bayh-Dole, 
the exercise of march-in rights was limited to circumstances where the patents in 
question were not practiced or to alleviate health and safety needs, neither of which 
applied to Norvir and Xalatan that were already commercial products. The NIH 
concluded that “the extraordinary remedy of march-in is not an appropriate means 
of controlling prices” (NIH, 2004b). This interpretation is nevertheless controversial; 
for instance, legal scholars Arno and Davis (2001, p. 662) find “countless references 
in the legislative record to the need to maintain competitive market conditions 
through the exercise of march-in rights,” including the control of profits and prices. 
The neglect to affirm march-in rights is as much a public value failure in 
patent policy as it would be laxity in enforcing informed consent in the regulation of 
human subject in research. The weakening of the safeguards built-in the Act partly 
explains the observed government tolerance of monopolistic practices but it does 
not justify the three-decade neglect of regulatory support to universities in dealing 
with the tensions of revenue-seeking licensing activities and their public service 
mission. It is worthwhile to stress that government-backed institutions would greatly 
assist universities in their efforts for good governance and self-regulation. 
Transparency. 
The citizens’ ability to exercise oversight over the policy process, from design 
to implementation, is often considered a public value of consensus. Bozeman (2007) 
argues that lack of transparency in the policy process inhibits this ability resulting in a 
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public value failure. The canonical examples are closed-door executive meetings such 
as the Clinton task force for health care reform (Hacker, 1997) or the Cheney talks 
on energy policy (Bozeman, 2007); various concerned publics interpreted the lack of 
transparency as a threat to the public interest even when they did not think that the 
First Lady or the Vice President were transgressing due process.29 
In contrast to these examples of public value failure, the passing of the Bayh-
Dole, while swift, was indeed subject to customary hearings and debate. It may not 
be easy to challenge the fact that the Act was enacted in a public and transparent 
fashion. Its implementation, on the other hand, is not so obviously transparent. 
Admittedly, the implementation of the core logic of the Act is straightforward: the 
government confers rights of intellectual ownership to research contractors (e.g. 
universities, hospitals, etc.) and demands minimal reporting requirements from them. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Act’s safeguards of the public interests is 
much less transparent. Granting of rights to research contractors should also be 
construed as a delegation of the government’s fiduciary duty to society with respect 
to publicly funded innovation. At the same time, university offices of technology 
transfer are constituted with the clear mission to profitably commercialize university 
inventions. Seeking to find a market for those inventions is as much a business as 
real estate or venture capital. Whether the OTT is constituted inside the organization 
(as a division or department) or outside (as an independent legal vehicle) its 
performance will primarily be assessed by revenue generation. Revenue is derived 
from licensing patents in two modalities, cash or stock options in the licensee firms. 
                                                 
29 Ex post facto, the Supreme Court found the First Lady in violation of Federal Advisory Committee 
Act for not being a federal employee. 
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Hence, many of the companies licensing from the university will be start-ups 
founded by faculty members working on a particular invention and will partner with 
the OTT that provides them with the resources and legal expertise to develop their 
high-technology products. In this partnership the OTT is constituted across two 
spheres, the university and the industry. It is crucial for the firm to keep private 
information secret if the firm is to successfully position itself in the marketplace—
information that includes technical aspects of the product under development, the 
configuration of the supply chain, and the marketing and business strategy of the 
firm. The OTT is the most important partner for the firm at this early stage and 
must be committed to secrecy if is to be a valuable partner; consequently, the OTT 
cannot be expected to function adequately if it is open to pubic scrutiny. This is a 
public value failure by design: the burden of implementation of Bayh-Dole befalls on 
organizations that straddle the public and the private and therefore cannot be entirely 
transparent. In fact, the OTT by design sits astride the public spheres of knowledge 
creation and the private spheres of profit making and is therefore ill equipped to 
internalize the ensuing tensions because the delegation of Bayh-Dole is much more 
clear about implementing the profit incentive than it is delegating the government’s 
fiduciary duty. 
Preclusion of benefit hoarding. 
The best example of this public value failure concerns precisely technology 
transfer policy. Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005) explain how the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. §3701-3714) that instituted cooperative agreements 
(CRADAs) between federal laboratories and industry resulted in one visible case in 
the commercialization of a technology design to hoard the benefits of improved 
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varieties of seeds. Seed-sterilizing technology, also called the terminator-gene, was 
developed under a CRADA between the Department of Agriculture and Delta and 
Pine Land Co., as a complex bioengineered procedure that prevents farmers from 
producing second-generation seeds from first-generation crops, thus enforcing 
intellectual property rights on new varieties of seed. Small farmers, including 
subsistence farmers in the developing world, explained these authors, “continually 
seek better plant varieties for local growing conditions, through careful selection of 
kept seed, as well as purchase of new varieties from both public and private seed 
distributors” (Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2005 p. 131). Seed-sterilizing technology 
prevents such practices and deprives vulnerable farmers from free riding the new 
seed varieties. However, the purpose of government for funding research to improve 
agricultural methods including the engineering of seeds for better crop varieties is to 
improve stability and sufficiency of the food supply by means of improving the 
productivity of arable land, irrigation, and crops. Seed-sterilizing technology does not 
serve that purpose or the values that inspire it. 
It would be a mistake to blame the CRADAs mechanism for the 
development of seed-sterilizing technology. Rather, the cause for this public value 
failure is the lack of institutional safeguards of the public interest that upon discovery 
of the terminator-gene did not prevent a firm from obtaining rights to the patents of 
such a technology. This lesson resonates with the implementation of Bayh-Dole 
because the problem in this case is not the profit incentive but the assumption that 
monopolistic profits are the only level of incentive that will bring about the 
development and commercialization of research. Exclusive licensing is hardly 
warranted when fundamental discoveries or research tools are in question or when 
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the application is nearly contained in the patent. In the former, the collective efforts 
of a research community could be throttled; in the latter, a competitive environment 
would better serve the wide dissemination of the technology. Thus, unless there is 
only one company willing to develop an application with a public-research patent, 
exclusive licensing of such a patent is a form benefit hoarding. 
Provision of Public Goods and Services. 
Even when private initiative is motivated by public values, as is the case of 
charity, the entrepreneur may decide the time, quality, and form of the service, and 
may even decide to discontinue its provision, at his discretion. When the government 
provides a service motivated by public values, any changes in the service level and 
quality should a priori reflect a change of values or a shift in the way public values 
organize public priorities. However, when the government delegates to a contractor 
the provision of a given service, private discretion over the provision may not 
represent a change in public values as much as it will be a change in the determinants 
of the bottom-line of the contractor. Bozeman (2007) declares that a public value 
failure will occur in a situation where the government, having delegated a given 
service in the past, finds itself in a situation where the need emerges to provide that 
service with urgency, yet neither it can avail itself of contractors nor it has the 
capacity to provide the needed service anymore. 
As it was discussed earlier, Bayh-Dole solved a two-sided problem by 
providing simultaneously an incentive for demand and supply of R&D by motivating 
a greater concern for mission-oriented research and by granting legal protection to 
developmental investors respectively. In this sense Bayh-Dole provides two public 
goods of great value: more socially sensitive research and lesser risk for technology 
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developers. Was there a shortage of these services before the Act? Research is not 
conclusive on this respect but one thing is certain, the abrupt increase of transferring 
activity since 1980 must have reduced any shortage or even perhaps turned it into a 
surplus. Yet, not every exclusive license granted is justified. To the extent that 
research tools are licensed exclusively, Bayh-Dole is reducing the availability of 
technological applications that would exist if those tools would be licensed on non-
exclusive basis (Mazzeloni and Nelson, 1998; Colyvas et al., 2002). Likewise, the 
cases where there is at least one company willing to take a non-exclusive license and 
develop a technology in a competitive environment (typical of some industries such 
as software and mobile telephony), an exclusive license is actually curtailing other 
firms from providing new products at competitive prices. In the absence of 
institutional mechanisms that restrain monopolistic excesses, the Act has two edges, 
one that expands the demand and supply of economically valuable R&D and another 
that cuts the number of potential providers. Again, appropriate institutional 
mechanisms could keep the incentives of the Act in place and at the same time 
maximize the number of research programs and developers willing to compete with 
each other in a race that promotes the public interest. 
 
3.5 Conclusion. 
The direction of the Bayh-Dole debate was influenced by the new political 
and economic context in which it unfolded. Neoliberal conceptions of the economy, 
innovation, and property rights came to dominate the political discourse since the 
1980s and the Bayh-Dole debate became dominated by the banners of the imperative 
of innovation and specially “competitiveness.” This situation and the attrition of 
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countervailing forces in the enacting coalition allowed for a legislative drift of the Act 
and a rollback of safeguards introduced to protect economic opportunity and access, 
increasing in this way the authority of markets. 
In terms of public value failures, it could be said that with the passing of 
time, voice and consideration is less and less equal in the Bayh-Dole debate, that the 
legitimate attributions of government are in retreat, and that the ambiguity of the 
delegation of the fiduciary role is condoning an environment of business secrecy. 
The enthusiasm for a hands-off government has resulted in a vacuum of institutional 
safeguards of economic opportunity; a vacuum manifested in the NIH inability to 
exercise march-in rights due to its narrow interpretation of that provision, and 
manifested too in the lack of government support for universities that were left to 
their own resources to countervail the force of financial need with the more tenuous 
commitment to public service. 
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Chapter 4 
EVALUATION OF DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOMES 
 
4.1. Introduction. 
In the previous chapter I sought to expand the discussion of Bayh-Dole 
beyond the regular concerns with the pace of innovation (and its rhetorical surrogate: 
competitiveness) and with the erosion of traditional academic values. In this chapter, 
I take the analysis deeper into the distributive character of the Act. 
All public policy, in one way or another, allocates resources, rights, or 
privileges (Rae,1979; 1981, Stone, 2002|1988). Equity is thus a central public value in 
policy analysis and it is often discussed in relation to the distribution of economic 
resources or access to resources. It is also important to consider however, equity in 
the distribution of political power. I use equity as a public value that motivates a fair 
distribution of influence and resources in society and I do not assume that all forms 
of inequality are unjust (“fair” in a Rawlsian sense; see Introduction). In fact, below I 
make explicit the normative framework in which I anchor the problematization of 
the inequalities examined in this chapter.30 
The formal relationship between the distribution of influence and the 
distribution of economic resources has been long recognized in policy analysis and 
evaluation (Lasswell, 1936), and more recently has received attention in the literature 
of science, technology and innovation (STI) policy (Healey, Hagendijk, Pereira, 2009; 
                                                 
30 I emphasize equity as a “public value” to separate its use to judge a social state of affairs from its 
use to judge individual behavior. This distinction is necessary to avoid wrongly imputing the inequity 
of certain social arrangements that we discuss here onto the values of citizens themselves. My use of 
equity and inequality is not too different than Cozzens (2007) who reserves “inequality” for 
descriptive purposes and “inequity” for normative assessment. 
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Senker, 2003; Wetmore, 2007).31 In the domain of STI, evidence from case studies 
suggests that inequality of resources follows from political inequality (Rayner and 
Malone, 2001),32 and in turn political inequality (defined by forms of representation 
and accountability) follows from structural inequalities (defined by patterns of 
ownership of productive assets, social hierarchy, and political culture), and 
completing the cycle, these last follow from long-term patterns of resource allocation 
(Cozzens et al., 2008). These authors have spearheaded the study of the conditions 
that determine whether the cycle reinforces or mitigates inequality. 
To discuss equity in relation to Bayh-Dole we must locate problematic 
inequalities across the relevant actors and through the relevant processes where this 
policy intervenes. Let’s begin by identifying the main actors according to their level 
of participation. By design, Bayh-Dole directly affects government research 
contractors. Here I will focus on universities because of their relative importance 
among research contractors—60% of government obligations for basic research ($ 
27.7bn) were allocated to universities in 2008 (NSF, 2009).33 Users of university 
patents who enter in licensing contracts with universities are the second level of 
actors. These may be technology development companies that pursue the 
commercial application of university patents or other research organizations in the 
                                                 
31 The Healy et al. is a final report of the ResIST project, a large multi-country team who researched 
specifically inequality and science and technology in large and emerging economies. The Senker and 
Wemore pieces are introductions to symposiums on inequality and science policy published 
respectively in the journals Science Technology and Human Values and Science and Public Policy.  
32 Rayner and Malone push the argument further, an suggest that “poverty cannot be understood in 
terms of lack of goods or income, or even basic needs, but must rather be understood in terms of 
people’s ability to participate in the social discourse that shapes their lives” (p. 176). 
33 This figure includes allocations to universities (51%) and allocations to university-based federally 
funded research and development centers, better known by their acronym FFRDCs (9%). While 
universities take 60% of government obligations for basic research, they take 40% in applied research 
and only 6% in development; universities total share in government R&D obligations is thus 27% in 
2008. 
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case of patents on research tools. Individual and organized groups of citizens are the 
next level of participating actors. Citizens are relevant not only as consumers or 
prospect consumers, but also as taxpayers who are entitled to have a say in what new 
technologies are introduced in their common living space. Consequently, adding the 
equity dimension to the evaluation of Bayh-Dole requires a look into the distribution 
of economic and political resources among these actors. 
Let’s now identify the relevant processes affected by Bayh-Dole. In the 
domain of STI policy, technology transfer occupies a special place because it links 
two processes traditionally separated in policy studies: research and innovation. 
Research involves knowledge creation by the scientific establishment, and innovation 
encompasses the creation of economic-value by private enterprise from new 
scientific and technical knowledge (in the form of commercialized applications). To 
the extent that the scientific establishment and private enterprise are separate 
institutions, the research-innovation distinction is tenable (David and Dasgupta, 
1994). However, as discussed in the previous chapters, this institutional distinction 
was blurred with the wave of reforms to the patent system of which Bayh-Dole is an 
integral part. Therefore, equity considerations on Bayh-Dole must take into 
consideration this hybridization of the organizations of research and innovation and 
their underlying distributive mechanisms. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of relevant inequalities I want to make 
explicit the normative framework that will guide my discussion of equity in the 
design and implementation of Bayh-Dole: the “democratization of science” can be 
understood as the aspiration of introducing decision checks and balances into the 
processes of research and innovation. Advocates of the democratization of science 
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think that these checks and balances ought to be modeled after other democratic 
institutions that have successfully precluded the centralization of political power in a 
single office, organization, or political body (see for instance Guston, 2004; 2005, 
Kitcher, 2001; Kleinman, 2000; Maasen and Weingart, 2005)—hence, my use of 
democratizing innovation is not quite in the vein of consumer-driven innovation 
(von Hippel, 2005). One way to characterize democratization is as the aspiration for 
striking the right balance between expediency and political equality in collective 
decision-making. It is obviously impractical to expect all collective decisions to be 
decided in the widest political forum, but it is not unreasonable to expect that 
decisions of great import to the social order be more broadly and critically 
deliberated and citizens participate more in the making of such decisions (see Dryzek 
and Dunleavey, 2009; on political equality see Dahl, 2006). 
The need to democratize decision-making when decisions affect the very 
structure of society acquires new urgency when we suspect that the construction of 
new knowledge and social order take place simultaneously. I will call this the “co-
production thesis” (Latour, 1987; Jasanoff, 2004) and include not only the 
production of knowledge but also the emergence of new technologies as forces that 
conjointly shape the social order (e.g. Jasanoff, 2005; Parthasarathy, 2007).34 
Considering that research and innovation are advancing at a fast pace, it 
remains an open question the extent to which fundamental social institutions are 
                                                 
34 A survey of the field of science and technology studies (STS), where the co-production thesis was 
elaborated can be found in Jasanoff, et al. (1995) and Hackett, et al. (2008). For the unfamiliar reader, 
a pedestrian illustration may help form an intuition about the co-production thesis: as mobile-texting 
usage continues to increase (soon it will surpass mobile-voice usage), the new language that is 
emerging is shaping the tool (SMS neologisms, abbreviations, etiquette, etc.) and is also shaping the 
terms of our interpersonal relationships; for instance, developing a cultural preference for brevity in 
communication may at the same time reduce our tolerance for elaborated articulations of complex 
thoughts and emotions. 
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simultaneously changing, and how much of these changes threaten democratic 
values. Taking this question seriously in the domain of STI implies normatively that 
an effort should be made to appraise ex ante the impacts of research or innovation 
decisions, where affected publics are identified and then given channels to have a say 
in those decisions. It also implies the necessity of reinforcing (or creating) 
institutional mechanisms that legitimize the decision-making process. In the sub-
domain of technology transfer, a clear normative implication is to seek a more 
equitable distribution of voice and vote in the design of patent licensing contracts. I 
propose therefore to examine Bayh-Dole under this normative framework, that is, 
the extent to which this policy assists in the democratization of research and 
innovation, particularly the extent to which it facilitates (or impedes) the 
participation of the stakeholders of technology transfer decisions. 
The aspiration to democratize research and innovation is not free of 
criticism. The first objection comes from the view that the current system for 
collective decision-making not only upholds democratic values but also that it works 
just fine—the early work of Robert Dahl (2005|1961) may give the impression that a 
“pluralist democracy” was just that system (compare with the later Dahl, 1983; 1989). 
A second objection may arise, even accepting that the current system has room for 
improvement, and that is taking issue with the co-production thesis. In fact, this 
thesis is far from a consensus outside the field of science and technology studies; and 
it is even received with acrimony in some quarters (as in the “science wars;” for a 
discussion see Hacking, 1999). Nevertheless, the critics of co-production are likely to 
fashion their views in line with the “technological determinism thesis,” that affirms 
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causal effects from science and technology to the social structure.35 Under this view, 
it is still possible to observe that contemporary technologies (biotechnology, 
nanotechnology) have the potential to produce significant social change, even 
altering the social compact, and this awareness implies the need for greater 
democratic checks on the emergence of these technologies. The need to rein in the 
emergence of technologies might be recognized under both theses, but the 
prescriptions will vary greatly. Technological determinism assumes a clear 
institutional separation between the production of knowledge and the maintenance 
of social order and thus their advocates may prefer to regulate production rather 
than to democratize it. To the extent that the preference for regulation is widely 
accepted, my normative framework emphasizing democratization will have, 
admittedly, limited sway in policymaking. However, I will show that examining Bayh-
Dole as an instrument of democratization may in some instances be reconciled with 
the view of this policy as an instrument of regulation. 
My argument in this chapter moves across the two dimensions introduced 
above—actors and processes. I begin by looking transversally through the levels of 
actors, first probing the distributive dynamics in universities and pursuing the 
implications of these dynamics into the industrial organization of high-tech 
development firms, and these into the effects on citizens as economic and political 
agents. Then in the second part, I revisit the standard arguments for the distribution 
                                                 
35 Insofar as the process-effect (science and technology) is kept analytically separated from the 
process-cause (social order), the transformative power of science and technology throughout history 
seems hard to contest. However, co-production unearths the simultaneity of both processes and it 
does so to such a fundamental level that it subverts their analytical difference, as though the analysis 
would be of a single thing (a single network of actors). This analytical strategy presents a challenge to 
co-production because practical observers may find themselves hard pressed to translate the lessons 
of co-production into plain language and to accommodate the standard preconceptions of policy 
makers. 
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of benefits from research and innovation and engage them in light of the 
hybridization of their institutions. 
 
4.2 From asymmetries in licensing income to a new OTT business model. 
After Bayh-Dole was enacted universities created the organizational 
capacities for managing their intellectual property, opening and staffing offices of 
technology transfer (OTTs) in a great hurry. The Association of University 
Technology Managers (AUTM) reports that by 1979, only 30 universities had an 
OTT but in two decades this number went up to 174 in 1999. The annual growth of 
OTT openings is exponential through the 1980s and 1990s, and now that most 
research universities are in business, the yearly increment is only marginal; by 2009 
the total was 194 (See Figure 5). The 2010 Carnegie Classification of Higher 
Education counts 206 U.S. universities with very high or high research activity; all of 
them have OTTs. 
While universities rushed to open OTTs, only a few have raised significant 
income from licensing their patents under Bayh-Dole. Figure 6 shows the great 
asymmetry in the distribution of licensing gross income, an asymmetry that seems 
consistent for 2009 when compared to the average of the last three years and the 
average of the last decade. In all cases, an exponential trend is the best fit to that 
distribution (results of regression analysis were not included in the figure). In 2009, a 
year very much in line with the decade’s average, the top 5% of earners (8 
universities) took 50% of the total licensing income of the university system; and the 
top 10% (15 universities) took 72%, nearly three-quarters of the system’s income. 
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Figure 5. Growth of University OTTs.  
 
 
Source: AUTM (2010) 
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Five Year 
Period
Number of 
OTTs Open
Cummulative
1925-1929 1 1
1930-1934 0 1
1935-1939 2 3
1940-1944 4 7
1945-1949 0 7
1950-1954 1 8
1955-1959 1 9
1960-1964 0 9
1965-1969 4 13
1970-1974 6 19
1975-1979 10 29
1980-1984 25 54
1985-1989 51 105
1990-1994 35 140
1995-1999 34 174
2000-2004 10 184
2004-2009 10 194
  117 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Licensing Gross Income by University. 
 
 
Source: AUTM (2010) 
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Year: 2009
99 316 18 2
95 881 50 8
90 1259 72 15
85 1417 81 22
50 1719 98 71
0 1759 100 142
Average of last 3 years (2007-09)
99 693 33 2
95 1326 62 9
90 1648 78 17
85 1785 84 25
50 2083 98 81
0 2122 100 162
Average of last decade (2000-09)
99 307 20 2
95 853 57 10
90 1116 74 19
85 1233 82 28
50 1479 98 93
0 1509 100 186
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Taking the top 20 earners each year individually for the last decade, I found a 
rather stable club of 40 leading research universities in the U.S. (listed in Table 2). 
Moreover, during the last three years the composition of the top 20 universities that 
controls 75% of the total licensing market has changed very little, and new entrants 
are actually long time members of the academic elite, namely, University of 
Michigan, University of Georgia, and Duke University. 
Table 2. Top earners of licensing gross income 2000-2009. 
University Rank by 
Decade 
Average 
University Rank by 
Decade 
Average 
University Rank by 
Decade 
Average 
New York Univ. 1 Univ. of 
Massachusetts 
15 U of TX Southw. 
Med Center 
29 
Columbia Univ. 2 Florida State Univ. 16 Washington Univ. 
St. Louis 
30 
Univ. of CA 
System 
3 Harvard Univ. 17 Baylor College of 
Medicine 
31 
Northwestern 
Univ. 
4 Michigan State 
Univ. 
18 Dartmouth 
College 
33 
Emory Univ. 5 Cal Tech 19 Univ. of IL—Ch 
and U&C 
34 
Stanford Univ. 6 Univ. of Iowa Res. 
Found. 
20 Tulane Univ. 36 
Univ. of 
Minnesota 
7 Res. Foundation 
of SUNY 
21 Duke Univ. 38 
MIT 8 Univ. of Colorado 22 Vanderbilt Univ. 39 
Wake Forest 
Univ. 
9 Mount Sinai Sch 
Med NYU 
23 Iowa State Univ. 40 
Univ. of WA Res. 
Found. 
10 Univ. of Michigan 24 Wayne State Univ. 41 
WARF 11 Univ. of Utah 25 Georgetown Univ. 42 
Univ. of Florida 12 Univ. of Georgia 26 Cornell Research 
Fdn. Inc. 
43 
Univ. of 
Rochester 
13 Johns Hopkins 
Univ. 
27 Eastern Virginia 
Med Sch 
56 
University of 
Texas System 
14 Univ. of 
Pennsilvanya 
28   
Source: AUTM (2010) 
 
It is hardly a surprise that the distribution of incomes from technology 
transfer is highly asymmetric. After all, it is a well-known fact that the U.S. university 
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system is characterized by elitism, where resources (endowments, public and private 
funding or research, tuition fees) are widely asymmetrical (see Figures 7 and 8). For 
instance, AUTM (2010) reports for 2009 that the 50 universities with the largest 
research budgets controlled 78% of the system’s research funds and 99% of the 
licensing net operative revenue (NOR)—defined as gross income minus operating 
costs.36 Moreover, our top-40 elite commanded 71% of the funding and 79% of 
licensing NOR. 
Figure 7. Total research funds and licensing NOR. 
Source: My own tabulation with data from AUTM (2010). 
 
                                                 
36 My calculations are based on the AUTM 2009 survey (AUTM, 2010). The estimated net operative 
revenues is calculated here as the Total License Revenue (LIRECD) minus Non-reimbursed Legal Fees 
(EXPLGF-REIMLG) minus Estimated Operational Expenses. This last variable is a conservative 
estimate of operational expenses assuming only $100k per full time employee (LICFTE) $75K for other 
FTE (OTHFTE) and $30k per patent application (NPTAPP). Acronyms in small-capitals are the variables 
in the AUTM survey database. 
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Figure 8. Federal research funds and licensing NOR. 
Source: My own tabulation with data from AUTM (2010). 
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income at 0.88. These distributions compare with household income of some the 
poorest countries in the world, specifically South Africa with a Gini of 0.58 and Haiti 
with 0.60 (ranked 134 and 138 among 141 for which Gini is available) (UNDP, 
2009). 
The distribution of licensing revenues is skewed to such an extent that most 
universities outside of the elite are functioning at an operational loss. Using 
information on legal expenses and employees from the AUTM survey (2010), I 
estimated net operating revenue (NOR) as defined above. As many as 61% of 
universities did not generate enough licensing income in 2009 to cover the wages of 
their technology transfer staff and the legal costs for the patents they filed. On 
average, 62% of OTTs have lost money each year since 1993, just to keep the office 
open. 
One interpretation for the low licensing income (and negative NOR) of the 
majority of universities is that they give most licenses at minimal or at no charge to 
the developing firms; thus promoting not only innovation but also equity. There is, 
however, some evidence that universities that began patenting after Bayh-Dole was 
enacted, did so a bit too eagerly without discriminating carefully between high and 
low quality patents (Mowery, Sampat, Ziedonis, 2002) while more experienced 
universities patented only high quality inventions. Accordingly, low incomes 
correspond to low quality patents because they have little if any commercial value. 
Still, even having high quality patents, some universities may have a culture 
of philanthropy and license them free of charge (or at cost). But there are indications 
that firms rely increasingly on patents even in sectors not traditionally reliant of them 
(Hall and Ziodenis, 2001), and as discussed in Chapter 2, OTTs are primarily 
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concerned with generating revenues (Thursby and Thursby, 2002). This systematic 
behavior across the board of OTTs resides in organizational isomorphism, which 
itself is explained by the fast diffusion of practices and attitudes towards patenting 
within the community of technology transfer professionals—for which AUTM is to 
be given credit. It is thus plausible to assume that a majority of universities invest 
resources in technology transfer activities, but cannot derive significant revenues 
from them. 
In fact, of the 149 universities who responded to the AUTM 2009 survey 
(AUTM, 2010), 91 could not even cover operational costs and another 20 did not 
generate enough licensing income to recover as little as 1% of their research budget 
for that year, only 38 generated income above 1%, 20 above 5%, and as few as 10 
made more than 10% of their total research expenditures. This picture speaks to the 
well-known fact that licensing revenue is significant only in the exceptional 
circumstance of landing a discovery of tremendous commercial value; what in the 
jargon of the field is referred to as a “blockbuster” patent. 
Emblematic of these exceptional patents are the gene splicing method of the 
Cohen-Boyer patents—that yielded near $255 million for Stanford University and 
UCSF during the life of the patent—and the Axel patents for co-transformation, a 
method to insert DNA into eukaryotic cells, from which Columbia University 
collected $790 million in licensing fees (Colaianni and Cook-Deegan, 2009). Further 
examples include the cancer treatments Taxol (Florida State U.) and Cisplatin 
(Michigan State U.), the vaccine for Hepatitis-B (UCSF), the antiretroviral Zerit (Yale 
U.), and the treatments for glaucoma Xalatan (Columbia U.) and Trusopt (Michigan 
State U.). The lucky universities that owned these patents derived significant 
  123 
revenues for their universities, between $15 and $45 millions per year—and the 
products rendered handsome profits for the firms that commercialized them, 
namely, Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pharmacia & Upjohn—now GE Healthcare 
(Eisenstein and Resnick, 2001). So rare are these kind of patents that university 
administrators must feel like winning a lottery when their faculty discover such a 
commercial invention. 
Going a little further with the simile that research is like a lottery and a 
blockbuster patent like the jackpot, one would be tempted to say that all universities 
play but only elite universities get to win. I estimated the probability of such a lottery 
modeling that success in discovering a blockbuster as a function of research funds, 
and found that indeed the chances drop dramatically beyond the top ten universities 
in research funding, at the total and federal levels. While the tenth university has a 
26% chance of landing a blockbuster patent in a given year (not bad for a lottery), 
the 40th has 13%, and the 100th just 8% (see Table 3).37 
Spite the probability of a blockbuster being disproportionately high for elite 
universities, small universities still have a reasonable chance of winning (the 149th in 
resources has more than 6.2% chance). If this research-as-lottery simile is actually 
used by universities to calculate their engagement in technology transfer, many of 
them would indeed be willing to invest in the necessary administrative capacity. 
 
                                                 
37 In this model, each annual draw is an independent lottery from previous years, hence the 
probability does not compound year after year. A more sophisticated model could involve a stochastic 
process where landing a blockbuster patent is an certain event in the future and each year of failure 
increases the probability year after year, or where the probability is actualized by licensing incomes of 
the previous year added to a stable stream of research funds, and thus the probability falls every year a 
blockbuster patent is not discovered. 
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Table 3. Probability of blockbuster patent as a function of Research Funds. 
 Probablity of NOR≥10m 
Rank According 
to Research Funds 
As a function of total 
research funds (TRF) 
As a function of federal 
research funds (FRF) 
3 48.0% 56.4% 
10 25.7% 24.6% 
20 20.4% 20.7% 
30 15.9% 15.2% 
40 12.9% 10.6% 
50 11.7% 12.3% 
100 7.7% 8.5% 
149 6.2% 7.4% 
 
Estimated using a PROBIT model: Regression on success/failure of blockbuster patent 
(NOR≥$10m) over TRF (intercept -1.534409, slope 0.001079) and over FRF (intercept -
1.444591, slope 0.001340); all estimated coefficients are statistically significant at p=.05. 
Data Source: AUTM, 2010. 
 
Still, research is not quite like a lottery, and although some element of good 
fortune attends to a momentous discovery, a university administration may be able to 
influence its chances by directing its research efforts, laboratories, faculty, and 
students to the pursuit of lucrative patents. A university may adjust the composition 
of its research portfolio as some fields are more likely to produce a blockbuster 
patent than others (particularly biotechnology); it may enter into agreements with 
large companies interested in outsourcing their R&D in exchange for rights to the 
resulting IP; and a university may also introduce organizational incentives for faculty 
by attaching patenting to promotion and compensation. Such agreement and 
reforms, whenever adopted, have met resistance from university faculty members, 
student movements, and other advocates of humanitarian causes (Winickoff, 2010). 
The organizational changes, particularly regarding incentives, may reasonably be 
expected to change the culture and orientation of researchers. However, as reviewed 
in Chapter 2, the evidence of such changes is yet to be observed. University grant-
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for-IP, deals which are increasingly common particularly at elite universities, have 
also come under scrutiny and criticism (see examples in Greenberg, 2007; Mirowski 
and Sent, 2002; Washburn, 2005). Committing future IP in the bargain is specially 
controversial (NRC, 2010), as exemplified by the controversy around the $500 
million deal between UC Berkeley and BP (Dalton, 2007). 
Universities are adapting to this threat to their reputation and have developed 
alternative strategies to manage their IP without attracting strong resistance to 
commercial activities and university-industry partnerships (Debackere and Veugelers, 
2005). As I pointed out in Chapter 3 (discussing transparency), the offices of 
technology transfer that are placed at a distance from the central university 
organization— established as affiliate units or even as separate legal entities—can be 
managed more like businesses than academic units. With more room to maneuver, 
OTTs can be more than simply licensing agents, and can now provide a wider array 
of services to the firms taking licenses. Because university patents are generally 
prototypes that need much work and investment to become commercial applications 
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001), it is likely that only a small group of people, including 
the inventor, will understand the potential uses and applications of the patents. It is 
there where OTTs have spotted a business opportunity because they can provide 
services to faculty-inventors who want to pursue their ideas into commercial 
products but have little experience in starting up a firm. By “nurturing start-ups,” 
OTT’s can add the most economic value to an invention disclosure. 
The scope of services that an OTT may provide can be as broad as to 
juxtapose with services typically associated with firm incubators (Mian, 1994; 1996; 
Phillips, 2002). For a start, in addition to the traditional legal council in patent 
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application, the OTT will provide legal assistance in building and managing the 
company’s IP portfolio, arranging for licenses from owners of prior patented art. 
Also, the OTT may advise in the legal constitution of the firm, particularly regarding 
the terms of use of university facilities (such as leasing of equipment) and the terms 
of employment for faculty-inventors. Partnering with the university incubator, if this 
exists, the OTT may assist in hiring the managerial team for the firm, and for an 
initial period it may provide for office space and administrative support. Another 
service will be networking, as a university may connect start-up firm executives with 
private investors, institutional investors, market analysts, marketing consultants, and 
the networks of entrepreneurial support. Likewise, an experienced technology 
transfer team may help the start-ups in attracting and negotiating capital influxes, 
first with angel capitalists, and later with corporate officers, venture capitalists and 
investment bankers. 
There are advantages and disadvantages from the nurturing start-ups model 
over the model of simply licensing the university’s IP. One is that the energies of the 
OTT will not be spent finding a market for the university patent portfolio, its own 
start-ups are ready to take up licenses; in turn, considerable efforts will be directed to 
finding a buyer of the start-up firm. In addition, inflow of incomes is deferred for the 
university—because instead of cash fees it takes stock in the new company (or stock 
options)—while the costs of nurturing a start-up are immediate, which may impact 
the cash flow of the university unless a portion of revenues is provisioned to finance 
these operations. 
Still, the costs for the OTT will not be significant compared to “angel 
capitalist”—private investors that may include family and friends of the inventors—
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who bear the brunt of financing initial operations. Another advantage for the 
university is that this strategy is likely to be perceived by its constituencies as a 
positive effort to foster entrepreneurship, to attract high-tech industries to the 
university’s region, and to contribute to economic growth and job creation. These 
favorable perceptions stand in stark contrast with the perceived excesses in university 
licensing—excesses related to aggressive negotiation and “creative clauses” (the 
reach-through provisions discussed in Chapter 2). The strategy of nurturing start-ups 
poses a greater financial risk to the university compared to a more traditional 
licensing-only business model, but it also lessens the reputational risk associated with 
commercial activities of the university. At the same time, the university can expect 
higher returns from its shares and options in a successful start-up and it retains a 
degree of control over that outcome. 
Considering these arguments, many universities will find that advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages, and those universities will surely adopt the nurturing 
start-ups model. It is too early to test weather this model will be successful for all 
universities—for instance, data from the AUTM survey on stock and options goes 
back only as far as 2000 (AUTM, 2010)—but it is not unrealistic to expect that it will 
become increasingly popular among OTTs. The potential of the nurturing start-ups 
model to expand the scope of university technology transfer is sufficient reason to 
consider its distributive consequences. 
 
4.3 From industrial organization to university politics. 
Here my argument moves to the second level of actors, the firms that apply 
and develop university patents. The link in the argument is the proposition that the 
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new business model of university technology transfer, the nurturing start-ups model, 
will have an impact on the industrial organization of high-tech companies and this, in 
turn, is an important determinant of the distribution of the economic benefits from 
innovation. 
To demonstrate this proposition I will enlist the Schumpeterian notion of 
“creative destruction” that explains both the long-term growth of productivity and 
the distribution of rents in capitalist economies (Schumpeter,1989|1939; 1994|1954; 
a review in Metcalfe, 1998). Economic history, observed Schumpeter (1994|1954), is 
marked by long waves of acceleration and deceleration of economic activity (cycles 
longer than regular business cycles) due to shifts in the technological platform of the 
productive system, such as the electric dynamo or the microprocessor. While 
emerging economic sectors harness the new technology they begin to displace the 
old sector in economic importance; during the transition the overall productivity of 
the economy falls because the productive factors must be retrained (labor) and 
retooled (physical capital) to fit the new technological platform. Productivity picks 
up only after a critical mass of adopters begin to exploit economies of scale of the 
new technology (see complete formulations in Hall and Rosenberg, 2010 and 
Magnusson, 1993). 
Two aspects of creative destruction are relevant here. The first is the role of 
destruction in the creative process of innovation; destruction is observed in every 
cycle of innovation as a new cohort of firms rise and an old cohort, unable to adapt 
to the new technological platform, perish. The second aspect follows from the first; 
innovation works also as a mechanism for reallocation of income and wealth. As new 
cohorts of firms wrestle markets from old cohorts, productive assets change hands, 
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and with the control of assets, rents and wealth change hands too. Innovation gives 
the edge that new firms need to succeed in competition with old firms, and by means 
of competition, the distribution of income and wealth is reshuffled, at least across 
firm cohorts. Creative destruction may also have an immediate effect on distribution 
by promoting competition not only across firm-cohorts but also within them, as 
competition drives prices down in final and intermediate product markets.  The 
longer-term effect on distribution is ambiguous, because the new economic structure 
may inject dynamism into marginal economic sectors, or conversely, the new 
technological platform may exclude some economic groups—if it were to emerge 
localized within a geographic area or favoring a type of factor of production. In fact, 
a standard hypothesis for the growing income inequality is that technical change 
brought about by information and communication technologies has been skill-biased 
(see Acemoglu, 1998; and Saint-Paul 2008). 
These two considerations make it clear that creative destruction relies on 
competition, and that without competition there is no destruction of old firms. 
Conceivably, innovation may take place without competition—if incumbent firms 
could block new entrants by investing themselves in R&D or buying out firms that 
threaten their market power—but the distributive effect of innovation is lost. 
Innovation without competition is creative destruction without destruction. 
Historian Alfred Chandler (2001; 2005) has shown that for important technological 
revolutions—including the chemical industry, electric power, and more recently, 
information and communication technologies—the stylized characterization of 
Schumpeter has only partially being realized, for new firms do emerge in the lead of 
new industry but they do not fully displace the old industries; rather, they just carve 
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in a space for themselves in the economy. Schumpetrian destruction does happen 
but is never complete; as leading firms consolidate their position at the core and 
firms in a nexus of support consolidate in the periphery, the structure of the new 
industry becomes stabilized in very long-run (Chandler, 1990). The history told by 
Chandler is all the more relevant to the Schumpeterian explanation because it 
demonstrates that each new technological platform does not fully reshuffle the 
ownership of productive assets and thus explains the secular trend in the 
concentration of economic power; every technological revolution adds only a few 
hands at the top. Innovation is indeed suspect for the rising income inequality of the 
last three decades (Acemoglu, 1998; Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante, 2001; Autor, 
Katz, and Krueger. 1998). Furthermore, detractors of creative destruction, mainly 
from neoclassical economics, use the assumption that monopolistic profits are the 
source of R&D investments and explain innovation as phenomena endogenous to 
the economic system (for a review see Valdivia, 2010). These models however have 
failed to explain the accompanying rise in income and wealth inequality, precisely 
because the explanation of inequality resides in what they omit, the concentration of 
economic power. 
I revisited creative destruction in order to justify my claim that the manner in 
which high-tech start-ups emerge had consequences on the distributional character 
of innovation. Reiterating the central relationships: if start-ups emerged to compete 
in markets against established firms, creative destruction takes place, successful new 
firms displace old firms, and economic resources change hands. Conversely, if start-
ups are acquired by established firms as soon as they show commercial promise, 
competition is stymied and with it the reallocative effect of innovation. 
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There is indeed some evidence supporting this logic. Surveying 118 start-up 
firms, Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2000) found that “while venture financing is certainly 
associated with certain ‘instances’ of creative destruction, the focus by venture 
capitalists on profit maximization and their ability to reduce the costs of identifying 
potential partners increases the relative attractiveness of cooperation with more 
established firms” (p. 31). 
To the extent that the OTT model of nurturing start-ups is aligned with the 
venture capital model, that is, both aim at maximizing the value of the firm, 
universities are likely to encourage start-ups to accept tender offers from established 
firms as opposed to seeking independence and consolidating their position as 
competitors. Furthermore, in markets where incumbents have raised barriers to 
entry—agreements with suppliers, productive capacity, distribution and marketing 
networks, or a brand-name—Gans and Stern (2003) show that strong patent 
protection leads start-ups to collude with established firms. In addition, the prospect 
of a protracted market battle against an established firm may seem impractical for a 
cash-starved start-up firm. Passing on a serious offer from an incumbent firm may 
be very hard indeed for a start-up valued largely by its intangible assets (including its 
intellectual property). 
Aside from the evidence offered by Gans, Hsu and Stern (2000), one may 
wonder if there is evidence that directly connects Bayh-Dole with the manner in 
which high-tech start-ups emerged (competing vs. colluding) and with the resulting 
industrial organization of that new economic sector. In fact, there is such historical 
evidence in the biotechnology industry, which has benefited greatly from university 
patenting. 
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While the biotechnology industry took-off before Bayh-Dole was enacted, it 
benefit greatly from the liberalization of university patenting in 1980. Biomedical 
patents have consistently increased their share of total university patents and usually 
have yielded the highest licensing incomes. For instance, Mowery and Ziedonis 
(2000, 2002) looked at data from the University of California System and Stanford 
University where biomedical patents issued to those universities came to represent 
60% of their portfolio in the 1984-1988 period. They also found that biomedical 
patents amount for nearly all the top-5-earners’ income for 1990 and 1995, and for a 
substantial portion of their licensing income—66% in the UC System, 83% in 
Stanford University, and 85% in Columbia University. 
It is commonly believed that start-up firms championed the emergence of 
the biotechnology industry and while young companies had an important role, the 
role of big established firms in the pharmaceutical industry should not be 
underplayed. Chandler (2005) chronicles how pharmaceutical giants Eli Lilly, Merck, 
Schering-Plough, and Ciba-Geigy led entry and key initial investments in 
biotechnology. Chandler documents a hundred start-ups that developed the “nexus” 
of support for the companies at the “core” of the industry, but among those with 
ambitions to operate at the core, only two succeeded independently (Amgen and 
Genzyme), while the vast majority eventually surrendered control to incumbents. 
Among the notable cases, Genentech and Chiron, while technically successful 
needed the financial assistance that came from their acquisition by Roche and Ciba-
Geigy respectively. Likewise, Genetics Institute and Immunex were acquired by 
American Home Products, Centocor by Eli Lilly, and Biogen entered into 
partnership with Merck. 
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Bayh-Dole did facilitate the emergence of biotechnology, and a consequence 
of this policy is the large number of start-up firms that sought to establish 
themselves as independent players in this industry. However, the story takes the turn 
predicted by Gans and Stern (2003), as nearly all those start-ups ended up reinforcing 
the position of established firms in the industry as opposed to presenting real 
competition. 
I should clarify that I am not attributing to Bayh-Dole the current market 
structure of the biotechnology industry. Rather, I have recalled the history of this 
industry to illustrate the potential for Bayh-Dole to curb distributional outcomes 
from innovation. Universities and the standard licensing model of the last three 
decades facilitated the emergence of biotech start-ups and these new firms eventually 
reinforced the market power of core companies in the pharmaceutical industry. If 
the new model of nurturing start-ups takes hold, OTTs will push start-ups further 
into that direction; that is, in the direction of colluding to established firms rather 
than standing up to compete. Bayh-Dole cannot be made responsible for the 
industrial organization of the new economic sectors, but to the light of this analysis 
future amendments to this policy should consider how best to foster competition. 
With greater competition, the ownership of productive assets in the economy would 
be reorganized to some extent and this should increase the distribution of economic 
benefits from innovation. 
I suggested in the introduction to make Bayh-Dole an instrument for the 
democratization of technology transfer, and this implies not only to rethink this 
policy in terms of the allocation of economic resources (as I just did) but also with 
respect to the allocation of political resources. I want to add this dimension, if only 
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briefly, because it complements the foregoing discussion. A caveat is in order here. I 
focus on the political organization of university interests because they are the 
implementers of Bayh-Dole. The political dynamics that involve the other relevant 
actors, firms and citizens, often involve political forces and relations in which patent 
policy and technology transfer is but a modest concern. However, of the broad range 
of industrial interests represented in political action, the ones that speak directly to 
Bayh-Dole lie precisely in their negotiation of agreements and patent licenses with 
universities. Likewise, citizens as consumers lack organized political representation, 
and as political persons they delegate much of the decisions about new technologies 
to private enterprise; but they do take political action relevant to Bayh-Dole as 
various constituencies of the university. Consequently, focusing on the political 
dynamics of the university system is indirectly relevant to firms and citizens as well. 
I showed above that the gains from technology transfer that universities 
derive are strongly related to their economic resources, and that the distribution of 
these resources is consistent with the well-known fact that the university system is 
elitist. It would seem, then, reasonable to expect that the majority of universities with 
modest research funding take an interest in shaping Bayh-Dole such that the 
incomes from licensing are not distributed as unequally as federal research funds. 
However, universities as a group have lent support to the Act and have not even 
hinted at reforms to increase participation of small universities in technology patents. 
Is this owed to the fact that elite universities control political representation 
of the university system? That may be the case to some extent. Consider for instance 
the Association of American Universities (AAU), arguably the most influential of all 
university associations: Founded in 1900, AAU is an invitation-only association 
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composed by 61 of the wealthiest universities. Presidents of the AAU are regularly 
invited to Congressional hearings to represent the view and interests of the university 
system; unmistakably, they show strong support of Bayh-Dole (Slaughter, 1993)—
even at times suggesting that no reforms are necessary to the law but only to 
practices and coordination. However, the solid support of the university system 
cannot be attributed entirely to the fact that the voices of elite universities are the 
ones policymakers are listening to more often. Other organizations, such as the 
American Council of Education, are much more plural in their composition, but 
have equally portrayed the position of universities as unanimously favorable towards 
Bayh-Dole (Slaughter, 1993; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). This may suggest two 
forces at play. One, that the leadership of university associations follows the lead of 
the elite echoing its influential voice, and the second, that it may cast the interests of 
its political base in the language and values that are prevalent in policy circles 
(Slaughter, 1990). For instance, as I discussed in Chapter 3, the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism may require universities to articulate their interests in terms of support 
for stronger patent protection and deregulation of monopolies. 
Also, Berman (2008) shows that universities were organized to support the 
passing of Bayh-Dole in Congress, and the organizer’s views became de facto the 
group’s discourse. In the 1970s the organizers were government officials and 
bureaucrats (Berman, 2008; Stevens, 2004), but the organization that was founded 
then, the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), is today the one 
that coalesces university support for Bayh-Dole. This association promotes the role 
of technology transfer professionals and informs various constituencies—policy 
makers, technology entrepreneurs, policy analysts—about the positive impacts of 
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university technology transfer. The leadership of AUTM is generally composed of 
executives from profitable OTTs; and once again, the views of the leadership is 
portrayed as the views of all universities. 
Consequently, the political dynamics of the university system allocate voice 
unequally among its members, and this is particularly true in the advocacy of Bayh-
Dole. Most small universities do not want to dismantle the Act, but they may want to 
amend it to create more opportunity for all universities to benefit from it, not only 
the elite. Their cause has a slim chance to surface in university political discourse. 
The internal dynamics of the university system will unlikely lead to forging a 
consensus on reforms to democratize technology transfer; instead, the dynamics will 
give way to other organic forms of reform—such as the emergence of the nurturing 
start-ups model—that may not necessarily benefit equally all universities and that 
carry the larger consequences on the distributive effects of innovation that I 
described above. 
I have discussed thus far the dynamics of allocation of political and 
economic recourses in the university system in relation to Bayh-Dole. I have also 
invoked creative destruction as an explanatory device to relate the new business 
model of OTTs with industrial organization and this with the distributive character 
of innovation. I have done all that self-consciously taking the university system as my 
focal point. However, if the focal point is more general, such as the economy as a 
whole, the discussion of distribution in technology transfer will invoke more general 
arguments on the distributive effects of the research and innovation processes as a 
whole. To complement my university-centered explanation, I now turn my attention 
to those more general arguments. 
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4.4 The distributive myths of research and innovation. 
I would like to be explicit about my aims in this section. At first glance, 
Bayh-Dole reallocates resources in the same fashion as a subsidy, transferring monies 
from general taxation to universities, or taking a longer view, from taxation to 
technology developers.38 
I will probe this intuition more formally by testing if the policy fits the 
concept of distributive policy.39 Second, the Act was intended to streamline 
innovation by privatizing public patents and was built to connect government 
funding of research (research policy) and patent protection (innovation policy). To 
understand the distributive character of Bayh-Dole it is then necessary to review the 
standard arguments that justify public support of research and innovation, in the 
distributive sense. In the process of reviewing those arguments I tackle some regular 
myths about the distributive character of research and innovation. 
My argument in this section is highly deductive. In contrast with the 
foregoing discussion, there is not much empirical evidence to draw from and 
relational hypotheses are consequently much harder to suggest. This is because (i) the 
relevant empirically observable effects cannot be attributed directly to Bayh-Dole, 
but to a host of reforms including court rulings, and (ii) in two of the three 
mechanisms of distribution that I identified (spillovers and wealth creation), 
                                                 
38 The transfer of monies has two elements. The traditional effective cash-flow—the current period 
funds granted to government research contractors—and an additional element of future cash-flows—
the yet unrealized licensing incomes or profits that the government would have kept had it kept rights 
to its patents and negotiated similar licensing terms. 
39 Distributive and redistributive policies reallocate resources, but the former does target a group as in 
the case of a subsidy or a tariff, and the latter targets the entire population as in the case of monetary 
policy or the income tax. This distinction was standardized by Lowi’s Four systems of policy paper (1972). 
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empirical hypotheses concern primarily how innovation creates growth and how 
growth trickles down, and both concerns are outside the scope of this study. 
 
4.4.1 Research funding and patent protection as distributive policies. 
Public funding of research reallocates resources between groups, specifically 
from taxpayers to research contractors. Why should taxpayers support the livelihood 
of researchers and their expensive activities? The traditional response is that 
investments in research, given sufficient time, have been a boon for society. 
The argument for public support for research, at least since the famous 
Endless Frontier report (Bush, 1945) is that free markets would not provide a level of 
research activity, particularly of basic research, that meets social expectations of 
economic growth, national security, public health, etc. This leads to the first myth in 
the distribution of benefits from research: 
P1. Research produces a public good: new knowledge. Once new scientific 
knowledge is placed in the public domain it is evenly distributed among all who are 
able and willing to use it. The open use of new scientific knowledge is the driver of 
economic growth, and is critical to national security, public health and overall quality 
of life. 
The public good argument is at best suspect. Callon and Bowker (1994) have 
persuasively argued that scientific knowledge is not a public good. One reason is in 
the significant costs of learning new knowledge already produced. Compare highly 
technical knowledge with national security, the canonical example of a pure public 
good. One of the characteristics of national security is that the enjoyment of the 
protection that a single citizen receives from the state does not require that individual 
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to pay additional costs in proportion of its consumption (additional to having paid 
taxes)—in economic lingo, the marginal cost is zero. In contrast, the individual who 
wants to understand advanced technical knowledge must invest enormous effort in 
time and resources to do so. And going from learning to application of technical 
knowledge only raises the costs. Application demands from firms “absorptive 
capacity,” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) or the productive capacity and the knowledge 
base to adapt an invention effectively into an existing production process. 
Patent protection is also distributive, because when it creates a monopoly 
from an invention, it reallocates resources between groups, specifically from the 
consumers to the monopolist. To understand the distributive effect of patents, a 
good starting point is to recall the allocative distortions of monopolies. Compared to 
competitive markets, monopolies sell less and at higher prices because their market 
power allows them to capture profit from the consumer surplus of those consumers 
willing to pay the monopolist price. What is more, monopolies also create 
deadweight loss, which is the vanishing surplus (for consumer and producer) at 
prices below the monopolist price (a review in Housman, 1981). 
The distributive character of patent protection is perhaps less obvious than 
that of public funding of research, but the reallocation of resources it produces is 
generally justified by two other myths: 
P2. Patents are a necessary incentive for innovation. That patents are a 
necessity for firms to take the risks of large investments in technology development 
(see Mazzeloni and Nelson, 1998—third patent theory) may be true for some firms 
and in some circumstances, but it is hardly an unqualified truth. In fact, two 
influential studies on the role of patents in U.S. manufactures—known as the Yale 
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survey (Levin et al., 1987) and the Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh, 2000; 2002)—have found that firms in most manufacturing sectors do not 
consider patents as an important instrument to secure returns for their R&D 
investments. Given that those surveys focused on established firms, it remains 
possible that patents are truly important for start-up firms, because, without that 
protection, large firms could more easily copy the new products and force emerging 
firms out of business. The point remains inconclusive, but this seems unproblematic 
to a good many policy-makers who hold as an article of faith that patents are 
necessary for innovation. 
P3. The benefits of innovation trickle down to all social strata. This premise 
is explained in a number of ways. One way is by consumption: the wealthiest 
constantly upgrade their consumption to the highest quality available, that is they buy 
today’s innovations, pushing down yesterday’s innovations to the next level in the 
economic latter. Insofar as new products keep appearing a top, everyone will keep 
upgrading their consumption. A second way to explain the trickle down effect is in 
reference to “wealth creation,” that is, new industries induce economic dynamism to 
old industries resulting in growth of the aggregate economy. Recall the discussion in 
the previous chapter—political discourse of innovation links in a logical chain 
innovation to economic growth to competitiveness—as a result innovation is 
generally taken as a social goal of consensus. Yet believing that new wealth is 
necessarily distributed fairly betrays a conviction in “trickle down economics” which, 
as an economic theory, is far from consensual (Thornton, Agnello and Link, 1978; 
Arndt, 1983, c.f. Aghion and Bolton, 1997). Still, a third common explanation for the 
trickle is related to “spillover effects.” Innovation spawns further innovation in the 
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input and intermediate goods sector, particularly in labor (see review in Feldman, 
1999). The successful introduction of a new product into the market also creates 
incentives for further innovation, in the processes of production at scale, 
commercialization, and distribution. Furthermore, patent protection forces potential 
competition to try alternative technical avenues. Also, patents enable profits, and 
these allow firms to re-invest profits in further R&D. 
Because the distributional power of spillovers resides in the multiplication of 
innovation itself, and innovation as a source of wealth creation explains better how 
the economic pie is made larger than how the pie is divided, the first mechanism—
distribution by consumption—seems to capture more aptly the immediate 
distributive effect of patents. This effect, as explained above is a reallocation from 
consumer’s surplus to monopolist’s profit. 
Yet, this reallocation is believed to be temporary because patent protection 
lapses in 20 years from the date of filing. This notion follows from a fourth myth: 
P4. The expiration of the patent opens the relevant market to competition. 
There are reasons to doubt the generality of this premise because, as I explain later in 
more detail, the profitability of a firm depends on its ability to retain market power, 
and a successful firm will use the initial advantage of a patent to develop capabilities 
that work as barriers to entry beyond the patent expiration. 
These four premises (summarized in Table 4) have been the basis for 
standard argumentation to justify funding of research and patent protection from a 
distributive perspective. Yet, how exactly does Bayh-Dole bring together the 
distributive elements of these policies? 
  142 
Table 4. Four premises: distribution of benefits from research and patents 
protection. 
P1. Research produces a public good: new knowledge 
P2. Patents are a necessary incentive for innovation 
P3. The benefits of innovation trickle down to all social strata 
P4. The expiration of the patent opens the market to competition. 
 
4.4.2 Bayh-Dole as a distributive policy. 
The architects of Bayh-Dole thought that public research was underutilized 
and that the public investment in research was not realizing its promise. It was 
believed at that time that patents owned by the government (public patents) 
remained undeveloped by the private sector due to the lack of economic incentives 
for development. The Bayh-Dole solution was simple; it “privatized” public patents. 
In doing so, however, Bayh-Dole restructured the distributive mechanisms of public 
research and exacerbated those of patent protection. 
Before the Act, universities patenting was much less frequent and this lent 
some credence to the belief that university research was in fact a public good 
(Dasgupta and David, 1994). Since Bayh-Dole however, it was not only permitted 
but also encouraged to turn new knowledge into a private good, particularly when it 
has a potential application. Bayh-Dole thus forced an analytical distinction between 
the activity of research and the product of research, in order to keep the former (the 
activity) conceptualized as a public good (P1) supported by government, and to be 
able to convert the latter (the output) into a private good, a patent. 
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The privatized patents are expected to accelerate innovation (P2) and 
innovation is expected, at the macro-level, to create new wealth that trickles down 
the economy (P3). In turn, at the micro level, it will work by creating monopolies in 
markets for new products that are based on public patents. Studying how new wealth 
spreads is outside the scope of this study. Rather, to shed some light into the 
distributive character of Bayh-Dole I prefer to focus on the distributive effects of 
monopolies that can be traced back to privatized public patents: the distributive 
effect of reallocating consumer benefits into profits.40 The reasoning is 
straightforward: the concentration of consumption benefits (consumer surplus) is the 
highest in a monopolistic market structure. If a patent could be developed in a 
competitive environment, that is, if an exclusive license is not a necessary incentive 
for innovation, Bayh-Dole artificially creates a monopoly. The reallocation of 
resources, inherent to patents, is exacerbated by Bayh-Dole’s liberal policy on 
exclusive licenses because patent-based monopolies reap the fruits of labor that are 
not uniquely theirs, since they are using publicly funded seed.41 From this 
perspective, Bayh-Dole effectively subsidizes entrepreneurs with general taxation. 
To put this point in perspective, consider the equivalent of Bayh-Dole in 
venture capital markets. For a start-up firm, the period between the first influx of 
                                                 
40 The macro and spillover effects of Bayh-Dole are best understood in the context of all other 
reforms to the innovation system in the period (1980s and 1990s). Recall, Bayh-Dole was only one 
piece in a set of reforms to patent policy (Chapter 2), and patent reform was only a province of the 
institutional change motivated by a neoliberal policy agenda (Chapter 3). 
41 This line of reasoning could be pursued further. Does a patent solve the allocative problem of 
remunerating fairly all parties whose effort resulted in a useful invention? There is surely an 
unaccounted and non-negligible amount of effort that society puts into every invention, by means of 
creating and maintaining institutions that preserve knowledge, to educate the inventor, and to enable 
him to do his work. It is a genuine question to ask whether patents are remunerating inventors in 
excess of their value-added, or to ask what other practical mechanism might remunerate, inventor and 
society, more fairly. 
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capital (aimed at developing the business concept) and the second influx of capital 
(aimed at financing growth) is called the “valley of death” because the company may 
be imperiled by lack of liquidity before it becomes eligible for the second influx. The 
valley of death occurs because of the asymmetry of information about the project: 
regardless of the entrepreneurs’ optimism, venture capitalists cannot yet determine if 
the investment is likely profitable. Until the firm is able to produce minimum 
evidence of future profitability, venture capitalists will be reluctant to assume the 
financial risk. The same has been said in the Bayh-Dole debates, that firms would be 
reluctant to assume the financial risk of development without exclusive rights to 
patents. Bayh-Dole is in this perspective the equivalent of setting up a government 
fund to help start-ups across the valley of death; it works as a subsidy to reduce the 
financial risk for entrepreneurs. It should be noted that the Small Business 
Administration announced, in February 2011, that it will set aside two billion dollars 
to set up two such funds, one for early stage companies and the other for companies 
in underserved communities. 
The argument that Bayh-Dole works as a subsidy because it allows exclusive 
licenses and thus sanctions patent-based monopolies must contend with the 
counterargument that, at the expiration of the patent, the monopoly effectively ends. 
At that time, competition should more widely distribute the benefits of innovation. I 
want to take issue with this counterargument because it does not hold in a wide 
variety of circumstances, and is particularly misleading in the markets being created 
with university patents. 
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4.4.3 Monopolies’ enduring market power. 
Monopolies seek to extend their market power well beyond the life of the 
patents they own. Market power is the ability of a firm to charge a price above its 
marginal cost and hence make profit. Market power is divvied up among the firms 
controlling the market; a monopolist holds complete power, an oligopoly shares less 
of it, and market power is all but diluted in the case of a fully competitive market. 
Profits are thus proportional to market power. 
The literature of first-mover advantages can help explain how a patent-based 
monopoly can retain market power in the long run. Firms derive first-mover 
advantages from pursuing three strategies: leading innovation, appropriation of 
scarce resources, and costumer switching costs (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988).42 
The strategy of investing in innovation has two basic mechanisms, one 
related to the industry’s learning curve and the other through R&D or patent-races. 
When learning and experience in the production and commercialization of a new 
product leads to drops in the unit cost as production expands, early investments in 
acquiring that experience may function as barriers to entry, to the extent that such 
learning is appropriable and leadership in market share can be maintained. Likewise, 
when the size of R&D investments or the priority in acquiring a patent can give an 
advantage, pursuing such strategies is a source of advantage. This is not the case for 
most industries, because competition finds a way to “invent around” patents 
(Mansfield, Schwarts, and Wagner, 1981); however, it does apply to the 
pharmaceutical industry (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). 
                                                 
42 This section draws heavily from Lieberman and Montgomery (1988; 1998). 
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The strategy of appropriating scarce resources is highly applicable in 
extractive industries, as rights of exploration and exploitation are tied to geography. 
Retailers may also find it advantageous to set up shop in specific locations ahead of 
the competition. Also, and particularly relevant to Bayh-Dole, Robinson and Fornell 
(1985) found that pioneers may appropriate the perception of quality and are thus 
able to differentiate their product from emerging rival substitutes. 
The third strategy refers to the additional costs for competitors of convincing 
buyers to switch to their product. In the case of low-cost products, costumers who 
find the first brand satisfactory may have little incentive to re-consider their decision 
in subsequent purchases. Consumers who acquire expertise on a given product (e.g. 
MS Office) may find it hard to switch to better alternatives even if those are less 
expensive (e.g. Open Office). Firms may also attach additional benefits, such as 
loyalty reward programs, that discourage the use of alternative products. Wernerfelt 
and Karnani (1987) suggest that switching costs may provide the opportunity to 
create a reputation for quality of a brand that is then used for a variety of other 
products. Social psychologists have discussed the common judgment biases that 
influence the formation of preferences. For instance, Carpenter and Nakamoto 
(1989) found that consumer preferences may be skewed in favor of products that 
enter the market first. This is particularly relevant to pharmaceuticals because 
generics are regularly sold at lower prices and struggle to gain a significant market 
share. 
The four myths described above have dominated justifications of public 
support of research and innovation on distributive grounds. However, it must not be 
forgotten that research and innovation policy have been mainly argued in terms of its 
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impact on productivity, growth and competitiveness (see Chapter 3), and the 
distribution of economic resources that results form it carries very little weight in the 
policy debate, much less the distribution of political resources. Not surprisingly, the 
myths of distribution to have gone largely unchallenged, and I sought in this last 
section to start the discussion of them. 
 
4.5. Conclusion. 
If the aim is to foster innovation and competition at the same time, it could 
be argued that Bayh-Dole is better suited for industries where an exclusive license is 
necessary for developing a new product, as is the case of the pharmaceutical industry, 
and more specifically, biotechnology. At the same time, as I explained above, the 
advantages that first-movers can derive from exclusive licenses are enduring and will 
effectively raise barriers to entry and competition. Reforms to Bayh-Dole could then 
work in these two fronts: by regulating exclusive licenses in order to allow them only 
when demonstrably necessary, and restricting the tenor of exclusivity in order to 
allow competition to more quickly position itself in the market fray. 
I would like to further emphasize two points I made in this chapter. First, in 
an important sense Bayh-Dole can be analyzed as a distributive policy because it 
subsidizes high-technology entrepreneurs, reducing their financial risk and enhancing 
their first-mover advantages. Moreover, the Act creates the incentive for OTTs to 
maximize the firm value of start-ups, possibly enhancing the market power of 
existing monopolies or oligopolies. 
Second, the asymmetry of resources allocated to universities seems to reflect 
the balance of power in university politics. In fact, university associations are 
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represented by those who stand to gain the most from Bayh-Dole, and consequently, 
they speak for the entire university system as though each an every member offer 
unconditional support to the status quo. 
Both findings could be useful to organize stakeholders that currently lack 
representation in the Bayh-Dole debate. On the one hand, organizing consumers in 
the markets based on public patents may increase pressure for monopolies to 
relinquish some of their market power, expanding in this way the benefits of 
innovation through consumption. On the other, non-elite universities could use their 
good standing among their peers to institutionalize cooperation. I am not only 
referring to research collaborations between elite and non-elite research universities, 
but also to other forms of cooperation such as sharing materials and databases. Take 
for instance Agbio that has had a measure of success forming a patent pool for 
biotechnology patents for agriculture; in fact, patent pools are a promising way to 
foster collaboration and competition and future reforms to Bayh-Dole should 
consider enabling and facilitating them (see Winickoff, 2006). Under collaboration 
agreements, non-elite universities would acquire access to some of the resources of 
elite universities, while mutually benefiting from the collaboration. Under such 
university collaborations, not only a better allocation of resources will be achieved, 
but also synergies in research may be experienced. 
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Chapter 5 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY EVALUATION 
 
5. 1 Introduction. 
The preceding chapters exposed a blind spot in the evaluation studies of 
Bayh-Dole; to wit, the systematic neglect of several important public values. Chapter 
3 described some of those values left out of the analysis and Chapter 4 dealt in more 
detail with equity. In this chapter I ask: Why is the neglect systematic? I have thus far 
chronicled some of the circumstances for such an oversight in the evaluation of 
Bayh-Dole; namely, the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas in U.S. policy-making and the 
structural asymmetry of political power in the university system. I now turn to a 
more general reason, one located in the philosophical underpinnings of policy 
evaluation as a methodology and as a set of practices. 
The following discussion is motivated by a practical problem: the decline of 
public trust in government. Political scientists have identified this problem since the 
early 1970s using half a century of electoral survey data that included the question: 
“How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington 
to do what is right?”43 (Alford, 2001; Citrin, 1974; Lipset and Schneier 1983, 1987; 
Miller, 1974; Nye, Zelikow, and King, 1997). The many putative causes for the 
public’s decline of confidence include heightened social tensions (e.g. around civil 
rights), domestic economic problems (e.g. unemployment, unmanageable fiscal 
                                                 
43 This question is from the American National Election Studies (ANES) produced by the Center for 
Political Studies and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
at the University of Michigan. Other questions in ANES are also used to compute the American 
Political Trust Index which does not differ from the specific question on trust mentioned above. 
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deficits, and competitiveness crisis), widening of economic disadvantage (Bartels, 
2008), or eroding national prestige (e.g. the apparent loss of U.S. clout in 
international affairs) (Nye, 2004a; 2004b, 2010), as well as incidents of political 
scandal (Watergate marked the beginning of the decline) and publicized failures of 
leadership and responsiveness (e.g. mismanagement of natural disasters like Katrina, 
or threats to national security). These disappointing realities are not by themselves 
the source of distrust because disillusion results from our perception of reality falling 
short of our normative expectations. The lack of trust in government is thus born 
from contrasting those perceived realities against notions of what government ought 
to be doing; which is why people in both ideological positions of U.S. politics are 
loosing their confidence, the government does either too much or not enough (see 
Figure 2.8 in Alford, 2001). It is then important to recognize that the problem of 
public trust in government depends on the ways in which people form normative 
views of government, and the extent to which they causally attribute specific aspects 
of their perceived reality to government. Therefore, not only contemporary events of 
political and social life have driven the citizens’ confidence in government down, but 
also the ways in which normative expectations about government are formed, ways 
that in many respects are governed by a “consequentialism morality” and guided by 
“instrumental reason.” 
This is the first link between the motivation and the problem of this inquiry. 
Instrumental reason is implicated as much in the decline of the public trust in 
government as it is in the foibles of conventional policy evaluation. The former point 
has been argued famously by Max Horkheimer (2004|1974) and elaborated further 
by the Frankfurt School to what amounts to a critique of “consequentialism” 
  151 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; Marcuse, 1968; and second generation Habermas 
1975, 1984, 1987). My goal here is to argue the latter point, that is, to examine 
deductively the limitations imposed by instrumental reason on the discipline of 
evaluation in light of the democratic commitments of this discipline. My formulation 
takes issue with the moral theory of consequentialism which is enabled by 
instrumental reason. 
A second manner in which the parallel problems of trust in government and 
incomplete policy evaluation are connected is the citizenry’s exclusion from the 
policy making process. Over the last four decades we have seen a public confidence 
in government drop, but we have also seen increasing civic mobilization and 
activisms to include the lay public input in policy decisions (Inglehart, 2001), 
including areas traditionally insular from lay opinion such as those involving highly 
technical expertise. Notable examples are nuclear power (Kasperson et al. 2008), 
ecological degradation (Hajer, 1995), and biotechnology in the food supply 
(Winickoff et al., 2005) where groups of organized citizens have increasingly 
demanded greater inclusion in bureaucratic regulation and legislative policy-making. 
In response to this situation, government has sought to increase spaces for wider 
participation in the policy making process (Kettl, 2000; Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004) 
and scholars have turned more eyes to public participation and engagement (Skocpol 
and Fiorina, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; see reviews in Carpini, Cook, 
and Jacobs, 2004 and Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2001a; 2001b). Policy 
evaluation has not been impervious to this evolution in political relations. In fact, 
evaluators have begun to see their role in organizational learning as derivative from 
their principal concern with organizational outcomes (Fleischer and Christie, 2009) 
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which may in part be a response to previous calls for involving stakeholders early 
and often in the evaluation process (e.g. Reineke, 1991). Nevertheless, I argue that 
these efforts will not be sufficient to correct the neglect of key public values in 
evaluation if the discipline does not revisit its own commitments to democracy. The 
problem resides in conceiving of policy analysis as an extra-political enterprise. When 
politics is brought back into our conception of policy analysis, the questions of 
political representation and legitimacy re-appear. To address these questions I draw 
from two theorists (Brown, 2009; Catlaw, 2007) who reformulate representation and 
legitimacy in relation to democracy, expertise, and the bureaucracy, and deploy their 
proposals to the case of policy evaluation. 
My argument proceeds in the following manner. In a deductive fashion, I 
first elucidate the problem of policy evaluation in relation to consequentialism. Then 
I introduce specific formulations of “representation” and “legitimacy” to re-conceive 
the methodology of policy evaluation. 
 
5.2 Consequentialism and policy evaluation. 
Policy evaluation, for all its sophistication, remains underdeveloped in 
important areas. Conventional evaluation provides tools to measure the impacts of 
public programs and policies but it does not give any criteria to evaluate the value of 
those impacts. Short of the latter, policy evaluation is only a dull scale that tells us if 
we have more or less, but not if collectively we are better or worse. My aim with the 
observations that follow is to make a case for expanding the scope of policy 
evaluation and pathway for developing the necessary methodology. 
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The so-called “evaluation problem” is the problem of measuring policy 
impacts. The policy impact is the effect a policy treatment has on a social unit or 
entity such as a nation-state, an organization, an individual, etc. However, no entity 
can experience two states, treatment and no treatment, at the same time; hence, the 
problem is to infer its counterfactual state.44 Policy evaluation methods have focused 
therefore on the production of counterfactuals and the attending problems, including 
the unit-homogeneity assumption necessary for statistical inference, the ceteris 
paribus assumption needed to preclude misattribution of causality, and the effect-
stability assumption that informs future public action (for reviews see Heckman, 
2007; 2001; Weiss, 1998). 
It is tautological to say that consequences matter; hence, the methodological 
focus of policy evaluation on consequences is self-evident and justified. However, it 
is also tautological that evaluation encompasses the assessment of value of the 
consequences of policies. In general, evaluations have taken two strategies to deal 
with the latter normative question: either they leave the reader to judge whether the 
direction and size of the impacts are desirable or they incorporate, in the evaluation 
methodology, an implicit normative theory of value. “Let the facts speak for 
themselves” say evaluators who think hardly anyone could argue with the value they 
attribute to the impacts they just inferred, or because they are confident that the 
moral system underlying their technical approach is fair. This is of course not 
altogether objectionable. For instance, if the impact of policy is fewer dead people, 
                                                 
44 Traditionally, counterfactual is used in the context of time series analysis, for extrapolations of 
trends that prevailed before treatment. I will use it here a bit more expansively, to include the control 
group in an experimental/quasi-experimental evaluation design, because this group is used to see what 
happens if the “fact” of treatment did not occurred on an identical individual, that is to say, the state 
“counter the fact.” 
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hardly anyone will deny that such an outcome is desirable. In contrast, when the 
impact is less well determined, for instance the value of a program to create jobs may 
depend on many factors including whether the new source of employment is 
sustainable and if it is not displacing other more sustainable sources of employment. 
This is one area where evaluation methodology needs further development, so that 
we can move away from an intuitive valuation towards a more systematic appraisal of 
the value of outcomes. 
The attention to consequences is not disingenuous. To start, there is a 
tradition in policy analysis going back to Dahl (1963)45 and Gamson (1968) that 
prescribes considering those outcomes that can be tied to the intentions that 
motivated the policy, generally the program’s stated goals. That is a convenient 
strategy from a methodological and a political point of view. Confining attention to a 
well-defined set of effects determines the space of outcomes to be examined, which 
in turn determines, per force of convention, the space of causal relations.46 
Otherwise, unabridged evaluation leaves the problem open to indiscriminate 
inclusion of effects and ad hoc causal relations. Exclusive attention to stated goals 
could also give a political advantage; it justifies a narrow focus of evaluation on the 
presumption that those goals emerged from a democratically legitimate policy 
process. Likewise, a public official may claim the same to fend off criticism on other 
less salutary consequences of the same policy. But criticisms cannot be dismissed too 
easily when ingenious evaluators uncover unintended consequences of clear and 
urgent concern. 
                                                 
45 Dahl’s Modern Political Analysis (1963) is now in its 6th edition. 
46 It is of course possible to conceive infinite putative causal relations for a single effect. Nonetheless, 
disciplinary tradition and convention often allows but a few causal relations to be deemed plausible. 
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Whether intended or unintended consequences, the measurement of 
outcomes, and the sizing of impacts have dominated the methodological efforts of 
policy evaluation. Evidently there is an underlying commitment to consequentialism. 
Elizabeth Anderson defines it as a theory of moral action satisfying the following 
conditions: 
“First, it gives people the sole ultimate aim of maximizing intrinsic 
value. Second, it holds the fundamental object of intrinsic value to be the 
state of affairs. It assesses the value of a state of affairs independent of the 
values of persons, actions, motives, norms, practices, states of character, or 
anything else. Third, it assesses the values of these other sorts of things, or at 
least actions, rules, or practices, solely in terms of their consequences, 
broadly construed–that is, in terms of how effectively they bring about or 
embody the best states of affair... [F]ourth: that all values are ‘agent–neutral’. 
A value is agent-neutral if it gives everyone a reason to value it. A value is 
agent–relative if it gives only some people a reason to value it” (Anderson, 
1993, pp. 30-31).47 
Consequentialist normative theories such as utilitarianism and welfarism 
(Sen, 1979) have in fact lent policy evaluation a normative core. A case in point is 
cost-benefit analysis that combines methodological individualism with a normative 
theory of value such that individual valuation is mapped onto a single scalar measure 
of value (willingness to pay) rendering, in this way, individual values additive and 
social value measurable. Cost-benefit evaluation provides a straightforward 
                                                 
47 In her own analysis, Anderson’s (1993) does not presume “agent-neutral evaluative 
consequentialism” and therefore, does not use the fourth condition. 
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representation of consequences—that is, of the policy impact—as a welfare gain or 
loss (formally consumer and producer surplus). At the same time, the change in 
welfare represents the social valuation and thus social value of the policy. The 
linchpin of this methodology is evidently the premise that individual valuation can be 
mapped onto a single scale of measure. 
I should clarify why I link cost-benefit analysis and “willingness to pay” 
because much of standard practice in cost-benefit does not seem to derive common 
costs or benefits from willingness to pay. The unifying method of cost-benefit 
analysis is to transpose every consideration of analysis onto a single scale, which is 
often expressed in a monetary unit (at a given point in time), so that a net calculation 
of pros and cons can be performed (and time-preference accounted for). Take for 
example, the regular cost-benefit analysis practice of monetizing the cost of a social 
program, not measuring willingness to pay but taking the realistic approach of adding 
all public expenditures associated to such a program. This is surely an acceptable 
approach. Still, the cost of different levels of service may not be appropriately 
estimated simply at the unit cost of the level actually observed. It is not unusual that 
the marginal cost or cost of one additional unit of service may come at a cost higher 
than the last unit serviced, as is the case of a traditionally upward sloped supply 
curve. How are those other levels of service—in the vicinity of the observed level—
estimated? The answer is given by approximating the public expenditure of the 
marginal unit via willingness to pay. The same may happen for the demand side, as 
the last consumer may be the last one willing to pay that high a price for the service. 
This is hard to imagine when the public service is, for instance, a toll-road simply 
because the price is flat for any level of demand. But imagine the auction of public 
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land where the buyer of the last plot may indeed be the last one willing to pay such a 
price-point per acre. Again, the demand in the vicinity of the observed consumption 
level cannot in all cases be assumed singled-priced. Willingness to pay is not needed, 
nor used, for a cost benefit analyses when price and cost are observable and it is 
plausible to assume that either the marginal cost or the demand are flat. But if it is 
perceived a high sensitivity of cost or price to the service level, they are needed. 
Boiling down all consideration to a single scale is open to criticism on both 
its normative and methodological implications. On the normative charge, economic 
individualism is not a precondition for methodological individualism, yet cost-benefit 
imposes self-interest as the sole driver of individual valuation in order to produce a 
social aggregate of welfare.48 Moreover, the choice of a discount rate is a normative 
choice because it represents the opportunity cost of the stream of net gains, which 
implicitly is a preference ranking of alternative states of affairs. On that 
methodological charge, willingness to pay misrepresents individual valuations when 
the presumed process that elicits valuation–utility maximization–is rendered 
internally inconsistent in the most common circumstances. Consider for instance, the 
case of preference-orders susceptible to price changes (as it happens often on eBay 
or Infomercials) or the case when the total of item-valuations of a basket exceed the 
budget constraint (evidenced by the sizable outstanding balance in most credit card 
holders). 
                                                 
48 The methodological strategy of studying social phenomena as the aggregation of individual actions 
does not imply any specific assumption on individual motivation such as self-interest or rational 
egoism. Recall Weber’s (1922|1978) admonition: “It is a tremendous misunderstanding to think that a 
‘individualistic’ method should involve what is in any conceivable sense an individualistic system of 
value” (p. 18). 
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Therefore, it is likely that the methodology of policy evaluation will benefit 
from addressing two weaknesses. First, the commitment to consequentialism seems 
to unduly constrict evaluation because public action is never exclusively motivated by 
the desire to achieve certain ends, but also because the act itself of making policy is 
congruent with certain principles and duties that we hold dear. Considering this 
duality of motive, an evaluation of motivations of public action complements the 
assessment of policy impacts. A subtle form of this duality is observed in political 
discourse. A coalition or a public official cannot garner political support for a policy 
proposal sounding half-hearted about it. Political promises are often tempered by the 
degree of uncertainty born in all predictions of policy impacts; when discourse 
cannot credibly assure results the uncertainty-gap is filled with a commitment to 
popular principles. As a result, policy advocates knit political discourse with two 
rhetorical threads: one alluding to the desirability of the likely outcomes; the second, 
declaring the principles upheld by the policy itself and the congruence of its likely 
outcomes with those principles and other core values. The point is that one 
important reason for policy is the act itself of enacting it; there is a symbolic value in 
making policy. 
There is no need to impose the assumption that all public action is done to 
advance some democratic principle because modern democracies have formal 
institutions that regulate the possibilities of public action justifying their character in 
reference to specific principles. While defining in strict terms what principle means is 
cumbersome, it is not difficult to recognize that social groups share a few stable 
precepts—such as the rule of law or free speech and religious freedom—and in the 
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liberal democratic tradition, these precepts are often deemed to be categorical and 
universal. 
Suggesting that policy may be in itself valuable is committing to a 
deontological theory of evaluation. Philosophers contrast consequentialist and 
deontological theories and it is worth clarifying our position in this respect. 
Evaluative consequentialism is teleological because according to it the moral value of 
an act is derived from the value of its purpose, of its raison d’être. Depending on the 
theory of moral value adopted, consequentialism can be utilitarian when hedonism 
commands valuation, or welfarist when a measure of welfare determines valuation. 
In contrast, in non-teleological theories, or deontological, both the act and its 
consequences are judged by their congruence with a value system. Different 
deontological theories of moral value will produce different sets of criteria to assess 
value of policy consequences. Let us stress this point: deontological theories are not 
“views that characterize the rightness of institutions and acts independently from 
their consequences”; as Rawls explained, “ethical doctrines worth our attention take 
consequences into account in judging rightness.” (1971, p. 30). The logic of arguing 
in favor of a shift from consequentialism to a deontological normative theory of 
policy evaluation is a logic with which we are all intuitively familiar. Our behavior is 
often purposive but desired consequences are never our only motivation. We often 
check the meaning of the act itself against our values and sometimes conclude that 
restraint is warranted even when the consequences were socially valued. The 
theoretical challenge is then to characterize such a “value system” or set of criteria 
well enough to inform policy evaluation. 
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The second underdeveloped area of policy evaluation is the reconciliation of 
any normative assessment of policy consequences with democratic values. A 
common strategy of evaluation is to uncover policy impacts that are at all lights 
worrisome, even alarming. These normative assessments could be called “front-page 
headlines” because they are akin to the type investigative journalism that unearths 
rotten problems. This strategy comes short for the wide majority of policy problems 
where problems are more subtle and complex and can only be assessed across 
multiple dimensions that do not boil down to a single shocking fact. Another 
common strategy is to use an evaluation method containing a packaged normative 
theory. 
A case in point is cost-benefit analysis that has utilitarianism built-in its 
method. Let me be more explicit about this, the cost-benefit approach admittedly is a 
clever contraption; it lets individuals reveal their valuations and indexes them as a 
price they are willing to pay. By having a common unit the different individual 
valuations can then be added to a grand social total, just as Bentham envisioned his 
felicificus calculus. Nonetheless, the normative theory that undergirds the cost-
benefit approach is suspect to be at odds with at least one aspect of democratic rule; 
that of political equality, or more precisely, equal consideration of interests. 
Specifically, if policy evaluation is to guide policy decisions, the interests of the 
constituency served by the policy ought to be given equal consideration, but in cost-
benefit evaluation individual interests are given asymmetric consideration by 
construction. Given that: (i) welfare is defined as total surplus equal to consumer 
plus producer surplus, (ii) that consumer surplus is the summation of individual 
surplus of all individuals willing and able to purchase the good, and (iii) given that 
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individual surplus is the difference between two prices–the would-pay price and the 
actual market price–; then, different levels of individual surplus mean that different 
individuals have different weights as measured by consumer surplus. Furthermore, 
given that: (iv) the would-pay price is nothing more than the demand schedule, and 
(v) that the demand schedule is derived from a utility maximization constrained to a 
budget; then, for any two equal preference profiles, a larger budget will result in 
greater willingness to pay. As a consequence, policy decisions guided by cost-benefit 
analysis seem to accord voice in proportion to purchasing power. What is more, 
those who cannot afford to pay are not given any consideration, regardless of their 
preferences or needs. Furthermore, units of producer surplus are the same as units of 
consumer surplus; implicitly then, cost-benefit analysis grants equal consideration to 
the producer. Evidently, that too is inconsistent with political equality; particularly, 
when production is concentrated in a few firms, where each top executive of those 
firms would be given disproportionately more political consideration than each 
consumer. 
Both stances, the built-in normativity in the method of analysis and the 
assumed normativity of certain troubling outcomes, hides in the background the 
normative frame of reference. In the next section I suggest a few conditions for the 
formulation of such a normative framework. 
 
5.3 Towards a normative framework for deontological policy evaluation. 
The first question in assessing the value of a policy outcome or the policy 
itself is value for whom? If evaluation is put to the service of democracy, it must 
provide a democratic answer to that question. I will concern myself with the case of 
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a “representative democracy” because that is the general structure of contemporary 
democratic nation-states. Those who reject the possibility of representation, usually 
perched on the participatory democracy tree, will surely object. However, it will 
become apparent that there are elements in my argument that may actually be 
reconciled with their views. 
From the outset I must clarify that formulating a normative framework for 
evaluation is not an effort to propose a closed-ended theory of value for policy; this 
has been precisely the shortfall that I am seeking to redress. Assuming that a 
plausible or popular theory of value is universally adequate, as it happens with 
consequentialism, subverts the notion that democracy can accommodate a plurality 
of values, and in the specific case of consequentialism I have argued that it misses 
entirely the duality of motive in policy making. 
A first approximation could be the formulation of a set of minimum 
standards that policy outcomes and process should satisfy if they are to be 
considered legitimate. This is precisely the strategy of Public Value Failure analysis 
(Bozeman, 2002; 2007) that I used in chapter 3 to examine the neglected public 
values of Bayh-Dole. For other examples see Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005), Fenney 
and Bozeman (2008), and the case studies discussed in Bozeman and Sarewitz 
(2011). 
After demarcating the outer terrain in which a policy is situated, a second 
approximation to the normative frameworks that we seek to sketch could be in 
narrowing the preferable set of values and map them onto the practical aims of 
policy. Such an approach was proposed by Frank Fischer who proposed a “critical 
policy evaluation” (1988, 2003). This project is certainly coterminous to the 
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deontological evaluation proposed here; however, Fischer sought to establish such a 
mapping distilling social values from the political philosophy of the Frankfurt critical 
theory. In the actual practice of policy making these value-set could meet resistance 
from critics of critical theory who find it hyperbolic in its characterization of 
contemporary problems withing democracies—my critique of “instrumental reason” 
and “consequentialism” is, of course, exposed to the same attacks. Alternative 
mappings in the same fashion could be done on liberal theories that are more 
accommodating of current political arrangements. For instance, the values from the 
political philosophy of Rawls (1971, 2005|1990) as condensed in the “difference 
principle” and “overlapping consensus” may lead to an evaluation of policy in 
regards to “primary goods”—resources and opportunity that citizens deploy and use 
in pursuing their conception of the good life. Also within the liberal tradition the 
mapping could be done against the enunciated capabilities of Nussbaum’s 
“capabilities approach” that refined Rawlsian (Nussbaum, 2000). A possible weak 
link in Fischer’s approach lies in that mapping a well-defined set of values onto 
policy goals may inadvertently validate some of the justifications of such goals. For 
instance, assessing developmental policies (that rely heavily on innovation) as a 
vehicle to alleviate poverty using Nussbaum’s approach—which incidentally is done 
by official UN assessment of the Millennium Development Goals—implicitly 
validates the view that poverty is something that can be solved with innovation. 
Those people called poor may instead see poverty as derived from their historical 
political marginalization, but those values are invisible to developmental policies 
center on mosquito webs and water filters. 
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Consequently, a third approximation to our normative framework for 
deontological evaluation ought to take seriously the values of the publics impacted 
by policy. The legitimate representation and aggregation of those values is precisely 
the historic challenge that various forms of representative democracy have tried to 
resolve. This means that two critical issues are at stake, how to understand 
representation, and how government derives legitimacy for its authority. 
To respond to the first question I draw directly from the discussion of 
representation in Mark Brown’s Science and Democracy (2009). Brown begins by 
critiquing the “theories of correspondence” that have characterized representation. 
Not only political but also scientific representation too, commonly thought to be 
different kinds of representation, have actually been conflated by the liberal 
democratic project. When no specific mechanism (like voting) can project the image 
of the “will of the people” to scale, as an architect’s design, neither view of 
government as a delegate or as a trustee are adequate—this is a parallel argument to 
the seminal work of Pitkin on representation (1967). Brown conceptualizes 
representation as a dynamic process that results from the functioning of a whole 
ecology of institutions of representation, each of which satisfies one or more of 
several critical functions, namely: “authorization, accountability, participation, 
deliberation, and resemblance” (Brown, 2009, p. 206). The thickness and 
heterogeneity of this ecological space, extending the natural analogy, determines the 
resilience of democratic representation. 
To respond to the question of government legitimacy, I enlist some concepts 
from Thomas Catlaw’s Fabricating the People (2007) who tackles the problem in the 
arm of government where legitimacy has being contested the most: the bureaucracy. 
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Like Brown, Catlaw rejects the theories of correspondence, but locates the culprit for 
the misconception in the ontology of the sovereign of democracy, the people. The 
liberal democratic project has been ultimately a project of creating a political identity 
in the sense that representation of the sovereign as one person, one will, succeeds 
only insofar as the sovereign is believed to exist and is given its coercive authority by 
every citizen. Moreover, this is only possible if the political self-concept of every 
citizen can accommodate such an entity. The inevitable consequence of the 
construction of this political national identity is the demarcation of its contours; that 
is, the construction of its negative which is the act of political exclusion. Exclusion is 
thus as fundamentally democratic as is representation. The contemporary crisis of 
administrative legitimacy is brought about by the fracture of the political identity. 
Once the national identity is fractured, exclusion is equivocal, almost capricious, and 
thus it slips into further fractious conflict. The current legitimacy crisis may then 
explained, at least in part, by the social tensions that became apparent since the 
1960s (one could imagine that a similar and perhaps deeper fracture led to the Civil 
War). I would hazard to add that it has been also co-produced by the rise of 
information technologies (c.f. Castells, 1996). Catlaw concludes that government and 
the bureaucracy will only undermine further their legitimacy if they insist in 
fabricating that “unum” of e pluribus unum. Government and policymakers that admit 
the defeat of the national political identity project must anchor their legitimacy in a 
multiplicity of institutions that have retain their legitimacy independently, or in 
Brown’s terms, must anchor policy in the ecology of democratic institutions of 
representation. 
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The political philosophy of Brown keeps the term representation but 
redefines it, Catlaw prefers to vanish it, but both rely on a robust and heterogeneous 
ecology of institutions to preserve democratic life.49 I submit then, that deontological 
evaluation would sharpen the examination of values relevant to policy by mapping 
them onto the institutions of representation and characterizing their dynamics. This 
is indeed similar to the policy analysis method that Bozeman named Public Value 
Mapping (2003) with the caveat that, to the light of the foregoing considerations, the 
characterization of values must be careful to discern values that emanate from 
theories of correspondence in representation and those that re-fabricate the people 
as a national political identity. For instance, deontological evaluation would distrust 
deriving values form polls and surveys given that they systematically boil down 
heterogeneous identities to a single menu of responses. 
 
5.4 Conclusion. 
The foundations of deontological evaluation should not be confused with the 
now popular characterizing of politics as local and its derivative prescription for 
evaluation to be sensitive to local and contextual needs. Nor should they be 
construed as negating such a prescription. Rather, I am submitting a challenge for 
evaluation to be reconceived more amply in its considerations of political power of 
the publics affected. Deontological evaluation must elevate the voice of traditionally 
marginalized technical and political representations, such as equity in the Bayh-Dole 
                                                 
49 I will not answer here the question of what are these institutions and how can we tell which are to 
be nurtured and which to be stunned. I might suggest that the design of those institutions may benefit 
from the work on the stabilization of social boundaries, called “boundary work” (Gieryn, 1990, 
Jasanoff, 1990) and “boundary organizations” (Guston, 2000, 2001). 
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debate. What is original of this proposition, the mapping of values into the various 
institutions of representation, could benefit from the methods of institutional 
analysis that have thus far been developed into a robust toolkit of analysis (Ostrom, 
2005). 
This project starts with a strong critique of the epistemological and ethical 
gaps that have grown within the discipline of evaluation, and I would add, gaps that 
have grown in despite of the increasing sophistication of its methods and techniques. 
Nonetheless, I should stress that, like Fischer’s “critical policy evaluation” (1988), 
and Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) “policy design,” deontological evaluation does 
not discard the conventional practices of evaluation; rather, it seeks to complement 
them, and ultimately, it seeks to assist a wide arrange of other democratic institutions 
in restoring legitimacy and trust to government. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Evading co-optation of prescriptions. 
My analysis of Public Value Failures in Bayh-Dole implies the need to 
counterbalance the forces of neoliberal discourse (Chapter 3) by strengthening the 
safeguards of the public interest (e.g. relax exceptional circumstances threshold, 
interpret pricing excesses within march-in rights) and assisting universities in 
balancing their financial need with their public mission. In turn, my emphasis on 
managing—instead of arresting—the emergence of the OTT business model of 
“nurturing start-ups” may seem to be rather accommodating to the neoliberal policy 
agenda (Chapter 4). It is worth clarifying my position in this regard. 
The neoliberal defense of free markets is a defense of markets left free from 
government intervention. Free markets are defined simply as free from regulation; 
no longer they are synonym of “competitive markets” and “monopolistic free-
markets” is not an oxymoron. Therefore, the emergence of the nurturing start-ups 
model among OTTs, and its possible effect on industrial firm concentration (i.e due 
to monopolistic markets) is not seen as problematic from the neoliberal perspective. 
However, from the perspective of an equitable distribution of the benefits of 
innovation, industry concentration and the unregulated monopolies are problematic. 
If that is so, why not propose policy to stifle the nurturing start-ups model? Why 
instead, do I propose a sort of “cultivation” of the nurturing model? My main 
reasons are that (i) the nurturing model is poised to become a standard in university 
technology transfer, (ii) that there is little opposition to it from the constituencies of 
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the university, and that (iii) it seems unlikely that future amendments to Bayh-Dole 
will proscribe the practice because the reforms are being debated in terms of 
liberalization not regulation of the market of technology transfer services. But even if 
these reasons do not suffice to elevate the nurturing model to the primary strategy of 
OTTs, the policy implication of adjusting and calibrating this business model, such 
that it fosters industrial competition and not concentration, remains valid. Other 
models such as patent pools (Winickoff, 2006) or socially responsible licensing 
(Mimura, 2010) may emerge as equally important—and should thus be encouraged 
to emerge—still, the nurturing of start-ups could play a role in widening the base of 
beneficiaries of innovation. 
What is more, Chandler’s (2005) account of the emergence of biotechnology 
as a highly concentrated industry would suggest that even before the nurturing start-
ups model is standardized, concentration in new industries was a likely outcome. 
That is why my policy recommendation is valid running the argument in reverse, that 
is, by adjusting this particular business model to reverse the propensity of emerging 
industries towards firm-concentration. 
 
6.2 Lessons and policy implications. 
The first lesson to remark from the analysis of Bayh-Dole is that the policy 
design is shaped as much by what is omitted in the debate as by what is said. The 
omissions in the Bayh-Dole debate included the transparency in its implementation, 
the failure of the NIH to interpret march-in rights too narrowly, and particularly 
considerations about equity. 
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The emphasis on the pace of innovation led to subsequent amendments to 
the law lifting licensing restrictions to large companies and establishing inadequate 
oversight in the Department of Commerce (the use of iEdison, the electronic 
reporting tool for Bayh-Dole, is not mandatory and is not available for public view). 
In turn, the emphasis on traditional academic values has led to other non-statutory 
changes in licensing practices. A few universities have proactively and voluntarily 
started to adopt practices in the public interest to counter accusations of 
mismanagement in the licensing of its IP. The changes include for instance, the Nine 
Points declaration (Bienenstock, 2007) enthusiastically embraced by AUTM and 
programs of “socially responsible licensing” established at University of Washington 
and University of California Berkeley (Mimura, 2007; 2010). 
The lack of discussion of equity issues has also led to changes, in this case by 
permitting certain practices to become commonplace. In particular, what I called 
“creative” licensing practices, such as reach-through provisions, would likely not 
have been adopted if the public discourse kept equity on the table. Of greater 
consequence even is the emergence of a new business model for offices of 
technology transfer—the nurturing start-ups model—that is poised to become the 
standard of service among offices of technology transfer. For all its advantages 
including a stronger commitment on the part of the university to entrepreneurship, 
this model may unfortunately contribute to the concentration of economic power in 
high-tech industries by leading start-ups to accept acquisition offers early in their 
development. 
It is not hard to imagine slight modifications to the nurturing start-ups model 
that would increase rather than curtail competition in technology markets. For 
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instance, the university may partner with venture capital funds and investment 
managers to establish long-term funding commitments for start-ups, as an added 
incentive for them to remain independent until they become attractive for an IPO—
initial public offering, which is the first sale of shares in the open financial market. 
The incentives for entrepreneurship would remain, the return for the university 
would increase even further (although after an extended period of stress in its cash-
flow), and this strategy would actually contribute to make new industries more 
competitive. This type of alternative development is unlikely to happen if equity is 
kept as an afterthought in the debate on technology transfer. 
Another way to understand this lesson is using the concept of “policy drift” 
(Chapter 3). McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987) are inclined to advocate a 
preservation of the policy design, because they propose to use administrative 
procedures to reproduce the political tensions that characterize the making of law 
throughout the implementation of the law, and keep administrative discretion in 
check by preventing what they call “bureaucratic drift.” Horn and Shepsle (1989) are 
of the same mind with respect to “legislative drift,” and they would prefer the 
institutionalization within the designated supervisory committees of Congress to 
keep the political tensions that prevailed when law was enacted. In their views, there 
is an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the act of enacting law, a recognition 
embodied in the judicial tradition of observance of the letter and the spirit of the law. 
In the case of Bayh-Dole, the lack of administrative procedures (that would have 
come as an specific mandate for universities) and congressional institutionalization of 
the 1980 political tensions (the ascent of a different generation of members of 
Congress) allowed a drift that privileged the profit motive over other views of the 
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public interest. The drift, form this perspective, could thus be attributed to the lack 
of voices advocating more equitable distribution of the benefits from Bayh-Dole. 
The retreat of this kind of argument, and the ascendancy of voices concerned with 
the pace of innovation and academic values, permitted an “epistemic drift” (Shapiro 
and Guston, 2006) in the way this policy was conceived. What is omitted in the body 
of evaluation studies of any given policy domain does seem to shape the design such 
a policy. 
If equity was neglected, the second lesson to draw from this study is the need 
to bring back equity consideration into the policy debate. The central approach 
offered in the preceding chapters is by expanding the scope of evaluation, and by 
beginning to examine why is a given outcome important, not just assuming its value. 
I can offer a brief example of how to go about examining the value of outcomes 
from the now familiar case of Bayh-Dole. 
Why is the pace of innovation important? Among many reasons, because it 
leads to economic growth, because that leads to greater wealth, and because that 
leads to a higher standard of living. At that point it becomes evident that we cannot 
aspire as a society to higher standards of living for only the few already comfortable. 
When we push the question of the pace of innovation hard enough, then we may 
realize that it involves distributive justice. Deontological policy evaluation may 
harness social theory to canvass the social choices confronting us. Chapter 4 made it 
clear that there is no single pathway for innovation; innovation can occur in a 
competitive environment or it can take place free of competition; the former leads to 
reshuffling the ownership of productive assets at every wave of innovation, the latter 
leads to the concentration of economic power in a few hands. Deontological 
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evaluation could then bring about a systematic understanding of the values that 
support each route for innovation and technology transfer. 
Why do traditional academic values matter? Among the various ways in 
which they matter, academic values matter because they constitute the university as 
an institution vital to democracy. The public mission of universities could be 
interpreted as providing citizens with the means to education and social mobility. 
The public mission could also be interpreted correctly as the provision of services to 
the productive sector by way of training the labor force and generating innovative 
ideas. Another correct interpretation is that the university offers society with a source 
of critical thinking, and a forum for deliberation of capital ideas for society. Pushing 
the question of academic values, in this case, leads us to recognize the diversity of 
services that the university my offer and design the management of technology 
transfer such that it recognizes the various needs and the trade-offs between those 
values. Deontological evaluation would help to balance those values when in conflict 
and would help to identify the specific ways in which they are to be served in the 
management of university IP. Deontological evaluation expands the scope of values 
considered in governance and management. 
 
A third lesson, this time from deontological evaluation, is to consider the 
political arrangements behind the outcomes examined by consequentialist evaluation. 
I showed that while universities benefit financially from Bayh-Dole in a rather 
asymmetric fashion, their associations voice, on behalf of all universities, an 
unqualified support of the Act and even the status quo. It is unlikely that those 
spokespersons really speak for those universities who keep an OTT open at an 
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operational loss, or that represent the sentiment of the whole university system given 
that a majority of research universities loose money in technology transfer activities. 
What happens is that patenting is not a zero-sum game and this is an important 
reason for the inaction of non-elite universities; they cannot cry foul play because no 
resources were taken away from them. But if non-elite universities would put 
themselves at a disadvantage by politically confronting elite universities, their best 
strategy is to invite cooperation. Cooperation does not need to mean political 
advocacy to reform Bayh-Dole, but arrangements like multi-campus collaborations 
or OTT consortia may go a long way democratizing technology transfer. 
 
A fourth lesson is related to the impartiality of an analytical rationale (e.g. 
market failure) is compromised if the policy evaluated (e.g. Bayh-Dole) is inspired by 
the same normative doctrine that inspired that rationale. Normatively, both market 
failure and Bayh-Dole rely on the “virtue” of the markets to justify themselves; 
hence in a market failure analysis of Bayh-Dole, the analyst becomes plaintiff, judge, 
and jury in the trial of policy. Could this be called an epistemic conflict of interest? 
If the norms that inspire the policy are the norms that set the evaluative 
criteria, then evaluation is not impartial. At the same time, if the norms behind 
evaluative criteria are irreconcilable with the norms of policy, evaluation is not 
impartial either. The question of a possible epistemic conflict of interest is really a 
question as to whether evaluation is always under-critical or over-critical, depending 
on the normative frame of reference. If epistemic conflict of interest is an apt term 
for this phenomenon, addressing this problem may benefit from a regular solution to 
conflicts of interest: full disclosure. A rule of thumb for the practice of evaluation 
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could then be for the evaluator to reveal its normative framework explicitly. Perhaps 
impartiality is to the evaluator what the new clothes were for Andersen’s emperor, 
no one dares to point out it is not there. The possibility of impartiality being 
pervasive does not mean that evaluation cannot be honest. Intellectual honesty 
requires evaluators to be explicit about their normative commitments and they can 
apply consistently their value-laden definitions and methods to the problem at hand. 
In addition to the foregoing lessons, Table 5 highlights some key points 
discussed in the preceding chapters. 
At the practical level, the dissertation reveals the importance of affirming the 
role of the university in managing the intellectual property that results from public 
research. Research universities are chartered as not-for-profit organizations and have 
a strong history of public service, and for that reason are the most adequate 
organizations to manage the commercialization of public research and to keep the 
profit motive in check with other social needs. This conclusion stands in stark 
contrast to other analysts (Kenney and Patton, 2009; Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy, 
2007) who have proposed to assign patent rights directly to inventors, and the 
contrast can be appreciated when one contrast their aims (to expedite development 
and commercialization of patents) with my aims (democratize technology transfer). 
Surprisingly, my prescriptions could be reconciled with theirs. Litan and colleagues 
are particularly concerned with the bureaucratization of patent filing and licensing 
negotiation because they see this to be detrimental to entrepreneurship. In their 
proposal, faculty-inventors keep the right to their patents, and mobilize much faster 
their inventions from the lab to the shelves. Inventors would scan and choose the 
best transfer agent in the market, no necessarily the OTT from their own university. 
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In this way they envision the creation of a market of transfer agents, where 
understaffed and inexperienced OTTs would shut down. Admittedly, there is 
efficiency to be gained from reducing the number of OTTs and clustering university 
patent portfolios under the most effective transfer teams may be beneficial to 
universities, entrepreneurs, and investment capital—incidentally, during decades 
before Bayh-Dole the Research Corporation played the role of one such consortia of 
OTTs (Mowery et al., 2004). This is not contrary to my own prescription of greater 
university cooperation in technology transfer as I would advocate too OTT 
consortia. However, I would insist in my prescription to consider the eventuality that 
the nurturing start-ups model becomes the dominant OTT business strategy. In that 
case, the design of OTT consortia is best given two conditions, first, that each 
consortia is formed from a mix of elite and non-elite universities, and second, to 
strive to make these consortia search and find financing for start-ups to cover 
liquidity gaps through the “valley of death”, in order to increase the chance that they 
emerge as stand alone firms. 
 
Furthermore, this study revealed areas that future reforms to Bayh-Dole 
should consider. Namely: 
(i) Providing federal assistance and incentives for universities to enter in 
partnerships that mix elite and non-elite institutions. The NSF and NIH have 
a history of positive experiences funding large research programs with teams 
constituted by faculty from several universities. Likewise, cooperation 
agreements could be modeled after professional and master’s programs that 
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combine faculty from two universities or more or offer education in two 
locations. 
(ii) Introducing incentives for start-up firms to prefer IPOs over the acquisition 
by established firms in the industry. For instance, a tax credits could be made 
to expire if a firm is acquired. Liquidity funds could also attach no-acquisition 
conditions for the receiving firms. 
(iii) Empowering federal agencies to enforce regulation of monopolistic practices 
related to Bayh-Dole licenses. This should include broadening the authority 
and discretion of agencies to use march-in rights, particularly to prevent 
pricing excesses in connection to university patents. 
(iv) Modifying the statute to allow agencies to include conditions in giving 
research grants that grantees must meet when managing their intellectual 
property. For instance, a grant in the development of cancer treatment may 
require the grantees to favor non-exclusive licensing when feasible or to 
apply fee-waivers for social, humanitarian, and research uses of the patents. 
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Table 5. Key points from the analysis. 
• The commercialization of academic research began long before Bayh-Dole was enacted. 
Therefore, it is no more than a myth that it originated with this policy. 
• The exponential growth of university patenting was supported by whole array of reforms to the 
patent system, including Bayh-Dole and other statues, court rulings, new institutional 
infrastructure (such as the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit), and advances in research 
fields amenable to patenting, particularly the emergence of molecular biology. 
• A systemic approach is preferred over an atomistic approach in evaluating Bayh-Dole. The 
effects of Bayh-Dole are best understood when this policy is studied in the context in which it 
operates, as part of the patent system, as part of the partnership between universities and 
technology development firms, and as part of the innovation system. 
• Institutional changes to economic and industrial policy as well as changes in corporate 
governance have a significant influence on the university organization and the way universities 
implement Bayh- Dole. 
• The ideological ascendancy of neoliberalism has transformed the U.S. policy agenda in the same 
period Bayh-Dole has been in effect, changing too the terms of the debate on this policy. 
• In the Bayh-Dole debate, proponents have consistently argued for the positive effects of this 
policy on the pace of innovation, while detractors have shifted from equity concerns to concerns 
with the loss of independence in academic research. In the last three decades, the influence in the 
Bayh-Dole debate has shifted greatly in favor of its advocates. 
• The policy design has drifted in the same direction as the policy debate. University administrators 
implement Bayh-Dole following strategies of the venture capital industry, validated by the 
conviction that it is the most expedite way to justify economic growth. There is nevertheless an 
emerging movement that is retaking some aspects of an implementation of Bayh-Dole with 
strategies to more broadly distribute the benefits of innovation. 
• While universities collect the benefits of patenting very unevenly, as a group, they actively 
support Bayh-Dole. This exposes “representational inequalities” in the organization of university 
associations. 
• Given that tax dollars fund university research and universities and technology development 
firms profit from patenting that research, Bayh- Dole can be assessed in the same way as a 
subsidy. 
• Given the current trend in licensing practices and OTT business models, Bayh-Dole may 
facilitate the concentration of economic power in a few large firms that will acquire start-ups 
• Following from the previous point, it is worrisome that the main research field that emerged 
from universities in the last four decades, biotechnology, has fortified the oligopolistic structure 
of the global pharmaceutical industry. Bayh-Dole has been a catalyst of such a process. 
• The evaluation of the values realized by a policy (deontological evaluation) is at least as valuable 
as that of consequences (conventional evaluation). The case of Bayh-Dole illuminate values 
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obscured or relegated by ideology and intellectual fads. 
 
6.3 Future directions: from a deontological evaluation of Bayh-Dole to anticipatory 
governance. 
I would like to return to the discussion of Chapter 4 where I contrasted the 
co-production thesis with the technological determinism thesis. I said that co-
production emphasizes the simultaneity of the production of new knowledge or the 
design of new gadgets, and the configuration of the institutions that order society. 
When these phenomena takes place in an interconnected network, the analytical 
separation required for the determinism thesis is no longer possible; ideas, things, 
discourses, policies are meshed in a complex network and the challenge of the 
analysis shift to determine the extent of the network where attention will be directed. 
There is a comforting simplicity in technological determinism particular 
when one thinks of the practical implication of such an analysis. Painted with a very 
thick brush: if such technology leads to such an outcome, and the outcome ranges 
from the felicitous to the perilous, the challenges for governance are to improve 
prediction of likely outcomes and improve control over the technology (cause) thus 
control the outcome. These are the two most common dispositions in the 
governance of technology, prediction and control. 
Conversely, the co-production thesis complicates matters. First, it trumps 
neat narratives that organize understanding in chains of case-effect relations between 
science and society (Latour, 1987), technology and the economy (see essays in 
Callon, 1998), technoscience and the social fabric, (Haraway, 1997), operating 
programs and codes of conduct. Second, it demands a different governance 
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approach. Prediction becomes a trivial problem—in a substantive not 
methodologically way—because predictable things are of little importance in the 
analysis of co-production. For instance, the size of the network (which is arbitrary in 
the first place) or the number of actors, are trivial matters in comparison to showing 
how intimate or interconnected actors are, and these non-trivial substantive 
attributes of our understanding are elusive to measurement. Likewise, the aspiration 
of controlling causes (specifically technoscience) becomes impossible because there 
is not clear distinction between cause and effect; any discretionary inclusion of actors 
in a group of causes cannot be understood properly as such because they are at once 
cause and effect of the excluded actors. The general disposition of governance under 
the co-production thesis must be instead organizational and integrative. The 
challenge becomes that or organization of actors, the configuration of the networks 
in which they interact, the integration of functions. The challenge becomes the 
management of the mutuality in the evolution of technology and the very institutions 
that facilitate and regulate their emergence. 
Cultural institutions such as scientists’ preferences for research questions are 
influenced by the hot topics in their fields and the feasibility of answering those 
questions with the available data and methods. Business models of venture capital 
are tailored to the needs of technologies in financially viable industries. Even the 
meaning and application of the institutions that regulate political voice 
(interpretation of the first amendment) must accommodate to the structure where 
the voice is uttered and disseminated—see Hindman’s (2006) concept of googlearchy. 
In the same fashion, the allocation of pubic funds for research depends, to a large 
extent, of what technical programs appear to be promising. Patent policy, as specific 
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to jurisprudence or economics as it seems, has also been wrought in important ways 
by the emergence of biotechnology, which in turn, has emerged along the paths 
permitted by the patent system. 
How can this mutuality of institutions and technology be managed? The 
theory of anticipatory governance proposes to create sites that are manageable by 
design, that are compatible with democratic values, and that are able to internalize 
that mutuality. The case of Bayh-Dole offers the possibility of studying how the 
mutuality between patent policy and biotechnology can be internalized within 
specific sites. Three are the core functions of anticipatory governance: foresight, 
engagement, and integration (Barben et al., 2008) and I would like to elaborate 
further on the function of integration from an institutional perspective. 
One of the aims of anticipatory governance, through integration, is to make 
individual decisions about innovation more socially robust. This implies minimally 
two things: that decision-making is more widely distributed among stakeholders (a 
goal shared with engagement), and that more considerations are involved in the 
decisions that those inherent to the decision (a goal shared with foresight). At an 
organizational level, this is achieved by promoting dialogue and interaction between 
innovation actors that do not have organizational incentives to interact. For instance, 
under a socio-technical integration project, humanists are embedded in laboratories 
to ignite well-structured discussions with biologists about the implications of their 
research beyond the merely technical (Fisher and Mahajan, 2006). In the same vein, 
organizational integration could take place by adding ethicists to the staff of 
congressional committees, including sociologists in agency advisory committees, 
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enlisting anthropologists in venture capital firms, or having natural scientists co-
author the next books on the politics of science or the bureaucracy of innovation. 
Anticipatory integration is more than bringing communities into dialogue. 
Integration is the creation of sites where the different logics that govern the 
innovation process can coexist and complement each other. In the example above, 
socio-technical integration in the laboratory combines curiosity and purposefulness. 
The “logics” of the innovation process are generally ascribed to the “tasks” 
of innovation, traditionally understood as research, development, commercialization, 
and more recently, reflexivity too.50 In despite of the history of iteration, interaction, 
and even simultaneity of these tasks, it remains common in some quarters—
particularly policy makers, administrators of research organizations, and scientists—
to insist that they are separated and that they operate under different logics. A 
stylistic representation of these logics would have research governed by curiosity and 
the prospects of priority of discovery, development structured by technical 
possibilities of application and scale, commercialization organized by the prospects 
of profit, and reflexivity guided by the critical understanding of the broader 
implications of innovation. That this division of labor has been refuted and falsified 
does not imply that it has not served, flawed as it is, to organize and coordinate 
resources in the innovation system. Hence, whenever a group involved in innovation 
                                                 
50 Here I take a narrow conception of reflexivity meaning simply the efforts to critically understand 
innovation as it takes place and from a historic perspective. At first, one may think that observing the 
object does not necessarily change the object. When the object is innovation, I argue that it does, 
perhaps as much as any other task. At a visible layer of analysis, innovation studies change the 
individual behavior of entrepreneurs, scientists, and policy-makers. A layer deeper, innovation studies 
change the terms of policy debate, shifting interest groups’ positions or reconfiguring these groups 
with respect to government policy, bureaucratic regulation, or even markets. Further, lessons from 
innovation studies percolate into society at large as “narratives of innovation” that weave new threads 
in the ideological tapestry and shape cultural conceptions of progress. 
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characterizes its work under this task-typology and the respective logic, the 
integration of logics can indeed be effected. 
Connecting the disjointed actors of innovation is an effective way to create 
integrative sites. Another way is to configure the institutions of innovation to 
promote, maintain, and regulate those sites. Institutional integration consists of 
configuring structures within which an innovation task (or various tasks) can no 
longer be performed as though a single logic would command it (see def. of “tasks” 
below). A good example is indeed Bayh-Dole. While university patenting was 
increasingly common in the 1970s, this statute sanctioned the ability of universities 
to take title to public patents and thus benefit financially from licensing these 
patents. This institution mixed the logics attending research and commercialization 
in the work of university scientists. Another example is the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) that allocated resources for reflexivity and thus 
created voices in the innovation community that insisted on discussing the broader 
societal implications of the emergence of nanotechnology. As a result, scientists, 
policy makers, agency regulators and businessmen must consider these new voices in 
their deliberations. 
Taking this dissertation as a point of departure, the notion of “institutional 
integration” in the context of anticipatory governance could be further developed to 
identify the blurring of boundaries between the traditional “tasks” and “logics” of 
innovation and introduce practices to foster socially robust innovation. 
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